David Douglas Speidel v. Dillon Packard, Terrance Clifford, Joshua Sholten, Delmas Ferrell, Tyler Hatcher, Chad Pleadwell, Crystal Chappell, Rebecca Welch, Julie Walters, Leah Ott, Dave Floyd, Matt Miller, Darcy Swetnam, Ryan W.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 21, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00667
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 10 DAVID DOUGLAS SPEIDEL, Case No. 2:25-cv-00667-RAJ 11 Plaintiff, ORDER 12 v. 13 DILLON PACKARD, TERRANCE 14 CLIFFORD, JOSHUA SHOLTEN, DELMAS FERRELL, TYLER 15 HATCHER, CHAD PLEADWELL, CRYSTAL CHAPPELL, 16 REBECCA WELCH, JULIE WALTERS, LEAH OTT, DAVE 17 FLOYD, MATT MILLER, DARCY SWETNAM, RYAN WALTERS, 18 CHRISTINE CLELAND- MCGRATH, TJ FANTINI, 19 AMANDA HUBIK, BRUCE MCDOUGALL, CAROLYN 20 MOULTON, ANTHONY YOUNG, SARAH HAYNE, PATRICK 21 EASON, PAUL NIELSEN, TIFFANY AMBROSE, and JAY 22 DEE WAGNER,

23 Defendants. 24

25 26 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the City Defendants’ motion to 3 dismiss, Dkt. # 29, the Judicial Officers’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. # 30, and Plaintiff David 4 Speidel’s motion to appoint counsel, Dkt. # 36. The Court has reviewed the motions, the 5 submissions in support of and in opposition to the motions, and the balance of the record. 6 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Mr. Speidel’s motion to appoint 7 counsel. The Court GRANTS the City Defendants’ and Judicial Officers’ motions to 8 dismiss. In addition, the Court, sua sponte, DISMISSES the claims against Defendant 9 Jay Dee Wagner. 10 II. BACKGROUND 11 Plaintiff David Speidel, proceeding pro se, alleges that 25 defendants engaged in 12 a vast conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights. The defendants can be categorized 13 into three groups: (1) the “City Defendants,” comprised of Anacortes police officers, 14 public defenders, prosecutors, court staff, city officials, and a city claims adjuster; (2) the 15 “Judicial Officers,” comprised of Judge Nielsen, Commissioner Eason, and 16 Commissioner Hayne; and (3) Jay Dee Wagner, an unrepresented individual. For the 17 reasons discussed below, the Court finds Mr. Speidel’s claims against Commissioners 18 Eason and Hayne are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and that he fails to state a 19 claim against the remaining defendants. 20 A. Allegations Against Wagner and the City Defendants 21 On February 27, 2024, Wagner reported that Mr. Speidel was operating a 22 motorcycle without proper registration. Dkt. # 1 at 14, 15. At approximately 9:05 p.m., 23 Officer Packard from the Anacortes Police Department was dispatched to investigate the 24 complaint, and upon arriving at the scene, observed Mr. Speidel dismount a motorcycle 25 and enter a nearby apartment. Id. at 15. Officer Packard attempted to speak with Mr. 26 1 Speidel, but Mr. Spediel refused. Id. At some point, Sergeant Clifford joined Officer 2 Packard. Id. Mr. Speidel alleges that together, the two officers “engaged in unlawful 3 and coercive behavior, including persistent knocking, attempting to coerce a child into 4 opening the door, and peering through windows,” and that the officers “remained on the 5 premises for approximately two hours.” Id. He also alleges four other police officers— 6 Delmas Farrell, Chad Pleadwell, Joshua Sholten, and Tyler Hatcher—“[p]articipated in 7 illegal search/seizure and coercive tactics” or were “[c]omplicit in police practices.” Id. 8 at 11. It is unclear if these other officers interacted with Mr. Speidel or were at the scene 9 at all Id. Ultimately, after unsuccessfully attempting to speak with Mr. Speidel, Officer 10 Packard and Sergeant Clifford towed Mr. Speidel’s motorcycle, issued two traffic 11 citations, and filed charges for criminal obstruction. Id. at 15. 12 Mr. Speidel appeared for a court hearing on October 24, 2024. Id. Mr. Speidel 13 alleges that at the hearing, his public defender “exhibited conduct suggesting an active 14 conflict of interest” and that he later learned the public defender was “transitioning to a 15 prosecutorial role in a neighboring county.” Id. Further, he alleges the recording of this 16 October 24 hearing was “altered,” that the court clerk potentially took part in the 17 tampering, and a prosecutor and multiple public defenders failed to take action to correct 18 the discrepancy. Id. at 15–16. 