David Douglas Speidel v. Dillon Packard, Terrence Clifford, Joshua Scholten, Delmas Farrell, Tyler Hatcher, Becky Welch, Chief Dave Floyd, and The City of Anacortes

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 2, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00667
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 10 DAVID DOUGLAS SPEIDEL, Case No. 2:25-cv-00667-RAJ 11 Plaintiff, ORDER 12 v. 13 DILLON PACKARD, TERRENCE 14 CLIFFORD, JOSHUA SCHOLTEN, DELMAS FARRELL, TYLER 15 HATCHER, BECKY WELCH, CHIEF DAVE FLOYD, and THE 16 CITY OF ANACORTES,

17 Defendants. 18

19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendants’ second motion to 22 dismiss, Dkt. # 42. No response to the motion was filed. The Court has reviewed the 23 motion and the balance of the record. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 24 GRANTS the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 25 26 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 The Court has set out the facts of this case in detail in its October 21, 2025 Order, 3 Dkt. # 40, and will only recount the facts pertinent to this Order. Briefly, in his original 4 complaint, pro se Plaintiff David Speidel alleged a vast conspiracy that began when 5 Anacortes police officers observed him commit a traffic infraction involving a 6 motorcycle, and subsequently attempted to speak to him despite him entering a nearby 7 apartment and refusing to engage with the officers. See Dkt. # 1. In the October 21, 2025 8 Order, the Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss and granted Mr. Speidel leave 9 to amend solely limited to the §§ 1983 and 1985 claims arising from an alleged 10 unreasonable search against Sergeant Terrance Clifford and Officers Dillon Packard, 11 Joshua Scholten, Delmas Farrell, Tyler Hatcher, and Chad Pleadwell. Dkt. # 40 at 15– 12 16. 13 On October 25, 2025, Mr. Speidel filed a Second Amended Complaint for 14 Violation of Civil Rights (“Amended Complaint”). Dkt. # 41. Mr. Speidel named 15 Sergeant Clifford and Officers Packard, Scholten, Farrell, and Hatcher, as well as Ms. 16 Rebecca Walsh, City of Anacortes Chief of Police Dave Floyd, and the City of Anacortes 17 as defendants. Id. In the Amended Complaint, Mr. Speidel alleges (1) a § 1983 claim 18 arising from an unreasonable search and seizure against Sergeant Clifford and Officer 19 Packard; (2) a § 1983 claim of retaliation against Sergeant Clifford and Officer Packard; 20 (3) a § 1983 claim arising from Due Process violations against Ms. Walsh; (4) a § 1985 21 claim of conspiring to conceal record tampering against Sergeant Clifford, Officer 22 Packard, Ms. Walsh, and Chief Floyd; and (5) a Monell claim against the City of 23 Anacortes. Id. 24 Mr. Speidel alleges that when he was an overnight guest at Alyssa Klaister’s 25 apartment, Sergeant Clifford and Officer Packard “entered the curtilage of the home, 26 1 demanded Plaintiff exit, and threatened arrest when he declined.” Id. at 1–2. Mr. Speidel 2 alleges that after he elected to remain inside, Sergeant Clifford and Officer Packard 3 seized his motorcycle and issued citations based on their observations through a window. 4 Id. at 2. Mr. Speidel also alleges that the probable cause affidavit in this case was altered 5 and that the court administrator, Ms. Walsh, republished and concealed court audio, 6 “suppressing exculpatory speech and obstructing Plaintiff’s defense.” Id. Mr. Speidel 7 also asserts new allegations, not included in his prior complaints, that after his public 8 criticism of official misconduct, Sergeant Clifford and Officer Packard caused his arrest 9 using excessive force, and he was placed in solitary confinement. Id. Mr. Speidel further 10 alleges that Chief Floyd ratified the officers’ conduct by concluding that “no policy 11 violations occurred and by failing to investigate documented tampering and retaliation.” 12 Id. Finally, Mr. Speidel alleges that the City of Anacortes “maintained customs and 13 practices of selective prosecution, record concealment, and retaliatory arrest against 14 citizens engaged in protected speech.” Id. 15 On November 14, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 16 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Mr. Speidel’s Amended Complaint. Dkt. # 42. 17 Mr. Speidel has not filed a response. 18 III. LEGAL STANDARD 19 Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint may be 20 dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must point to factual allegations in 22 the complaint that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 23 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In analyzing a motion to dismiss, courts “accept all 24 factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 25 favorable to the nonmoving party.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 26 1 2005). “Conclusory allegations and unreasonable inferences, however, are insufficient 2 to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 Similarly, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights 4 violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of 5 Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 6 IV. DISCUSSION 7 A. Mr. Speidel’s Failure to File a Response 8 Under this district’s Local Civil Rules, a “response shall be filed and received by 9 the moving party no later than 21 days after the filing date of the motion.” Local Civil 10 Rules, W.D. Wash. LCR 7(d)(4). “[I]f a party fails to file papers in opposition to a 11 motion, such failure may be considered by the court as an admission that the motion has 12 merit.” Local Civil Rules, W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(2). Mr. Speidel has not filed a 13 response. Accordingly, the Court considers Defendants’ motion to have merit and grants 14 Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) 15 (holding that a pro se litigant’s failure to follow a court’s local rules and file a timely 16 opposition to a motion to dismiss is proper grounds for dismissal). Nevertheless, for the 17 sake of completeness, the Court will address Mr. Speidel’s claims below. 18 B. Unreasonable Search 19 Mr. Speidel alleges a § 1983 claim (count 1) arising from an alleged unreasonable 20 search and seizure. Dkt. # 41 at 2. However, the Court dismissed with prejudice Mr. 21 Speidel’s claim for unreasonable seizure and granted leave to amend as to his 22 unreasonable search claim only. Dkt. # 40 at 15–16. Accordingly, the Court will 23 consider Mr. Speidel’s claim arising from an alleged unreasonable search only.1

