NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0293n.06
No. 24-1380 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Jun 13, 2025 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
) In re: LYNN BETH BAUM, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED Debtor. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ________________________________________ ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ) MICHIGAN | UNITED STATES DAVID M. FINDLING; FINDLING LAW FIRM ) BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR PLC, ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF Creditors-Appellees, ) MICHIGAN ) v. ) OPINION ) TAMMY L. TERRY, Chapter 13 Standing ) Trustee, ) Trustee-Appellant. )
Before: MOORE, GRIFFIN, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. In this bankruptcy matter, the debtor Lynn Beth Baum voluntarily
dismissed her Chapter 13 petition. Then the bankruptcy court ordered Chapter 13 Trustee Tammy
L. Terry to distribute all the funds received. Creditors David M. Findling and the Findling Law
Firm PLC (“Findling”) appealed to the district court. The district court denied Terry’s motion to
dismiss but ordered Findling to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. The court
then vacated the show-cause order. Here, Terry seeks review of these orders under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(1). We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court’s orders
before us are not final. No. 24-1380, Findling v. Terry
I.
Lynn Beth Baum filed a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in February 2022.
Attorney David Findling and his firm represented Baum initially, but later were disqualified
because they were also creditors asserting a pre-petition attorney’s fee lien. In re Baum, 639 B.R.
721, 722–23 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022). During the next year, Baum proposed several bankruptcy
plans, and made or directed payments to the Trustee Tammy Terry that totaled $147,466. In re
Baum, 650 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2023).
In March 2023, however, Baum voluntarily dismissed her bankruptcy petition without a
confirmed plan. Terry then proposed to distribute the funds she had received, under which Terry
would retain 8% of what she had held on Baum’s behalf, as a trustee’s fee under 28 U.S.C.
§ 586(e)(2). Findling objected to Terry’s fee and Baum objected to other aspects of the proposed
distribution. In an opinion dated May 5, 2023, the bankruptcy court said it would order the Trustee
to pay all the funds to Baum—except for (1) “any and all administrative expenses allowed under
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)” and (2) “the Trustee’s percentage fee under 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2).” In re
Baum, 650 B.R. at 858. The accompanying order said the distribution was “without prejudice to
any attorney lien that Findling may claim in any of the funds to be paid to the Debtor by the Trustee
under this Order.” Terry did as ordered—retaining a trustee’s percentage fee of $11,974.65, paying
Baum’s bankruptcy attorney $31,468.30, and returning $104,069.27 to Baum.
Findling filed a timely notice of appeal to the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).
The notice incorrectly identified (and attached) the bankruptcy court’s opinion, rather than its
order. On June 13, the district court received the designated record and issued a scheduling order.
The order required, as relevant here, that Findling file a brief by July 13. But Findling never did.
-2- No. 24-1380, Findling v. Terry
On July 20, Terry moved to dismiss Findling’s appeal based primarily on defects in the
notice of appeal. The district court denied Terry’s motion to dismiss. In that order, the district
court rejected most of Terry’s arguments but ordered Findling to show cause why the appeal should
not be dismissed for having failed to file the required brief or otherwise to prosecute the case.
Findling’s response pled confusion caused by an earlier bankruptcy court order (not appealed
here). The district court vacated the show-cause order without explanation. Terry then appealed
both orders.
II.
The parties say we have jurisdiction in this appeal, but we must independently satisfy
ourselves that we do. See NOCO Co. v. OJ Com., LLC, 35 F.4th 475, 480 (6th Cir. 2022).
Although a single-judge order initially said we did, we are not bound by that order. See Fed. R.
App. P. 27(c); United States v. Kechego, 91 F.4th 845, 853 (6th Cir. 2024); see also In re Troutman
Enters., Inc., 286 F.3d 359, 364 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e are under a continuing obligation to verify
our jurisdiction over a particular case.”).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), a court of appeals may hear “appeals from all final decisions,
judgments, orders, and decrees” of a district court (or bankruptcy appellate panel) reviewing a
bankruptcy court’s decision. The determination whether the district court’s order is final “largely
mirror[s] our understanding of finality under [28 U.S.C. §] 1291.” In re Lindsey, 726 F.3d 857,
859 (6th Cir. 2013). That means “a decision by the district court on appeal remanding the
bankruptcy court’s decision for further proceedings in the bankruptcy court is not final, and so is
not appealable to this court, unless the further proceedings contemplated are of a purely ministerial
character.” Settembre v. Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 552 F.3d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted).
