IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2018-CA-00710-SCT
DAVID DICKERSON
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/12/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LAMAR PICKARD TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: BRAD A. SMITH JASON L. DAVIS ALEXANDER KASSOFF HUMPHREYS McGEE COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COPIAH COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL BY: ALEXANDER KASSOFF HUMPHREYS McGEE SCOTT A. JOHNSON ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BRAD A. SMITH JASON L. DAVIS ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DEATH PENALTY - POST CONVICTION DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/05/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A jury convicted David Dickerson of capital murder, arson and armed robbery and
sentenced him to death for capital murder. He was sentenced to twenty years for arson and
forty years for armed robbery, to run consecutively. Dickerson appealed his convictions and sentences, and the Court affirmed. Dickerson v. State, 175 So. 3d 8, 12 (Miss. 2015).
Dickerson then instituted post-conviction collateral relief proceedings. Dickerson claims he
is incompetent to proceed with the post-conviction proceedings; so the Court remanded the
case and ordered the trial court to determine whether Dickerson was competent to proceed
in post-conviction proceedings. The trial court found Dickerson competent. Dickerson now
appeals that finding.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. A grand jury indicted Dickerson for capital murder, arson and armed robbery.
Dickerson moved for a determination of his competency to stand trial. The court appointed
Dr. Criss Lott to evaluate Dickerson. Dr. Lott determined that further observation was
needed to determine the nature and severity of Dickerson’s mental illness and to rule out the
possibility of malingering. Accordingly, Dickerson was sent to be evaluated by Dr. Robert
Storer and Dr. Reb McMichael at the State Hospital at Whitfield for two months. The trial
court then held a competency hearing at which all three doctors testified that Dickerson was
competent to stand trial according to the standard articulated in Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960).1 Dickerson offered no witnesses or
evidence of his own at the hearing. The trial court found that Dickerson was competent to
1 To be deemed competent to stand trial under the Dusky standard, the “defendant must have the ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . and . . . a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” Beasley v. State, 136 So. 3d 393, 398 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402).
2 stand trial according to the Dusky standard and then held the trial in July 2012. The jury
found Dickerson guilty on all three charges and recommended the death penalty. Dickerson
appealed to this Court. On appeal, “Dickerson raise[d] ten assignments of error[,]” including
that “the trial court erred in finding [him] competent to stand trial.” Dickerson, 175 So. 3d
at 14. The Court held that the trial court’s finding that “Dickerson was competent to stand
trial was . . . not manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Id. at 17.
The Court ultimately affirmed Dickerson’s conviction and death sentence. Id. at 35.
¶3. After his direct appeal, Dickerson filed for post-conviction relief and moved to stay
the post-conviction proceedings, claiming that he was not competent to proceed. The Court
granted his motion and remanded the matter to the trial court for a determination of
Dickerson’s competency to proceed before the Court in post-conviction relief proceedings.
¶4. The trial court held a competency hearing in February 2018 at which Dr. Storer and
Dr. Malcolm Spica both testified that they had examined Dickerson to evaluate his
competency, and the doctors were both accepted as experts at the hearing. Dr. Storer
testified that Dickerson was competent to proceed because Dickerson possessed a factual and
rational understanding of post-conviction proceedings and had the ability to consult with his
attorneys. Dr. Spica also testified that Dickerson had the ability to communicate with his
attorneys, but Dr. Spica’s report supported Dickerson’s contention that he did not have a
rational or factual understanding of post-conviction proceedings. After hearing the doctors’
testimonies and reviewing both of the doctors’ written reports, the trial court found
3 Dickerson competent to proceed. Dickerson now appeals the trial court’s decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5. A trial court’s findings regarding competency will not be overturned unless the trial
court’s decision was “manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Beasley
v. State, 136 So. 3d 393, 398 (Miss. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Martin v. State, 871 So. 2d 693, 698 (Miss. 2004)).