19 Mr. Speidel alleges he contacted a litany of individuals about the events described 20 above, including the Anacortes mayor, chief of police, city attorney, several city council 21 members, and other city staff. Id. at 16. None responded to his complaint. Id. 22 Finally, Mr. Speidel filed a claim with the Anacortes claims adjuster, Tiffany 23 Ambrose. Id. at 13. Mr. Speidel alleges she “summarily denied the claim based solely 24 on the officers’ narrative and refused to acknowledge or investigate misconduct.” Id. 25 26 1 “Her actions may demonstrate bad faith claims handling and further evidence systemic 2 denial of redress, contributing to ongoing harm.” Id. 3 As a result of these allegations, Mr. Speidel named all individuals described above 4 as defendants in this case. He asserts against them claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 5 violations of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Fourteenth 6 Amendment and under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for civil conspiracy. Id. at 14. He seeks relief 7 including $33 million in damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and removal of all 8 named officials from office. Id. at 17. 9 B. Allegations Against the Judicial Officers 10 Mr. Speidel also brings the same claims against the Judicial Officers. Id. In 11 describing the allegations against the Judicial Officers, the Court takes judicial notice of 12 documents filed in Mr. Speidel’s Skagit County Superior Court case. See Harris v. 13 County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We may take judicial notice of 14 undisputed matters of public record . . . including documents on file in federal or state 15 courts.”). 16 Commissioner Hayne presided over Mr. Speidel’s traffic infraction case in 17 Anacortes Municipal Court. Dkt. # 34 at 11. On July 25, 2024, she denied Mr. Speidel’s 18 motion to suppress evidence and found Mr. Speidel committed two traffic infractions. 19 Id.1 Mr. Speidel appealed the decision, which the Skagit County Superior Court denied 20 on February 14, 2025. Dkt. # 34 at 23. In his complaint, Mr. Speidel alleges 21 Commissioner Hayne failed “to respond to requests for hearing and due process 22 oversight.” Dkt. # 1 at 12. 23 24

25 1 The criminal obstruction charge against Mr. Speidel was apparently dismissed at some point. Dkt. # 30 at 5. 26 1 It is unclear from the complaint and the judicially noticed documents how 2 Commissioner Eason and Judge Nielsen were involved with Mr. Speidel’s case or how 3 they otherwise interacted with him. Dkt. # 30 at 2. Mr. Speidel’s only allegation against 4 Commissioner Eason is that he engaged in “complicity or indifference in review of 5 suppression motions.” Dkt. # 1 at 12. As to Judge Nielsen, Mr. Speidel appears to allege 6 he engaged in misconduct during a past court proceeding in 2021, including editing the 7 court record from that proceeding. Id. at 13. Mr. Speidel alleges Judge Nielsen’s past 8 actions “suggest a coordinated effort to undermine a defendant’s right to a fair trial” and 9 “indicate participation in a civil conspiracy to deprive citizens of their constitutional 10 rights.” Id. 11 C. Procedural History 12 On April 14, 2025, Mr. Speidel filed his original complaint. Dkt. # 1. On April 13 24, 2025, the City Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. # 29. On May 6, 2025, the 14 Judicial Officers also filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. # 30. Mr. Speidel did not file an 15 opposition to either motion, but on May 22, 2025, he filed an amended complaint and a 16 motion to appoint counsel. Dkts. # 35, 36. On June 2, 2025, the Judicial Officers filed a 17 response to the new filings, in which they indicated they intend to stand on the arguments 18 made in their motion to dismiss the original complaint. Dkt. # 37. The City Defendants 19 filed a joinder to that response. Dkt. # 38. 20 Wagner, the individual who initially reported Mr. Speidel’s traffic violation to the 21 police, is the sole unrepresented defendant in this case. Mr. Speidel has not filed a 22 certificate confirming he served Wagner, and Wagner has not filed any documents in this 23 case. 24 25 26 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. Motion to Appoint Counsel 3 Mr. Speidel seeks appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Dkt. # 4 36. Under that statute, the “court may request an attorney to represent any person unable 5 to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The statute applies only to individuals 6 proceeding in forma pauperis. See Chan v. Ryan, No. 22-cv-1796, 2023 WL 197429, at 7 *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2023). The decision to appoint counsel is within “the sound 8 discretion of the trial court and is granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Agyeman 9 v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Franklin v. Murphy, 10 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984)). A finding of exceptional circumstances “requires 11 at least an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an 12 evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of 13 the legal issues involved.’” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 14 (9th Cir. 1986)). 