1 The Court previously dismissed Mr. Speidel’s unreasonable seizure claim with prejudice because it was clear from 25 the allegations that Mr. Speidel was never seized. Id. at 8. The Amended Complaint arguably suggests Mr. Speidel’s unreasonable seizure claim is actually based on the seizure of his motorcycle rather than any seizure of 26 1 1. Sergeant Clifford and Officer Packard 2 a. Overnight Guest Status 3 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 4 “A government agent conducts a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 5 when the agent infringes ‘an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider 6 reasonable’ or ‘physically occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining 7 information.’” United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 8 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) and United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 9 400, 404 (2012)) (alteration in original). At the very core of the Fourth Amendment 10 “stands the right of a [person] to retreat into his own home and there be free from 11 unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Id. at 1157 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 12 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). This protection extends to the curtilage of the home, which 13 is the “area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home.’” Id. at 1158 14 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). In addition, a person “may 15 have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than her own house so as to extend 16 Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures in that place.” 17 United States v. Barajas-Avalos, 377 F.3d 1040, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United 18 States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1986)). For example, one’s “status as 19 an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the 20 home . . . .” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97 (1990). 21 While Mr. Speidel alleges that he was “an overnight guest” and cites Olson, Dkt. 22 # 41 at 1, this allegation alone is not sufficient because it is conclusory. That is, Mr. 23 Speidel does not allege facts to support that he was an overnight guest at another’s home. 24