DISCUSSION
¶6. Dickerson raises two assignments of error in this appeal. First, he claims that the trial
court’s determination that he was competent to proceed in post-conviction relief proceedings
was manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Second, Dickerson claims
that the trial court erred by failing to accede to Dickerson’s assertion that the standard set
forth in Dusky and Gammage v. State, 510 So. 2d 802 (Miss. 1987),2 is the only standard for
evaluating a petitioner’s competency to proceed in post-conviction proceedings in a
Mississippi court and by failing to apply the Dusky/Gammage standard to determine
2 In Gammage, the Court applied the Dusky standard and held that “[a] defendant not competent to stand trial is one who does not have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or does not have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Gammage, 510 So. 2d at 803 (emphasis omitted) (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402).
4 Dickerson’s competency to proceed.3
I. Whether the trial court’s determination that Dickerson was competent to proceed in post-conviction relief proceedings was manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
¶7. Dickerson raises two main issues in his argument that the trial court’s determination
of his competency was manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. First,
Dickerson argues that the trial court’s reliance on Dr. Storer’s report is misplaced. Second,
Dickerson claims that the trial court erred by failing to admit Dr. Spica’s report into evidence
and that Dr. Spica’s report should have been relied upon by the trial court.
A. Dr. Storer’s Report
¶8. Dickerson asserts the trial court should not have relied on Dr. Storer’s report and
testimony because Dr. Storer, in reaching his conclusion, (1) erred by finding that Dickerson
did not have a severe and persistent mental illness; (2) incorrectly relied on his belief that
3 The State makes a cursory claim that there is no constitutional right to competency in post-conviction proceedings. Dickerson argues to the contrary. We decline to address the issue because it is not necessary to decide the case.
“It is well-settled by the decisions of this Court that a constitutional question will be passed on where the issues involved in a particular case are such that the case may be decided on other grounds.” Warner-Lambert Co. v. Potts, 909 So. 2d 1092, 1093 (Miss. 2005) (citing Broadhead v. Monaghan, 117 So. 2d 881, 888 (Miss. 1960)). “This Court has previously stated that when there is no necessity to reach a question, we will not.” Id.
“As this Court stated in Kron v. Van Cleave, 339 So. 2d 559, 563 (Miss. 1976), ‘courts will not decide a constitutional question unless it is necessary to do so in order to decide the case.’” Scott ex rel. Scott v. Flynt, 704 So. 2d 998, 1007 (Miss. 1996); see also Johnson v. Mem’l Hosp. of Gulfport, 732 So. 2d 864, 866 (Miss. 1998).
5 marked cognitive deficits in executive functioning are not accepted as mental defects that
significantly interfere with competency-related abilities; (3) lacked an understanding of post-
conviction relief proceedings, including what level of assistance an attorney requires of a
petitioner during the proceedings; and (4) failed to administer any standard test for evaluating
competency.
1. Severe and Persistent Mental Illness
¶9. Dickerson argues that schizophrenia is a severe and persistent mental illness and that
Dr. Storer’s diagnosis that Dickerson did not have schizophrenia based on the lack of
symptoms Dickerson displayed was erroneous. The State argues that Dickerson failed to cite
any relevant authority to support this contention. “Failure to cite relevant authority obviates
the appellate court’s obligation to review such issues.” Arrington v. State, 267 So. 3d 753,
756 (Miss. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Byrom v. State, 863 So. 2d
836, 853 (Miss. 2018)).
¶10. Regardless of Dickerson’s failure to cite authority to support his contention, this Court
has held that a person suffering from schizophrenia may still be competent to stand trial as
well as competent to be executed. Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 736, 736 n.19 (Miss. 2008)
(citing Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2008));
Billiot v. State, 655 So. 2d 1, 17 (Miss. 1995).
¶11. Dickerson argues that Dr. Storer erred by determining that Dickerson did not suffer
from schizophrenia because Dickerson had been previously diagnosed with the illness in
6 1997 by another doctor. Dr. Storer explained that he disagreed with the previous diagnosis
because Dickerson’s symptoms at the time Dr. Storer evaluated him were not consistent with
schizophrenia. Dickerson argues that his symptoms of schizophrenia were merely in
remission when Dr. Storer observed him for this competency hearing. He further argues that
according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), a
psychologist seeing a patient during remission might fail to detect symptoms of the illness.