-3- No. 24-1380, Findling v. Terry
When a district court dismisses an appeal, we have jurisdiction under § 158(d)(1) to review
whether that determination was correct. In re Cyberco Holdings, Inc., 734 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir.
2013) (explaining the BAP’s dismissal of the appeal “fully resolved the appellate proceedings by
deciding the jurisdictional question and left nothing for the bankruptcy court to do”). But here the
district court neither affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order nor dismissed the appeal. The orders
before us now, rather, are quintessentially interlocutory.
Terry contends that the district court’s orders are final because she says her motion to
dismiss was a “proceeding” that involved “a discrete dispute” with “specific procedural steps.” In
re Cal. Palms Addiction Recovery Campus, Inc. (California Palms), 87 F.4th 734, 739 (6th Cir.
2023). Terry confuses the standard for determining whether a bankruptcy court order is final and
therefore appealable by right to the district court (§ 158(a)(1)) with the standard for determining
whether a district court’s decision in a bankruptcy appeal is appealable to this court (§ 158(d)(1)).
See In re Wohleber, 833 F. App’x 634, 638 (6th Cir.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0293n.06
No. 24-1380 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Jun 13, 2025 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
) In re: LYNN BETH BAUM, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED Debtor. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ________________________________________ ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ) MICHIGAN | UNITED STATES DAVID M. FINDLING; FINDLING LAW FIRM ) BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR PLC, ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF Creditors-Appellees, ) MICHIGAN ) v. ) OPINION ) TAMMY L. TERRY, Chapter 13 Standing ) Trustee, ) Trustee-Appellant. )
Before: MOORE, GRIFFIN, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. In this bankruptcy matter, the debtor Lynn Beth Baum voluntarily
dismissed her Chapter 13 petition. Then the bankruptcy court ordered Chapter 13 Trustee Tammy
L. Terry to distribute all the funds received. Creditors David M. Findling and the Findling Law
Firm PLC (“Findling”) appealed to the district court. The district court denied Terry’s motion to
dismiss but ordered Findling to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. The court
then vacated the show-cause order. Here, Terry seeks review of these orders under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(1). We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court’s orders
before us are not final. No. 24-1380, Findling v. Terry
I.
Lynn Beth Baum filed a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in February 2022.
Attorney David Findling and his firm represented Baum initially, but later were disqualified
because they were also creditors asserting a pre-petition attorney’s fee lien. In re Baum, 639 B.R.
721, 722–23 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022). During the next year, Baum proposed several bankruptcy
plans, and made or directed payments to the Trustee Tammy Terry that totaled $147,466. In re
Baum, 650 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2023).
In March 2023, however, Baum voluntarily dismissed her bankruptcy petition without a
confirmed plan. Terry then proposed to distribute the funds she had received, under which Terry
would retain 8% of what she had held on Baum’s behalf, as a trustee’s fee under 28 U.S.C.
§ 586(e)(2). Findling objected to Terry’s fee and Baum objected to other aspects of the proposed
distribution. In an opinion dated May 5, 2023, the bankruptcy court said it would order the Trustee
to pay all the funds to Baum—except for (1) “any and all administrative expenses allowed under
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)” and (2) “the Trustee’s percentage fee under 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2).” In re
Baum, 650 B.R. at 858. The accompanying order said the distribution was “without prejudice to
any attorney lien that Findling may claim in any of the funds to be paid to the Debtor by the Trustee
under this Order.” Terry did as ordered—retaining a trustee’s percentage fee of $11,974.65, paying
Baum’s bankruptcy attorney $31,468.30, and returning $104,069.27 to Baum.
Findling filed a timely notice of appeal to the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).
The notice incorrectly identified (and attached) the bankruptcy court’s opinion, rather than its
order. On June 13, the district court received the designated record and issued a scheduling order.
The order required, as relevant here, that Findling file a brief by July 13. But Findling never did.