25 his person. See Dkt. # 41 at 2. However, the Court will not invent arguments for Mr. Speidel and will not address this theory without briefing from him. 26 1 See United States v. Armenta, 69 F.3d 304, 308 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant’s 2 “bald assertion that he was an overnight guest (and [another’s] statement to that effect) 3 is not sufficient to establish that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house”). 4 Even if the Court were to accept the allegation, Olson does not support Mr. Speidel’s 5 position because Olson was about whether “a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a 6 house where” one was arrested violated the Fourth Amendment. Olson, 495 U.S. at 93 7 (emphasis added). The officers did not enter the apartment, and Mr. Speidel was not 8 arrested. Therefore, Olson does not support Mr. Speidel’s claim. 9 b. Curtilage of the Home 10 Similarly, while Mr. Speidel alleges that the officers “entered the curtilage of the 11 home” and cites Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), Dkt. # 41 at 2, this allegation 12 alone is insufficient because it is conclusory. Mr. Speidel does not allege where the 13 officers were physically located to support his allegation of entry onto the curtilage of 14 the home. See generally Dkt. # 41. Mr. Speidel’s reliance on Jardines is misplaced. 15 While Jardines stands for the proposition that the curtilage of the home is subject to 16 Fourth Amendment protections, here, Mr. Speidel’s claim fails because he does not allege 17 non-conclusory facts to suggest the officers in fact intruded on the curtilage of the 18 apartment he entered. 19 c. Observation through a Window 20 Mr. Speidel alleges that the officers “issued citations based only on alleged visual 21 observation through a window.” Dkt. # 41 at 2. This allegation alone is insufficient to 22 support an unreasonable search claim because it is conclusory. However, even if the 23 Court were to accept it as sufficiently factual, it is still insufficient to give rise to an 24 unreasonable search claim. “An observation of the interior of a protected structure 25 through a window, even when enhanced by a flashlight, does not constitute a search when 26 1 the observation is made from an open field or public place.” Barajas-Avalos, 377 F.3d 2 at 1056. Thus, relying on Barajas-Avalos, the court in Delong v. City of Port Orchard, 3 No. 06-cv-5115, 2006 WL 2290742 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2006), found an officer did not 4 violate the Fourth Amendment by using “a flashlight to look inside the window near the 5 front door from a place accessible by the public.” Delong, 2006 WL 2290742, at *8. On 6 the other hand, in United States v. Fuentes, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Or. July 8, 2011), 7 the court found it was unreasonable to “enter the curtilage of [defendant’s] home, stand 8 within inches of a window that is not associated with any point of entry, and peer into the 9 home without any particularized basis for believing exigent circumstances existed.” 10 Fuentes, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 1154. 11 Here, Mr. Speidel’s only allegation is that officers “issued citations based only on 12 alleged visual observation through a window.” Dkt. # 41 at 2. Mr. Speidel does not 13 allege where, how, or why the observations through the window constituted a violation. 14 Moreover, Mr. Speidel attaches to his Amended Complaint certain police incident 15 reports. The reports reflect that the officers “looked through a window on the east side 16 of the apartment walkway.” Dkt. # 41-1 at 17. In other words, the observations through 17 the window were made from “a place accessible by the public.” Delong, 2006 WL 18 2290742, at *8; Barajas-Avalos, 377 F.3d at 1056. Therefore, nothing in the Amended 19 Complaint or the attached reports supports the inference of an unreasonable search. 20 2. Officers Scholten, Farrell, and Hatcher 21 Mr. Speidel named Officers Scholten, Farrell, and Hatcher as defendants in the 22 Amended Complaint. Dkt. # 41. Mr. Speidel only states in the “Parties” section that 23 they “were at all times officers of the Anacortes Police Department acting under color of 24 state law.” Id. at 1. Mr. Speidel never mentions them in the “Statement of Facts” section, 25 nor does Mr. Speidel assert any causes of action against them in the “Causes of Action” 26 1 section. Id. at 1–3. Therefore, Mr. Speidel fails to allege any claims upon which relief 2 can be granted against these officers. Accordingly, Officers Scholten, Farrell, and 3 Hatcher are dismissed from this action. 4 C. Mr. Speidel’s Remaining Causes of Action 5 Mr. Speidel asserts a claim (count 2) for “First Amendment Retaliation” based on 6 new allegations of a retaliatory arrest that took place on October 6, 2025. Dkt. # 41 at 2. 7 A district court has the ability to deny or strike claims in an amended complaint if the 8 claims fall outside the limit imposed by the district court’s order granting leave to amend. 9 See Temple of 1001 Buddhas v. City of Fremont, No. 22-15863, 2023 WL 4399243, at 10 *1 (9th Cir. July 7, 2023) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 11 barring the plaintiff from adding new due process claims after the district court had 12 dismissed the complaint “with leave to amend only certain claims”); Ferris v. Santa 13 Clara County, 891 F.2d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding district court did not abuse 14 discretion in striking second amended complaint that added an entirely new claim). The 15 Court strikes this new claim because it is based on new allegations not asserted in the 16 prior complaints and is outside the scope of the Court’s order granting leave to amend. 17 Mr. Speidel also asserts the following causes of action based on conduct alleged 18 in his prior complaints: (1) “Due Process and Access to Courts (§ 1983)” against Ms. 19 Welch; (2) “Civil Conspiracy (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3))” against Sergeant Clifford, Officer 20 Packard, Ms. Welch, and Chief Floyd; and (3) “Municipal Liability (Monell)” against the 21 City of Anacortes. Dkt. # 41 at 2–3. These claims fail because the Court granted limited 22 leave to amend only as to Mr. Speidel’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims arising from an 23 unreasonable search. Dkt. # 40 at 15–16. Indeed, the Court previously dismissed claims 24 against Ms. Welsh with prejudice based on quasi-judicial immunity. Id. at 11–12, 16. 25 And while the Court permitted leave to amend the § 1985 and official capacity claims 26 1 arising from the alleged unreasonable search, these claims as pled in the Amended 2 Complaint relate to “record tampering,” retaliation, and other issues unrelated to the 3 alleged unreasonable search. Dkt. # 41 at 3. Even if the Court were to consider the 4 claims, there are no plausible allegations in the Amended Complaint that Ms. Welsh 5 “altered and withheld court records,” that the named officer defendants “conspired to 6 conceal record tampering and retaliate against Plaintiff,” or that the City of Anacortes 7 maintained “policies and customs encouraging false reports, evidence concealment, and 8 retaliatory arrest of citizens engaged in protected speech.” Dkt. # 41 at 3. Accordingly, 9 these claims are dismissed. 10 D. Leave to Amend 11 Whether to grant leave to amend is within the district court’s discretion. 12 Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008). “Leave to amend 13 may be denied if a court determines that ‘allegation of other facts consistent with the 14 challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” Id. (quoting Schreiber 15 Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). “Leave 16 to amend may also be denied for repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous 17 amendment.” Id. Mr. Speidel has amended his complaint twice, including once with the 18 benefit of the Court’s October 21, 2025 Order explaining the deficiencies with his 19 allegations. See Dkts. # 1, 35, 41. Based on Mr. Speidel’s repeated failures to cure the 20 deficiencies in the complaint, the Court, in its discretion, declines to grant further leave 21 to amend.

22 23 24 25 26 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, 3 Dkt. # 42, and DISMISSES Counts 1 and 3–5 WITH PREJUDICE. Count 2 is 4 STRICKEN. 5 The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this order to Plaintiff and close 6 this case. 7 DATED this 2nd day of April, 2026. 8 A

9 10 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 11 United States District Judge

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