Dr. Storer, however, testified at the hearing that the DSM-5 states that “[n]egative symptoms
are more closely related to prognosis than are positive symptoms and tend to be the most
persistent.” Accordingly, Dr. Storer testified that the signs of the remaining, underlying
negative symptoms would be fairly obvious to a trained psychologist. In his report, Dr.
Storer noted that Dickerson’s emotional functioning was good and that his eye contract was
also appropriate. Based on Dickerson’s failure to display any signs of underlying negative
symptoms associated with schizophrenia, Dr. Storer concluded that Dickerson did not have
schizophrenia.
¶12. Regardless of the procedural bar to this claim for failure to cite relevant authority, we
find that Dr. Storer’s conclusion that Dickerson did not suffer from a severe and persistent
mental illness was reasonably based on the DSM-5. Therefore the trial court’s finding that
Dickerson did not suffer from a severe and persistent mental illness was not manifestly
against the overwhelming weight of the evidence
2. Cognitive Deficits in Executive Functioning Related to Competency
7 ¶13. Dickerson argues that Dr. Storer incorrectly stated that cognitive deficits in executive
functioning are irrelevant and not accepted as mental defects that significantly interfere with
competency-related abilities. The State argues that Dickerson’s claim is barred because he
failed to cite relevant legal authority to support it, because he failed to object to Dr. Storer’s
being allowed to testify as an expert in the fields of clinical and forensic psychology and
because the doctrine of res judicata bars his contention that his cognitive deficits in executive
functioning render him incompetent.
¶14. Notwithstanding the procedural bars, Dr. Storer was accepted as an expert in the fields
of clinical and forensic psychology and actually refused to testify to what Dickerson claims.
At the competency hearing, Dr. Storer refused to testify that cognitive deficits in executive
functioning are irrelevant to a court’s finding of competency. Instead, he testified that
cognitive deficits in executive functioning, alone, are not recognized as “a sufficient
foundation for a finding of [in]competence” in any jurisdiction of which he is aware. Even
so, Dr. Storer explained that the severity of the dysfunction should determine whether the
deficit in executive functioning alone could support a finding of incompetence and offered
an example of severe memory impairment due to head trauma as an instance in which a
cognitive deficit in executive functioning could support a determination of incompetency on
its own. Those circumstances, however, are not present in Dickerson’s case.
¶15. Dr. Storer noted that executive functioning is one part of many to be considered in a
finding of competency. He listed criteria for determining whether a person has a cognitive
8 deficit in executive functioning. He further testified that the mere presence of a deficit in
executive functioning in a person does not automatically mean that the person will also have
deficits in their competency-related abilities.
¶16. Dr. Storer also pointed out that at the hearing held before Dickerson’s trial to
determine his competency to stand trial, Dr. Lott testified that, despite Dickerson’s having
cognitive deficits, he was competent to stand trial. According to the standard of competency
Dickerson asserts should apply in post-conviction proceedings, coupled with his failure to
offer any evidence that his cognitive deficits in executive functioning have changed since his
pretrial competency hearing, this contention is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
¶17. The trial court’s finding that Dickerson did not have deficits in executive functioning
severe enough to render him incompetent to proceed in post-conviction proceedings was not
manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
3. Dr. Storer’s and Dickerson’s Understandings of Post-Conviction Proceedings
¶18. Dickerson argues that neither he nor Dr. Storer has a factual understanding of post-
conviction proceedings or of what a petitioner must be able to do to assist post-conviction
counsel. Dickerson’s counsel argues that post-conviction proceedings, while backward
looking, also involve an analysis of new facts and claims that Dickerson does not have a
factual understanding of the nature of these proceedings. The State disagrees and argues that
Dr. Storer and Dickerson both possess a factual understanding of post-conviction
9 proceedings.
¶19. The purpose of the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act “is to
provide prisoners with a procedure, limited in nature, to review those objections, defenses,
claims, questions, issues or errors which in practical reality could not be or should not have
been raised at trial or on direct appeal.” Mississippi Code Section 99-39-3(2) (Rev. 2015).
