David E. Killian v. State of Indiana

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 3, 2020
Docket19A-CR-2628
StatusPublished

This text of David E. Killian v. State of Indiana (David E. Killian v. State of Indiana) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
David E. Killian v. State of Indiana, (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

FILED Jun 03 2020, 9:28 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Travis Neff Myriam Serrano Warsaw, Indiana Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

David E. Killian, June 3, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-2628 v. Appeal from the Kosciusko Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff David C. Cates, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 43D01-1807-F4-672

Vaidik, Judge.

Case Summary [1] Under Indiana Rule of Evidence 412(b)(1)(A), the court in a criminal case

involving alleged sexual misconduct may admit “evidence of specific instances

of a victim’s or witness’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that someone other

than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2628 | June 3, 2020 Page 1 of 6 evidence.” Here, David E. Killian Sr. was charged with sexually abusing his

teenaged granddaughter, and the State presented evidence that he had

impregnated her in 2017. Killian wanted to present evidence that his son—his

granddaughter’s father—was convicted of sexual misconduct with a minor in

1994, arguing that the conviction for a similar crime establishes that his son

could have been the “source” of the pregnancy. But Rule 412(b)(1)(A) does not

allow for this speculation. It allows only evidence of sexual behavior that—

itself—could have been the source of some physical evidence. Because the son’s

sexual misconduct with a minor over twenty years ago obviously could not

have been the source of the pregnancy, the trial court properly excluded the

evidence. We therefore affirm Killian’s convictions.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Killian is the grandfather of K.M. and the father of K.M.’s father, David Killian

Jr. (“Father”). In August 2017, when K.M. was fourteen years old, she told

Father that Killian had been sexually abusing her. According to K.M., the

abuse occurred numerous times over four to five months and included sexual

intercourse, oral sex, and fondling. Father reported K.M.’s allegations to police,

and they opened an investigation. During the investigation, K.M. discovered

she was pregnant. In January 2018, K.M. gave birth to a daughter, S.M. After

S.M. was born, DNA samples from S.M., K.M., and Killian were tested, and

the results showed that Killian’s “probability of paternity is 99.9999 percent.”

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2628 | June 3, 2020 Page 2 of 6 Tr. p. 95. The State then charged Killian with three counts of sexual

misconduct with a minor, one as a Level 4 felony and two as a Level 5 felony.

[3] Shortly before trial, Killian moved to admit evidence under Evidence Rule 412.

The court held a hearing on the motion on the first day of trial. Killian said he

wanted to introduce evidence that Father was convicted of sexual misconduct

with a minor in 1994. He explained that evidence that a person who is

“genetically similar” to him has a prior conviction for “exactly what’s been

charged here . . . goes to the defense’s theory of the case that someone other

than the Defendant could be the source of the semen which caused the

pregnancy which caused the DNA test.” Id. at 10-11. The State objected, and

the court denied Killian’s motion. The jury found Killian guilty as charged, and

the court sentenced him to seventeen years in the Department of Correction.

[4] Killian now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [5] Killian contends that the trial court should have allowed him to introduce

evidence of Father’s 1994 conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor under

Evidence Rule 412. The admission of evidence is a matter of discretion for the

trial court, so we review such decisions only for an abuse of discretion. Beasley v.

State, 46 N.E.3d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 2016).

[6] Evidence Rule 412, which was amended in 2014 to correspond to the federal

rule, provides, in relevant part:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2628 | June 3, 2020 Page 3 of 6 (a) Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct:

(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim or witness engaged in other sexual behavior; or

(2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s or witness’s sexual predisposition.

(b) Exceptions.

(1) Criminal Cases. The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case:

(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s or witness’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence;

(B) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s or witness’s sexual behavior with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or if offered by the prosecutor; and

(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.1

1 Federal Rule of Evidence 412 includes very similar language:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2628 | June 3, 2020 Page 4 of 6 Killian argues that Father’s conviction was admissible under subsection

(b)(1)(A), which allows “evidence of specific instances of a victim’s or witness’s

sexual behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was

the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence.” Specifically, he asserts

that the conviction is evidence of a “specific instance” of sexual behavior by

Father and that it “provides that someone other than David Killian Sr. was the

source of the semen that impregnated K.M.” Appellant’s Br. p. 16. We

disagree.

[7] The problem with Killian’s argument is that Rule 412(b)(1)(A) only allows

evidence of other sexual behavior that—itself—could have “produced” some

physical evidence that is presented in the case. Pribie v. State, 46 N.E.3d 1241,

1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; see also United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d

1469, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that evidence of sexual contact in

August 1988 was not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 412 because

(a) Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct: (1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition. (b) Exceptions. (1) Criminal Cases. The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case: (A) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence; (B) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or if offered by the prosecutor; and (C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.

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Related

United States v. Anthony Damian Azure
845 F.2d 1503 (Eighth Circuit, 1988)
United States v. Manuel Jesus Torres
937 F.2d 1469 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)
Jordan Pribie v. State of Indiana
46 N.E.3d 1241 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2015)
Leandrew Beasley v. State of Indiana
46 N.E.3d 1232 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2016)

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