15 Mr. Speidel does not qualify for appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 16 1915(e)(1) because he paid his filing fee and is therefore not proceeding in forma 17 pauperis. Moreover, the Court, in its discretion, finds there are no exceptional 18 circumstances supporting appointment of counsel. For the reasons discussed below, at 19 this juncture, it does not appear Mr. Speidel is likely to succeed on the merits of his 20 claims. Moreover, the core of his allegations is not unusually complex, and he has 21 demonstrated an ability to sufficiently articulate them. 22 B. City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 23 The Court next turns to the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss. As a threshold 24 matter, the Court addresses the impact of Mr. Speidel’s amended complaint, filed after 25 the City Defendants’ and Judicial Officers’ motions to dismiss. In light of the leniency 26 1 afforded to pro se litigants, the Court is not inclined to disregard the amended complaint 2 based on arguments that Mr. Speidel filed the amended complaint too late, without leave 3 to amend, and without complying with local rule requirements. In addition, while an 4 amended complaint typically replaces the original complaint, the Court notes Mr. 5 Speidel’s amended complaint contains significantly less detail than his original 6 complaint, and is therefore even less likely to survive a motion to dismiss. Again, in light 7 of the leniency afforded to pro se litigants, the Court will construe the complaint and 8 amended complaint as a single document for purposes of analyzing the pending motions 9 to dismiss. 10 To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must point to factual allegations in the 11 complaint that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 12 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In analyzing a motion to dismiss, courts “accept all 13 factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 14 favorable to the nonmoving party.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 15 2005). “Conclusory allegations and unreasonable inferences, however, are insufficient 16 to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). 17 1. Claims Against Officer Packard and Sergeant Clifford 18 Mr. Speidel appears to assert only claims based on Fourth Amendment violations 19 against Officer Packard and Sergeant Clifford. Dkt. # 1 at 14. The City Defendants argue 20 these claims should be dismissed because (1) the officers did not seize Mr. Speidel; (2) 21 Mr. Speidel does not allege facts establishing a search within the scope of the Fourth 22 Amendment. Dkt. # 29 at 4–6. The Court agrees. 23 a. Unreasonable Seizure 24 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. 25 Const. amend. IV. “For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when a law 26 1 enforcement officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some way 2 restrains the liberty of a citizen.” United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1326 3 (9th Cir. 1997). “A police officer has restrained the liberty of the citizen if, taking into 4 account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 5 have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police 6 presence and go about his business.” Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 7 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “no seizure occurs if a suspect 8 does not yield in response to a show of authority.” United States v. Smith, 217 F.3d 746, 9 750 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625–26 (1991)). 10 Here, Mr. Speidel fails to allege an unreasonable seizure because he never yielded 11 to Officer Packard and Sergeant Clifford’s authority. Dkt. # 1 at 15. When Officer 12 Packard attempted to speak with Mr. Speidel, Mr. Speidel refused, entered a nearby 13 apartment, and never came out to speak with the officers. Id. 14 b. Unreasonable Search 15 “A government agent conducts a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 16 Amendment when the agent infringes ‘an expectation of privacy that society is prepared 17 to consider reasonable’ or ‘physically occupie[s] private property for the purpose of 18 obtaining information.’” United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2016) 19 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) and United States v. Jones, 20 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012)). At the very core of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right 21 of a [person] to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 22 governmental intrusion.” Id. at 1157 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 23 511 (1961)). This protection extends to the curtilage of the home, which is the “area 24 immediately surrounding and associated with the home.” Id. at 1158 (quoting Oliver v. 25 United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, 26 1 a person “may have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than her own house so as 2 to extend Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures in that 3 place.” United States v. Barajas-Avalos, 