¶20. Dickerson uses his own statement, as recorded in Dr. Storer’s report, to support his
contention that he lacks sufficient understanding of post-conviction proceedings. When Dr.
Storer asked him what sorts of questions his post-conviction attorneys were asking him when
they met, he replied, “They’re going on what they already know. That’s the way post-
conviction is. They’re going on everything that’s already been written.”
¶21. Dickerson also claimed that he had sent letters to his post-conviction counsel
regarding his post-conviction proceedings but that he had yet to receive a reply. While this
act does not necessarily mean that Dickerson has the ability to effectively communicate with
his counsel, it at least shows that he possesses a willingness to communicate with his counsel
and has made an active and rational effort to do so.
¶22. Dickerson then argues that Dr. Storer does not understand the nature of post-
conviction proceedings either. He offers Dr. Storer’s testimony at the competency hearing
at which Dr. Storer stated, “In my consultations with attorneys . . . I have been advised . . .
that post-conviction review is primarily a review of the records to make sure that everything
. . . was done correctly and in accordance with the rules and procedures as they stood at the
10 time of the trial,” to support his argument. Dickerson, however, prematurely cuts off Dr.
Storer’s statement from his testimony at the competency hearing. In the next sentence of his
testimony, Dr. Storer stated,
[Post-conviction review] also includes[s] new things. For example, the Atkins ruling by the Supreme court. That ended up being applied retrospective[ly]. Miller v. Alabama rulings have been applied retrospectively. So even though those may not have applied at the time of the trial, . . . in post-conviction proceedings, they may be brought up if they applied and were not brought up [at trial]. My understanding is that all of that is encompassed in post- conviction review.
¶23. At the hearing, Dr. Storer also testified that it was his understanding that post-
conviction attorneys are supposed to engage in investigation of facts that were not presented
at trial. Dr. Storer’s statement from his testimony, read in totality, does not support
Dickerson’s argument that Dr. Storer lacks an understanding of the nature of post-conviction
proceedings.
¶24. Dr. Storer explained that he used his understanding of the nature of post-conviction
proceedings in determining that Dickerson possesses a reasonable, factual and rational
understanding of the proceedings. Therefore, the trial court’s finding that Dickerson had a
rational understanding of the nature of post-conviction relief proceedings was not manifestly
against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
11 4. Methods Dr. Storer Used to Evaluate Dickerson’s Competency
¶25. Dickerson argues that because Dr. Storer failed to perform any standard tests for
competency, specifically the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool - Criminal
Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), his report on Dickerson’s competency is inaccurate and should
not be relied upon by the trial court. Once again, the State argues that because Dickerson
failed to cite any authority to support his argument, the issue is procedurally barred and the
Court is under no duty to review it. The State also argues that Dickerson waived review of
this issue by failing to object to Dr. Storer’s methods before or during the competency
hearing. The State further argues that because Dickerson stipulated his acceptance of Dr.
Storer as an expert in the fields of clinical and forensic psychology, he is barred from raising
issue with the methods used. Notwithstanding these procedural bars, the methods and test
Dr. Storer administered during his evaluation were reliable.
¶26. Dickerson claims that the MacCAT-CA is the best known and most widely used test
by practitioners when competency is at issue. Dickerson asserts that the MacCAT-CA is an
evaluation procedure used to determine a defendant’s ability to understand the nature of the
proceedings. Dr. Storer claims, however, that the MacCAT-CA does not apply here.
¶27. Dr. Storer testified the MacCAT-CA is intended to assess a defendant’s competency
to stand trial only and that it is not intended to assess any other types or levels of competency.
