David Ferrer Arroyo v. Albertsons Companies, Inc. et al.

Opinion

O 1

2 3 4 5 6 7

8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

11 DAVID FERRER ARROYO, Case № 2:24-cv-08935-ODW (Ex)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS [49] 14 ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC. et al., 15

Defendants. 16

17 19 Plaintiff David Ferrer Arroyo brings this putative class action against Defendant 20 Albertsons Companies, Inc. for allegedly selling gift cards containing no monetary 21 value. (Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), Dkt. No. 46.) Albertsons moves to dismiss this 22 action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule” or “Rules”) 12(b)(6). 23 (Mot. Dismiss (“Mot.”), Dkt. No. 49). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS 24 the Motion.1 25 26 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND2 2 The Court incorporates the factual background in the Court’s August 19, 2025 3 order granting Albertsons’ motion to dismiss Ferrer’s First Amended Complaint. 4 (Order Granting Mot. Dismiss (“MTD Order”) 2–3, Dkt. No. 45.) The principal 5 material difference between Ferrer’s First Amended Complaint and his Second 6 Amended Complaint is his allegation that Albertsons failed to warn Ferrer that the full 7 monetary value he added to the gift cards might not be available on the gift cards after 8 purchase. (Compare FAC ¶¶ 10, 13, 16, 18, 25, 38, Dkt. No. 26, with SAC ¶¶ 10, 13, 9 16, 18, 25, 38.) 10 Ferrer initiated this putative class action on behalf of himself and all other 11 similarly situated consumers “who purchased a gift card from an Albertsons owned 12 store, for a specified monetary amount, and who were not able to access the total 13 monetary amount of gift card value purchased, because the total monetary amount was 14 not available on the gift card after purchase.” (SAC ¶ 27(1).) Ferrer asserts one cause 15 of action for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”). (SAC ¶¶ 36– 16 41.) Albertsons now moves to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim. (Mot.) 18 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 19 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 20 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To 21 survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading 22 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. 23 Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual allegations in the complaint 24 “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. 25 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Stated differently, the complaint must “contain 26 27 2 All factual references derive from Ferrer’s Second Amended Complaint or attached exhibits, unless 28 otherwise noted, and well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of this Motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 1 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 2 its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 3 Determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief is a “context-specific 4 task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 5 sense.” Id. at 679. Generally, a court limits its review to the pleadings and must 6 construe all factual allegations in the complaint “as true and . . . in the light most 7 favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 8 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, “unwarranted 9 deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 10 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 11 When a plaintiff’s claims are fraud-based, Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading 12 requirements apply. Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 13 1989). Rule 9(b) provides: “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with 14 particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” “A pleading satisfies 15 Rule 9(b) if it identifies ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct 16 charged.” MetroPCS v. SD Phone Trader, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1150 (S.D. Cal. 17 2016) (quoting Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)). 18 The plaintiff must “set forth more than the neutral facts necessary to identify the 19 transaction [and] must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why 20 it is false.” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106 (emphasis omitted). 21 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide 22 leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. 23 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 24 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court determines that 25 the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly 26 cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 27 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, leave to amend “is properly denied . . . if 28 1 amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City & County of San Francisco, 2 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). 4 Albertsons moves to dismiss the single CLRA cause of action, primarily 5 arguing that Ferrer again fails to plead an actionable misrepresentation or omission. 6 (Mot. 10–15.) 7 The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive 8 acts or practices.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a). Specifically, the CLRA makes illegal 9 acts or practices that are “undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result 10 or that results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.” Id. Conduct 11 that is “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer” violates the CLRA. Colgan v. 12 Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 663, 680 (2006). Where, as here, 13 Ferrer’s CLRA claims are based on a fraudulent omission or misrepresentation, he 14 “must plead (1) misrepresentation or omission, (2) reliance, and (3) damages, all with 15 the particularity required by Rule 9(b).” Boyd v. SunButter, LLC, 762 F. Supp. 3d 16 931, 941 (C.D. Cal. 2025); see also Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 17 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standards apply to claims for 18 violations of the CLRA.”). 