IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 12-1997 Filed February 24, 2016
DAVID DALE JENSEN, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Nancy A.
Baumgartner, Judge.
David Jensen appeals from the dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Aaron Rogers, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ. 2
DOYLE, Judge.
In this postconviction-relief (PCR) action, David Jensen seeks specific
performance of the provision of his plea agreement requiring that he register as a
sex offender for only ten years, not for a lifetime as the Iowa Department of
Public Safety (IDPS) has determined. The PCR court granted summary
judgment in favor of the State on the grounds that the court was without authority
to determine the length of time that Jensen had to register as a sex offender, and
it dismissed Jensen’s application. We agree with the district court and therefore
affirm.
In November 2010, Jensen filed a pro se PCR application. After the
State’s motion to dismiss was denied in January 2012, the State filed a motion
for summary judgment in June 2012. Shortly thereafter, through appointed
counsel, Jensen filed an amended and substituted PCR application. Hearing on
the motion for summary judgment was held in October 2012.
The salient facts are set forth succinctly in the PCR court’s ruling on
summary judgment:1
On July 21, 2006, Jensen was sentenced in Jones County cause FECR003832. He was sentenced for the crimes of third- degree sexual abuse and lascivious acts with a child. The plea and sentence were pursuant to a plea agreement. The lascivious-acts charge has since been vacated in Jones County cause PCCV004322. (The reason was not divulged.) Jensen was sentenced to serve ten years in prison and was ordered by the 1 In regard to this statement of facts, the PCR court noted: For the purpose of the summary judgment motion, neither the State nor [Jensen] produced the transcripts of [Jensen’s] guilty pleas and sentencings in the relevant cases where he was convicted of sex offenses, nor were any certified court records produced for purposes of said motion. Despite this, [Jensen] does not dispute the State’s recitation of the relevant facts, nor does the State dispute [Jensen’s] recitation of the relevant facts. 3
Jones County sentencing court to register as a sex offender for a period of ten years. On August 2, 2006, Jensen was convicted in Polk County cause FECR201517 of attempting to entice away a minor. He was sentenced to serve two years in prison, to be served concurrently with the Jones County case. Jensen has discharged both sentences. The record was silent with regard to the Polk County charge as to what his sex-offender-registry requirements were, if any. The sex-offender-registry requirements in Iowa Code chapter 692A were amended in 2009. The amendments retroactively applied to persons convicted of sex offenses prior to the July 1, 2009 enactment date, if the person was required to be on the sex offender registry as of June 30, 2009. Jensen did not register as a sex offender until he was released from prison in November of 2010. When he was released, the [IPDS] determined that Jensen’s registration requirement was a lifetime registration based upon Iowa Code chapter 692A. It is undisputed that Jensen has made no application or given notice to the [IPDS] to request an administrative or judicial review of his registration requirements. Jensen’s amended and substituted [PCR application] does not allege ineffective assistance of counsel in accepting the plea agreement, which he believed would require him to only register as a sex offender for ten years. He does not ask that his plea or sentence be set aside. The only relief requested is . . . specific performance of the plea agreement and that he only be required to register as a sex offender for ten years.
Relying on State v. Bullock, the PCR court concluded it had no authority to
grant the relief requested by Jensen. See 638 N.W.2d 728, 735 (Iowa 2002)
(noting the length of time an offender must remain on the sex-offender registry is
administratively determined after an offender’s release from prison). The court
granted the State’s motion and dismissed Jensen’s application. Jensen
appealed, but the appeal was delayed until this court determined Jensen was
entitled to appointed counsel. See Mears v. State Pub. Def., No. 13-0768, 2014
WL 7343214, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2014). After procedendo was issued
in Mears in February 2015, this appeal proceeded and was transferred to this
court in January 2016. 4
We normally review PCR proceedings, including dismissals of PCR
applications by way of summary disposition, for correction of errors at law. See
Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2011). However, we review PCR
applications that assert constitutional infirmities de novo. See id. In determining
whether summary disposition is warranted, like summary judgments, the moving
party has the burden of proving that the material facts are undisputed and that
judgment as a matter of law is merited. See Iowa Code § 822.6 (2013); Castro,
795 N.W.2d at 792; Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 558-60 (Iowa 2002).
Here, the material facts are not disputed by the parties.