He also testified that he believes that competency to proceed in post-conviction proceedings
is very different from competency to stand trial because of the difference in the required
12 abilities to perform varying types of tasks at each stage. Accordingly, Dr. Storer testified that
he would only administer the MacCAT-CA in an evaluation to assess competency to stand
trial and not in an assessment of any other level or sort of competency, including competency
to proceed in post-conviction proceedings. Instead of the MacCAT-CA, Dr. Storer
administered the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) to Dickerson in order to obtain
objective information for diagnostic clarification. Dr. Storer’s written report states that
“[t]he PAI is a self-administered, objective inventory of adult personality designed to provide
information on critical clinical variables.” Dr. Storer noted that he “would have loved to
have given a direct measure of competence, but there is no competence assessment measure
that directly looks at post-conviction competence.”
¶28. Dr. Storer’s failure to administer a test designed strictly for determining competency
to stand trial did not render his opinion regarding Dickerson’s competency to proceed in post-
conviction proceedings incorrect or unreliable. Therefore, the trial court’s finding was not
¶29. We find each error Dickerson alleges Dr. Storer committed in his evaluation of
Dickerson to be without merit. The trial court properly considered Dr. Storer’s report.
B. Dr. Spica’s Report
¶30. Dickerson argues that the trial court erred by failing to rule on the admissibility of Dr.
Spica’s report and further claims that the report should have been admitted because its
conclusion that Dickerson was incompetent to stand trial was reliable. Dickerson further
asserts that the report should have been admitted because it was competent and relevant
13 evidence. The State argues that Dickerson’s failure to obtain a ruling on his motion to admit
the evidence constitutes a waiver. The State claims that despite the waiver, the trial court
committed no error because it did not exclude the report and did consider it in determining
Dickerson’s competency to proceed in post-conviction relief proceedings.
¶31. “[I]t is the responsibility of the movant to obtain a ruling from the court on motions
. . . and failure to do so constitutes a waiver.” Smith v. State, 986 So. 2d 290, 296 (Miss.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 708 (Miss.
1997)). “[I]t is the duty of the objecting party to obtain a ruling from the trial court on
objections, and . . . if the record includes no ruling by the trial court, the objections are
waived for purpose of appeal.” Rials v. Duckworth, 822 So. 2d 283, 288 (Miss. 2002)
(citing Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 120 (Miss. 1999)).
¶32. The facts of Franklin v. Lovitt Equip. Co., Inc., 420 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Miss. 1982),
are similar to what occurred here. In Franklin, the appellant claimed that the trial court
failed to consider parol evidence that the appellant offered to the court even though the
record “clearly indicate[d] that the testimony in question was permitted to be introduced into
evidence . . . .” Id. The appellant argued that the trial court failed to consider the evidence
based on the fact that the trial court reserved ruling on the admissibility of the evidence when
it was presented and then failed to enter a definitive ruling on its admissibility before
rendering a final decision. Id. This Court concluded, “Although the chancellor never ruled
on this issue, it must be assumed that he considered the parol evidence in rendering his final
14 decision.” Id.
¶33. At Dickerson’s competency hearing, Dickerson moved to have Dr. Spica’s report
admitted into evidence, and the State objected based on relevancy. The trial court allowed
Dr. Spica’s report to be marked for identification, noted the objection and reserved ruling on
the admission of the report into evidence. After the conclusion of Dr. Spica’s testimony, the
State renewed its objection to Dickerson’s motion to admit Dr. Spica’s report, and, again, the
trial court reserved ruling on the matter. It was not until after both parties filed post-hearing
briefs and the trial court had issued its Memorandum Decision and Order that Dickerson
renewed his motion to admit Dr. Spica’s report into evidence.
¶34. Dickerson argues that Dr. Spica’s report should have been admitted as relevant
evidence by citing Mississippi Rule of Evidence 401, which states that evidence is relevant
if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence” and if “the fact is of consequence in determining the case.” Miss. R. Evid. 401.
Although the trial court failed to rule on the admissibility of Dr. Spica’s written report, it is
clear that the trial court considered it from the language the court used in its Memorandum
Decision and Order. In that order, the trial court wrote that it reviewed the written reports
of both Dr. Storer and Dr. Spica in its determination of Dickerson’s competency to proceed
in post-conviction proceedings.
¶35. We find that any error the trial court may have committed by failing to rule on the
admissibility of Dr. Spica’s report would be a harmless error because the trial court did
15 consider Dr. Spica’s written report in its determination of Dickerson’s competency.