-2- No. 24-1380, Findling v. Terry
On July 20, Terry moved to dismiss Findling’s appeal based primarily on defects in the
notice of appeal. The district court denied Terry’s motion to dismiss. In that order, the district
court rejected most of Terry’s arguments but ordered Findling to show cause why the appeal should
not be dismissed for having failed to file the required brief or otherwise to prosecute the case.
Findling’s response pled confusion caused by an earlier bankruptcy court order (not appealed
here). The district court vacated the show-cause order without explanation. Terry then appealed
both orders.
II.
The parties say we have jurisdiction in this appeal, but we must independently satisfy
ourselves that we do. See NOCO Co. v. OJ Com., LLC, 35 F.4th 475, 480 (6th Cir. 2022).
Although a single-judge order initially said we did, we are not bound by that order. See Fed. R.
App. P. 27(c); United States v. Kechego, 91 F.4th 845, 853 (6th Cir. 2024); see also In re Troutman
Enters., Inc., 286 F.3d 359, 364 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e are under a continuing obligation to verify
our jurisdiction over a particular case.”).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), a court of appeals may hear “appeals from all final decisions,
judgments, orders, and decrees” of a district court (or bankruptcy appellate panel) reviewing a
bankruptcy court’s decision. The determination whether the district court’s order is final “largely
mirror[s] our understanding of finality under [28 U.S.C. §] 1291.” In re Lindsey, 726 F.3d 857,
859 (6th Cir. 2013). That means “a decision by the district court on appeal remanding the
bankruptcy court’s decision for further proceedings in the bankruptcy court is not final, and so is
not appealable to this court, unless the further proceedings contemplated are of a purely ministerial
character.” Settembre v. Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 552 F.3d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted).
-3- No. 24-1380, Findling v. Terry
When a district court dismisses an appeal, we have jurisdiction under § 158(d)(1) to review
whether that determination was correct. In re Cyberco Holdings, Inc., 734 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir.
2013) (explaining the BAP’s dismissal of the appeal “fully resolved the appellate proceedings by
deciding the jurisdictional question and left nothing for the bankruptcy court to do”). But here the
district court neither affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order nor dismissed the appeal. The orders
before us now, rather, are quintessentially interlocutory.
Terry contends that the district court’s orders are final because she says her motion to
dismiss was a “proceeding” that involved “a discrete dispute” with “specific procedural steps.” In
re Cal. Palms Addiction Recovery Campus, Inc. (California Palms), 87 F.4th 734, 739 (6th Cir.
2023). Terry confuses the standard for determining whether a bankruptcy court order is final and
therefore appealable by right to the district court (§ 158(a)(1)) with the standard for determining
whether a district court’s decision in a bankruptcy appeal is appealable to this court (§ 158(d)(1)).
See In re Wohleber, 833 F. App’x 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2020); In re Cyberco Holdings, 734 F.3d at
437, 440–41 (recognizing the separate requirements of (1) jurisdiction to appeal a bankruptcy
court’s decision to the district court and (2) jurisdiction to appeal the district court’s decision to
the court of appeals). Under § 158(a)(1), which looks to a final order in a bankruptcy proceeding,
orders “qualify as ‘final’ when they definitively dispose of discrete disputes within the overarching
bankruptcy case.” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 37 (2020); see also
Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 505 (2015). By contrast, § 158(d)(1)’s jurisdiction
focuses on whether the district court finally disposed of an appeal from the bankruptcy court, or
whether further proceedings will occur on a district court’s remand. See Settembre, 552 F.3d at
441. For example, in California Palms, we reviewed the bankruptcy court’s order converting the
proceedings from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 after the district court ruled on the appeal. 87 F.4th at
-4- No. 24-1380, Findling v. Terry
739. As to that conversion, the district court’s order was final because it affirmed the bankruptcy
court’s decision. See id. Here, however, the district court’s orders did not finally dispose of
Findling’s appeal of the bankruptcy court’s decision.
Terry otherwise argues that we can review the district court’s orders under the “collateral
order doctrine.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). But that
doctrine permits appeals from a “small class” of decisions that “finally determine claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action.” Id. Here, the district court’s orders
do not finally determine any discrete rights in the bankruptcy case. Nor are the district court’s
rulings effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final decision. Hence the doctrine does not
apply.
* * *
We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
-5-