377 F.3d 1040, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 4 United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1986)). For example, “a person 5 has standing to challenge an alleged search if he or she has ‘joint control and supervision’ 6 of the place.” Id. 7 “An observation of the interior of a protected structure through a window, even 8 when enhanced by a flashlight, does not constitute a search when the observation is made 9 from an open field or public place.” Id. at 1056. Thus, in Delong v. City of Port Orchard, 10 No. 06-cv-5115, 2006 WL 2290742 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2006), the court found an 11 officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by using “a flashlight to look inside the 12 window near the front door from a place accessible by the public.” Id., at *8. On the 13 other hand, in United States v. Fuentes, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Or. July 8, 2011), the 14 court found it was unreasonable to “enter the curtilage of [defendant’s] home, stand 15 within inches of a window that is not associated with any point of entry, and peer into the 16 home without any particularized basis for believing exigent circumstances existed.” Id. 17 at 1154. 18 As alleged, there are insufficient facts to suggest the officers engaged in an 19 unreasonable search. It is unclear from the allegations how Mr. Speidel is connected with 20 the apartment he entered. He does not allege he is the legal owner or tenant of the 21 apartment, that he has “joint control and supervision” of the place, or that he otherwise 22 has such sufficient interests in the apartment to give rise to Fourth Amendment 23 protections.2 Further, Mr. Speidel’s bare allegation that the officers were “peering 24

25 2 It appears from a related case that the apartment may belong to Mr. Speidel’s girlfriend. Klaister v. City of Anacortes, No. 25-cv-1459-RAJ, Dkts. # 1, 5. 26 1 through the windows” is insufficient. Id. It is unclear from these allegations whether the 2 officers lawfully looked into the apartment windows from a public place, or if they 3 unlawfully did so from the curtilage of the home away from any point of entry. 4 The City Defendants also argue the officers’ conduct fall within the “knock and 5 talk” exception. Dkt. # 29 at 5–6. Under that exception, an officer may “encroach upon 6 the curtilage of a home for the purposes of asking questions of the occupants.” Lundin, 7 817 F.3d at 1158 (quoting United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 8 2012)). “[T]o qualify for the exception, the government must demonstrate that the 9 officers conformed to the habits of the country . . . by doing no more than any private 10 citizen might do.” Id. at 1159 (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013)) (internal 11 quotation marks omitted). “In the typical case, if the police do not have a warrant they 12 may ‘approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, 13 and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.’” Id. (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 14 8). Mr. Speidel alleges the officers approached the apartment after 9 p.m., engaged in 15 “persistent knocking,” “attempt[ed] to coerce a child into opening the door,” and 16 remained on the premises for approximately two hours. Dkt. # 1 at 15. This potentially 17 exceeds the bounds of what society deems acceptable for a private citizen. However, the 18 Court will not reach the applicability of the “knock and talk” exception because as 19 discussed above, the complaint does not sufficiently allege Mr. Speidel was entitled to 20 Fourth Amendment protections within the apartment he entered. 21 2. Claims Against Other Officers 22 Mr. Speidel also sued Officers Farrell, Pleadwell, Sholten, and Hatcher because 23 they “[p]articipated in illegal search/seizure and coercive tactics” and were “[c]omplicit 24 25 26 1 in police practices.” Dkt. # 1 at 11.3 Claims against these officers are dismissed because 2 the complaint does not allege what involvement they had with Mr. Speidel, if any. 3 Moreover, because Mr. Speidel does not plausibly allege an underlying illegal search or 4 seizure, he fails to allege these officers “participated” or were “complicit” in a 5 constitutional violation. 6 3. Claims Against Court Clerk, Prosecutor, and Public Defenders 7 “Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights 8 violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Acres 9 Bonusing, Inc. v. Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 916 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Mullis v. U.S. 10 Bankr. Court for Dist. Of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987)). Similarly, 11 prosecutors are “absolutely immune from liability in § 1983 lawsuits for prosecutorial 12 actions that are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” 13 Lomeli v. County of San Diego, 637 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1076 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting 14 Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 15 “Absolute immunity from damages applies even when prosecutors are alleged to have 16 acted in bad faith or maliciously.” Id. (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 17 (1976)). Finally, a public defender representing a client is not “a state actor ‘under color 18 of state law’ within the meaning of § 1983.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 19 (1981). 20 Mr. Speidel sued the court clerk, prosecutor, and multiple public defenders based 21 on alleged misconduct during his October 24, 2024 hearing. Dkt. # 1 at 15–16. 22 Specifically, Mr. Speidel alleges they either took part in, or failed to correct, the alleged

23 3 Mr. Speidel also sued Police Chief Dave Floyd. Id. The Court reads Mr. Speidel’s 24 complaint as including Chief Floyd among the group of city officials who received Mr. 25 Speidel’s written complaint and failed to take corrective action. The claims against Chief Floyd are therefore addressed below. 26 1 alteration of court records. Id. He further alleges his public defender exhibited “conduct 2 suggesting an active conflict of interest.” Id. These allegations fundamentally arise from 3 each of these defendants’ actions while performing their duties as clerk, prosecutor, or 4 public defender. The claims against the clerk and prosecutor are therefore precluded by 5 immunity, and the allegations against the public defenders cannot give rise to a § 1983 6 claim. 7 4. Claims Against City Officials 8 Next, Mr. Speidel alleges he complained about the events described above to the 9 Anacortes mayor, chief of police, city attorney, several city council members, and other 10 city staff, and that they each failed to take corrective action. Id. at 16. Claims against 11 these individuals are dismissed because there is no constitutional requirement for public 12 officials to respond to citizen complaints. 13 5. Claims Against City Claims Adjuster 14 Mr. Speidel alleges the city claims adjuster, Ms. Ambrose, failed to reasonably 15 investigate his claims. Id. at 13. Claims against Ms. Ambrose are similarly dismissed 16 because there is no constitutional requirement for a city claims adjuster to investigate a 17 citizen’s claims. 18 6. Claims Against City Defendants in Official Capacity 19 Mr. Speidel sued all defendants in both their individual and official capacities. 20 Official-capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action 21 against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 22 165–66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 23 (1978)). “As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to 24 respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit 25 against the entity.” Id. To establish § 1983 liability against the government entity, the 26 1 plaintiff must show the entity itself is the “moving force” behind the alleged 2 constitutional deprivation. Id. Thus, “in an official-capacity suit the entity’s ‘policy or 3 custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Id. Mr. Speidel fails to 4 plausibly state official capacity claims against the City Defendants because he does not 5 identify any policy or custom leading to the alleged constitutional violations. 6 7. Claims under Section 1985 7 To “state a claim for conspiracy under § 1985, a plaintiff must first have a 8 cognizable claim under § 1983.” Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. Of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 930 9 (9th Cir. 2004). Because Mr. Speidel fails to state a claim against the City Defendants 10 under § 1983, his § 1985 claims against them are also dismissed. 11 C. Judicial Officers’ Motion to Dismiss 12 Turning to the Judicial Officers’ motion to dismiss, they argue the Court should 13 dismiss the claims against them under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “The Rooker- 14 Feldman doctrine recognizes that federal courts generally lack subject matter jurisdiction 15 to review state court judgments.” Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 16 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002). “The doctrine also precludes a federal district court from 17 exercising jurisdiction over general constitutional challenges that are ‘inextricably 18 intertwined’ with claims asserted in state court.” Id. “A claim is inextricably intertwined 19 with a state court judgment if ‘the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state 20 court wrongly decided the issues before it’ . . . or if ‘the relief requested in the federal 21 action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.’” Id. (quoting 22 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) and Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 23 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995)). 