¶36. The trial court found Dickerson competent to proceed in post-conviction collateral
relief proceedings after considering the conflicting evidence produced by each party and the
conflicting reports and testimonies of the experts. When conflicting evidence capable of
more than one reasonable interpretation is presented to the court, the trial judge, as with any
finder of fact, is entitled to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to afford
their testimony. Trim v. Trim, 33 So. 3d 471, 479 (Miss. 2010). Therefore, we find that it
was within the discretion of the trial court to weigh the credibility of the doctors’ conflicting
testimony and to choose between their competing interpretations. The trial court’s
determination that Dickerson is competent to proceed was not manifestly against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence.
II. Whether the trial court erred by failing to apply the Dusky/Gammage Standard to determine competency to proceed in post-conviction relief proceedings.
¶37. Dickerson argues that the Dusky/Gammage standard is the only standard that exists
for determining competency in a Mississippi courtroom. At the competency hearing, the
State proffered that the standard for competency in post-conviction proceedings should be
that the “[p]etitioner is competent to proceed in post-conviction review proceedings if he has
sufficient present ability to consult with his attorneys with a rational understanding as to facts
relevant to his case.”
¶38. The trial court noted that neither party cited any controlling authority setting forth the
16 standard that either asserted was applicable to competency determinations for post-conviction
relief proceedings. The trial court even addressed standards for competency used by other
states for competency determinations in post-conviction. The trial court explained that in
Florida, a petitioner must identify specific factual matters that require competent consultation
with counsel, and in Illinois, a petitioner must show why personal communication would be
required between petitioner and counsel.
¶39. The trial court found that Dickerson has the sufficient present ability to consult his
attorneys with a reasonable degree of rational understanding in investigating, preparing and
presenting claims for post-conviction relief, as well as a rational and factual understanding
of the nature and object of post-conviction proceedings. According to these findings of fact,
the trial court determined that Dickerson was competent to proceed in post-conviction relief
proceedings under any of the standards proffered by the parties or under the standards used
by other states that acknowledge a right to competency during the post-conviction collateral
relief stage.
CONCLUSION
¶40. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court’s determination that Dickerson
is competent to proceed in post-conviction collateral relief proceedings was not manifestly
¶41. AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ., MAXWELL, BEAM, ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ.
17 COLEMAN, JUSTICE, SPECIALLY CONCURRING:
¶42. I concur with the majority’s reasoning and result. I write separately to address the
State’s argument that Dickerson has no right to competency during his post-conviction
collateral relief proceedings.
¶43. In short, the State is correct that we have never held that a petitioner enjoys a statutory
or constitutional right to competency during post-conviction proceedings. Dickerson
supports his position that a post-conviction petitioner has a right to competency with Neal
v. State, in which the Court wrote in perfunctory fashion that a defendant must be competent
at all stages of the criminal process, including post-conviction. Neal v. State, 687 So. 2d
1180, 1183 (Miss. 1996) (citing Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1985)).
However, Rumbaugh does not concern the issue of whether a party has the right to be
competent in post-conviction proceedings. Instead, the Rumbaugh Court considered
whether one must be competent to waive a right to collateral review. Rumbaugh v.
Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966)).
Dickerson and—more importantly—the Neal Court misinterpret Rumbaugh. Id. at 402.
Nothing in Rumbaugh confers a right to competency at the post-conviction stage of criminal
proceedings. Again, Rumbaugh addressed the right to be competent when waiving appeals
and collaterally attacking convictions and sentences. Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 398. As such,
it speaks not at all to the question presented here—whether the Mississippi Post-Conviction
Collateral Relief Act or the Mississippi Constitution provide a statutory right to competency
during post-conviction proceedings.
18 ¶44. In today’s case, the Court granted Dickerson’s request for a competency hearing by
order. The hearing having been heard and the determination that Dickerson is competent
having been made (and now affirmed), it indeed seems a bit late in the current game to
address the issue. It remains, however, a question that the Court should one day answer.
MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.