Jensen pled guilty to third-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code
sections 709.1 and 709.4(1) (2005). The sex-offender-registry statute defines
third-degree sexual abuse as an “aggravated offense.” Iowa Code
§ 692A.1(1)(c) (Supp. 2005). Then, as now, a person convicted of an
aggravated offense is required to register for life. Compare id. § 692A.2(5)
(Supp. 2005), with id. § 692A.106(5) (2013); see also Bullock, 638 N.W.2d at 734
(comparing section 692A.2 (1999), which required “lifetime registration only upon
a second or subsequent offense; otherwise, imposing a ten-year registration
requirement,” with section 692A.2 (Supp. 1999), which is similar to section
692A.2 (2005), finding the 1999 supplement “broaden[ed] lifetime registration to
include persons convicted of an ‘aggravated offense’”). Nevertheless, the
sentencing court advised Jensen that, pursuant to Iowa Code section 692A.2,
Jensen “has an obligation to register as a sex offender within five days after his
release either on parole or work release. This obligation to register continues for
a period of ten years from release on parole or work release.” 5
On appeal, Jensen argues: (1) Bullock should not apply where the ten-
year-registration provision was part of a plea bargain and there has been
detrimental reliance, (2) the registration portion of the sentencing order still
stands today as no one has set it aside, and (3) Bullock should no longer be
considered good law. Like the district court, we disagree, and we find Bullock
dispositive.
Bullock holds “that the determination of the length of any required
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 12-1997 Filed February 24, 2016
DAVID DALE JENSEN, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Nancy A.
Baumgartner, Judge.
David Jensen appeals from the dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Aaron Rogers, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ. 2
DOYLE, Judge.
In this postconviction-relief (PCR) action, David Jensen seeks specific
performance of the provision of his plea agreement requiring that he register as a
sex offender for only ten years, not for a lifetime as the Iowa Department of
Public Safety (IDPS) has determined. The PCR court granted summary
judgment in favor of the State on the grounds that the court was without authority
to determine the length of time that Jensen had to register as a sex offender, and
it dismissed Jensen’s application. We agree with the district court and therefore
affirm.
In November 2010, Jensen filed a pro se PCR application. After the
State’s motion to dismiss was denied in January 2012, the State filed a motion
for summary judgment in June 2012. Shortly thereafter, through appointed
counsel, Jensen filed an amended and substituted PCR application. Hearing on
the motion for summary judgment was held in October 2012.
The salient facts are set forth succinctly in the PCR court’s ruling on
summary judgment:1
On July 21, 2006, Jensen was sentenced in Jones County cause FECR003832. He was sentenced for the crimes of third- degree sexual abuse and lascivious acts with a child. The plea and sentence were pursuant to a plea agreement. The lascivious-acts charge has since been vacated in Jones County cause PCCV004322. (The reason was not divulged.) Jensen was sentenced to serve ten years in prison and was ordered by the 1 In regard to this statement of facts, the PCR court noted: For the purpose of the summary judgment motion, neither the State nor [Jensen] produced the transcripts of [Jensen’s] guilty pleas and sentencings in the relevant cases where he was convicted of sex offenses, nor were any certified court records produced for purposes of said motion. Despite this, [Jensen] does not dispute the State’s recitation of the relevant facts, nor does the State dispute [Jensen’s] recitation of the relevant facts. 3
Jones County sentencing court to register as a sex offender for a period of ten years. On August 2, 2006, Jensen was convicted in Polk County cause FECR201517 of attempting to entice away a minor. He was sentenced to serve two years in prison, to be served concurrently with the Jones County case. Jensen has discharged both sentences. The record was silent with regard to the Polk County charge as to what his sex-offender-registry requirements were, if any. The sex-offender-registry requirements in Iowa Code chapter 692A were amended in 2009. The amendments retroactively applied to persons convicted of sex offenses prior to the July 1, 2009 enactment date, if the person was required to be on the sex offender registry as of June 30, 2009. Jensen did not register as a sex offender until he was released from prison in November of 2010. When he was released, the [IPDS] determined that Jensen’s registration requirement was a lifetime registration based upon Iowa Code chapter 692A. It is undisputed that Jensen has made no application or given notice to the [IPDS] to request an administrative or judicial review of his registration requirements. Jensen’s amended and substituted [PCR application] does not allege ineffective assistance of counsel in accepting the plea agreement, which he believed would require him to only register as a sex offender for ten years. He does not ask that his plea or sentence be set aside. The only relief requested is . . . specific performance of the plea agreement and that he only be required to register as a sex offender for ten years.
