David Davidson v. Department of the Navy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 19, 2024
DocketAT-3330-14-0603-B-3
StatusUnpublished

This text of David Davidson v. Department of the Navy (David Davidson v. Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
David Davidson v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DAVID L. DAVIDSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-3330-14-0603-B-3

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: March 19, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

J. Cole Davis , Esquire, Panama City, Florida, for the appellant.

David Kendrick , Panama City, Florida, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied his request for corrective action in his Veterans Employment Opportunities Act (VEOA) appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. For the reasons discussed below, we DENY the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, but still DENY corrective action on a basis different than that articulated in the initial decision.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW At all relevant times, the appellant was a preference-eligible employed by the agency in Orlando, Florida, as a GS-7 Contract Specialist. Davidson v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. AT-3330-14-0603-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 7; Davidson v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. AT-3330-14-0603-B-2, Appeal File (B-2 AF), Tab 7 at 44. The appellant applied to an announcement advertising two agency GS-7 Contract Specialist vacancies located in Panama City, Florida, in the same office which employed his wife. IAF, Tab 1 at 9, Tab 9 at 4-8; Davidson v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. AT-3330-14-0603-B-3, Appeal File (B-3 AF), Tab 20, Hearing Transcript at 143-44 (testimony of the selecting official). The vacancies, which were posted under the agency’s Pathways Recent Graduates program, were open to all applicants who had completed qualifying education requirements within specified timeframes. IAF, Tab 9 at 4-5. The appellant was not selected for either vacancy. IAF, Tab 1 at 9. The appellant filed a VEOA complaint regarding his nonselection with the Department of Labor (DOL). IAF, Tab 11 at 14-20. After DOL issued him a 3

close-out letter, the appellant filed a Board appeal in which he claimed that the agency violated his right to compete for the vacancies under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f) (1). IAF, Tab 1, Tab 11 at 4-5. Specifically, the appellant alleged that agency officials refused to consider him because they erroneously believed hiring him would constitute nepotism since the appellant’s wife worked in the office where the vacancies were located. IAF, Tab 11 at 4-5. The administrative judge found jurisdiction over the appeal but, without holding a hearing, denied the appellant corrective action on the grounds that the agency, which referred the appellant to the selecting official after reviewing his resume, was not required to consider him at every stage of the selection process. Davidson v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. AT-3330-14-0603-I-1, Initial Decision at 3 (June 10, 2014). On review, the Board vacated the initial decision and remanded the case for a hearing, concluding that a genuine dispute of material fact remained regarding what consideration, if any, the selecting official gave to the appellant’s application, and whether the agency inappropriately applied nepotism rules in denying the appellant the opportunity to compete. Davidson v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. AT-3330-14- 0603-I-1, Remand Order, ¶¶ 1, 10 (Dec. 15, 2014). After holding a hearing on remand, the administrative judge again denied the appellant’s request for corrective action, concluding that the agency did not deny the appellant the opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1). B-3 AF, Tab 28, Remand Initial Decision. The appellant filed a petition for review. Davidson v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. AT-3330-14-0603-B-3, Petition for Review (B-3 PFR) File, Tab 3. The agency filed a response, to which the appellant replied. B-3 PFR File, Tabs 5, 6.

The appellant was not entitled to corrective action under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) as a matter of law. The Board’s regulations reserve to it the authority to consider any issue in an appeal before it. McClenning v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 3, ¶ 16; 4

5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(e). Thus, we exercise our authority to deny the appellant corrective action on a basis which the agency did not raise. The Board has held that the right to compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) is not limited merely to situations in which an agency elects to use merit promotion procedures, but rather is triggered when an agency accepts applications from individuals outside its own workforce, as was the case here. Montgomery v. Department of Health and Human Services, 123 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶ 7 (2016); IAF, Tab 9 at 4-5. But in Kerner v. Department of the Interior, 778 F.3d 1336, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2015), which was decided after the remand order was issued in this appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that VEOA was intended to assist veterans in gaining access to Federal employment and that 5 U.S.C. § 3304 did not apply when an applicant was already employed in the Federal civil service. In Oram v. Department of the Navy, 2022 MSPB 30, ¶ 17, the Board followed Kerner in finding that a current Federal employee was not entitled to recovery on his claim that he was denied an opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f) as a matter of law. The appellant was already employed in the Federal civil service when he applied to the vacancies at issue.

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Related

Kerner v. Department of the Interior
778 F.3d 1336 (Federal Circuit, 2015)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Cyril Oram v. Department of the Navy
2022 MSPB 30 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)
Chong McClenning v. Department of the Army
2022 MSPB 3 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)

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David Davidson v. Department of the Navy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-davidson-v-department-of-the-navy-mspb-2024.