19 A. Misrepresentation 20 Ferrer still fails to plead an actionable misrepresentation. To sufficiently plead 21 a fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must identify “how” the misrepresentation 22 is misleading. See, e.g., Oh v. Catalina Snacks, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 3d 903, 913 23 (C.D. Cal. 2025). As in his First Amended Complaint, Ferrer only pleads one 24 statement: that the Vanilla-branded gift card packaging stated gift cards “could be 25 purchased in any amount between ‘$20–$500’ with a ‘5.95 Purchase Charge.’” (SAC 26 ¶ 10.) The Court previously explained that this statement is not misleading with any 27 explanation from Ferrer as to “how this statement is misleading—for instance, that 28 consumers could not purchase the gift cards for the amounts indicated.” (MTD 1 Order 6–7.) Despite this explanation, Ferrer adds only that Albertsons failed to warn 2 him “that the full monetary value he paid to Albertsons might not be available to him 3 on the gift cards after purchase” and “to check the balance before leaving the store.” 4 (SAC ¶ 16.) This allegation does change the Court’s previous analysis. Even if 5 Albertsons knew the gift cards might lose value after purchase, that does not alter the 6 fact that the gift cards “could be purchased in any amount between $20–$500” at the 7 time of purchase. (Id. ¶ 10.) 8 B. Omission 9 Ferrer also still fails to plead an actionable omission. To plead an actionable 10 omission under the CLRA, “the omission must be contrary to a representation actually 11 made by the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged to 12 disclose.” Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis 13 omitted) (quoting Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 836 14 (2006)). 15 Ferrer again fails to show that the alleged omissions are contrary to a 16 representation made by Albertsons. As discussed above, the only statement that Ferrer 17 alleges is that Albertsons’s gift cards can be purchased “in any amount between ‘$20– 18 $500’ with a ‘5.95 purchase charge.’” (SAC ¶ 10.) However, Ferrer still fails to 19 demonstrate how omission the omission of a disclosure regarding fraud or potentially 20 valueless gift cards contradicts the statement that the gift cards can be purchased for 21 certain amounts. (See MTD Order 8.) Ferrer does not cure this defect by simply 22 adding the allegation that Albertsons failed to warn Ferrer that he may later lose the 23 value. (See SAC ¶ 16.) 24 Ferrer also again fails to allege a duty to disclose. (See generally SAC.) Under 25 California law, an obligation to disclose may arise in the following four 26 circumstances: (1) “when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the 27 plaintiff”; (2) “when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not 28 known to the plaintiff”; (3) “when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from 1 the plaintiff”; and (4) “when the defendant makes partial representations but also 2 suppresses some material facts.” Kulp v. Munchkin, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1169 3 (C.D. Cal. 2023). “[F]or non-disclosed information to be material, a plaintiff must 4 show that, ‘had the omitted information been disclosed, one would have been aware of 5 it and behaved differently.’” Falk v. Gen. Motors Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 6 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting Mirkin v. Wasserman, 5 Cal. 4th 1082, 1093 (1993)). 7 First, Ferrer does not plead a fiduciary relationship. (See generally SAC.) 8 Second, Ferrer also fails to add anything to plausibly suggest Albertsons had 9 exclusive knowledge of material undisclosed facts. Instead, Ferrer adds even more 10 news articles including discussion about third parties draining gift cards after 11 purchase. (See, e.g., SAC ¶ 13 n.2.) For obvious reasons, widespread reporting of the 12 potential that gift cards may lose value after purchase refutes any inference that 13 Albertsons was in exclusive knowledge of that same fact. 14 Third, Ferrer fails to add any factual allegations to plausibly suggest active 15 concealment. Instead, Ferrer adds only that Albertsons “actively concealed” that 16 Ferrer may not have the full monetary value of his gift cards after purchase. (SAC 17 ¶ 38.) Such a conclusory allegation, standing alone, represents a “formulaic recitation 18 of the elements of a cause of action” and does not “raise a right to relief above the 19 speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 20 Finally, Ferrer fails to add anything to plausibly explain how disclosure of a gift 21 card’s potential loss of value would have caused a reasonable consumer to behave 22 differently, such that the omission was material. Instead, Ferrer adds only that 23 Albertsons failed to warn him “that the full monetary value he paid to Albertsons 24 might not be available to him on the gift cards after purchase” and “to check the 25 balance before leaving the store.” (SAC ¶ 16.) But nothing in the Second Amended 26 Complaint suggests that third parties drained Ferrer’s or any other consumer’s gift 27 cards prior to them leaving the store. Thus, even if Albertsons did add Ferrer’s 28 1 || requested disclosure, it is implausible that such a disclosure would alter a consumer’s 2 || behavior. 3 Based on the foregoing, Ferrer still does not meet the threshold requirement of 4 || pleading a misrepresentation or omission. Thus, the Court need not reach Albertsons’ 5 || additional arguments for dismissal. Furthermore, despite ample opportunity to state a 6 || valid claim, Ferrer again fails to do so. In its previous Order, the Court identified the 7 || pleading deficiencies and explained how to cure them. (See generally MTD Order.) 8 | As Ferrer’s Second Amended Complaint adds little yet suffers the same pleading 9 || defects as the previous pleading, the Court finds that further amendment would be 10 || futile. See, e.g., El Dorado Cmty. Serv. Ctr. v. County of Los Angeles, No. 2:15-cv- 11 || 07998-JEFW (MRWx), 2017 WL 6017297, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2017). Accordingly, 12 || the Court declines to grant leave to amend. 13 Vv. CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Albertsons’s Motion to 15 || Dismiss, (Dkt. No. 49), and DISMISSES the Second Amended Complaint WITH 16|| PREJUDICE and WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The Court will issue 17 || judgment consistent with this Order. 18 20 21 March 12, 2026 N .

4 OTIS D. IGHT, II 05 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

26 27 28