24 Mr. Speidel’s claims against Commissioner Hayne and Commissioner Eason are 25 precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they in essence seek to challenge the 26 1 state court traffic infraction judgment against him. Specifically, Mr. Speidel alleges that 2 while presiding over his traffic infraction case, Commissioner Hayne failed to “respond 3 to requests for hearing and due process oversight.” Dkt. # 1 at 12. In addition, although 4 it is unclear how exactly Commissioner Eason was involved in Mr. Speidel’s case, Mr. 5 Speidel similarly alleges that Commissioner Eason engaged in “complicity or 6 indifference in review of suppression motions.” Id. These are impermissible attacks on 7 judicial decisions inextricably intertwined with the final state court judgment. 8 Mr. Speidel’s allegations against Judge Nielsen conceivably do not relate to his 9 state court judgment and therefore falls outside the scope of the Rooker-Feldman 10 doctrine. Mr. Speidel appears to allege that during a hearing in 2021, Judge Nielsen 11 engaged in “potential editing of the court record.” Id. at 13. Nevertheless, “[i]t is well 12 established that state judges are entitled to absolute immunity for their judicial acts.” 13 Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 14 547, 553–54 (1967)). “This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting 15 maliciously and corruptly.” Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. Claims against Judge Nielsen stem 16 from his performance of judicial duties are therefore precluded by judicial immunity. 17 D. Claims Against Wagner 18 Finally, Mr. Speidel sued Wagner, the individual who allegedly reported Mr. 19 Speidel’s traffic infraction to the police. Dkt. # 1 at 14. To state a § 1983 claim, the 20 alleged constitutional deprivation must have been committed “under color of state law.” 21 Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999). This requirement 22 “[e]xcludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or 23 wrongful.” Id. (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)) (internal quotation 24 marks omitted). Here, the allegations against Wagner implicate private conduct and does 25 not give rise to a § 1983 claim. 26 1 E. Leave to Amend 2 “A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some 3 notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 4 could not be cured by amendment.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 5 1995). Given the liberal policy in favor of amendment, the Court finds Mr. Speidel’s 6 §§ 1983 and 1985 claims arising from an alleged unreasonable search are potentially 7 capable of amendment. Thus, those claims against Sergeant Clifford and Officers 8 Packard, Farrell, Pleadwell, Sholten, and Hatcher, in their individual and official 9 capacities, are dismissed with leave to amend. However, for the reasons discussed above, 10 Mr. Speidel may not proceed on the theory that he was subjected to an unreasonable 11 seizure. Next, Mr. Speidel’s claims against the remaining City Defendants, the Judicial 12 Officers, and Wagner are either precluded by immunity, are based on actions that cannot 13 give rise to § 1983 liability, or are precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. These 14 claims cannot be cured and are dismissed without leave to amend.4 15 // 16 // 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 // 21 22

23 4 Dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a dismissal for lack of subject matter 24 jurisdiction, which is without prejudice. See Kroncke v. Saldate, 130 Fed. App’x 110, 25 111 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, claims against Commissioner Hayne and Commissioner Eason are dismissed without prejudice, although without leave to amend. 26 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to appoint 3 counsel, Dkt. # 36. 4 The Court GRANTS the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. # 29. Claims 5 against Defendants Clifford, Packard, Farrell, Pleadwell, Sholten, and Hatcher, in their 6 individual and official capacities, under §§ 1983 and 1985 for unreasonable search under 7 the Fourth Amendment are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and WITH 8 LEAVE TO AMEND within 21 days of this Order. All claims against the remaining 9 City Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 10 The Court GRANTS the Judicial Officers’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. # 30. Claims 11 against Commissioner Hayne and Commissioner Eason are DISMISSED WITHOUT 12 PREJUDICE and WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Claims against Judge Nielsen 13 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 14 The Court, sua sponte, DISMISSES claims against Defendant Wagner WITH 15 PREJUDICE. 16 17 Dated this 21st day of October, 2025.

18 A

19 20 The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge 21

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