Relying on State v. Bullock, the PCR court concluded it had no authority to
grant the relief requested by Jensen. See 638 N.W.2d 728, 735 (Iowa 2002)
(noting the length of time an offender must remain on the sex-offender registry is
administratively determined after an offender’s release from prison). The court
granted the State’s motion and dismissed Jensen’s application. Jensen
appealed, but the appeal was delayed until this court determined Jensen was
entitled to appointed counsel. See Mears v. State Pub. Def., No. 13-0768, 2014
WL 7343214, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2014). After procedendo was issued
in Mears in February 2015, this appeal proceeded and was transferred to this
court in January 2016. 4
We normally review PCR proceedings, including dismissals of PCR
applications by way of summary disposition, for correction of errors at law. See
Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2011). However, we review PCR
applications that assert constitutional infirmities de novo. See id. In determining
whether summary disposition is warranted, like summary judgments, the moving
party has the burden of proving that the material facts are undisputed and that
judgment as a matter of law is merited. See Iowa Code § 822.6 (2013); Castro,
795 N.W.2d at 792; Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 558-60 (Iowa 2002).
Here, the material facts are not disputed by the parties.
Jensen pled guilty to third-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code
sections 709.1 and 709.4(1) (2005). The sex-offender-registry statute defines
third-degree sexual abuse as an “aggravated offense.” Iowa Code
§ 692A.1(1)(c) (Supp. 2005). Then, as now, a person convicted of an
aggravated offense is required to register for life. Compare id. § 692A.2(5)
(Supp. 2005), with id. § 692A.106(5) (2013); see also Bullock, 638 N.W.2d at 734
(comparing section 692A.2 (1999), which required “lifetime registration only upon
a second or subsequent offense; otherwise, imposing a ten-year registration
requirement,” with section 692A.2 (Supp. 1999), which is similar to section
692A.2 (2005), finding the 1999 supplement “broaden[ed] lifetime registration to
include persons convicted of an ‘aggravated offense’”). Nevertheless, the
sentencing court advised Jensen that, pursuant to Iowa Code section 692A.2,
Jensen “has an obligation to register as a sex offender within five days after his
release either on parole or work release. This obligation to register continues for
a period of ten years from release on parole or work release.” 5
On appeal, Jensen argues: (1) Bullock should not apply where the ten-
year-registration provision was part of a plea bargain and there has been
detrimental reliance, (2) the registration portion of the sentencing order still
stands today as no one has set it aside, and (3) Bullock should no longer be
considered good law. Like the district court, we disagree, and we find Bullock
dispositive.
Bullock holds “that the determination of the length of any required
registration is an administrative decision initially committed to the [IPDS],” and
therefore, a sentencing court is “without authority to determine the length of any
future registration by the defendant.” 638 N.W.2d at 735. More importantly:
Until the [IPDS] has made a decision on the defendant’s term of registration, there is no concrete controversy. Any adjudication by the district court prior to an administrative decision and a request for judicial review of that decision is premature. Therefore, the nature and extent of the defendant’s registration obligation are issues that are not ripe for our review.
Id.
The district court concluded the relief Jensen requests
is relief that the district court is without authority to give, i.e., order that he only be required to register as a sex offender for ten years. The Bullock case is unequivocal in holding that a sentencing court is without authority to determine the length of time that a criminal defendant has to register as a sex offender.
We agree.
Bullock is controlling in this case, and we leave the task of overruling
precedent to the Iowa Supreme Court. See State v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583, 584
n.1 (Iowa 2014) (acknowledging that both the district court and the court of
appeals properly relied on applicable precedent and noting that “[g]enerally, it is 6
the role of the supreme court to decide if case precedent should no longer be
followed”); State v. Eichler, 83 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1957) (“If our previous
holdings are to be overruled, we should ordinarily prefer to do it ourselves.”);
State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (“We are not at
liberty to overturn Iowa Supreme Court precedent.”). Although the IPDS has
made an administrative decision that Jensen is subject to lifetime registration on
the sexual offender registry, Jensen has not pursued or exhausted his
administrative remedies with regard to that decision.2 It is clear, under Bullock,
that Jensen has an obligation to exhaust his administrative remedies first; his
pursuit here of adjudication by the district court prior to an administrative decision
and request for judicial review is premature. See 638 N.W.2d at 735. Therefore,
the extent of Jensen’s registration obligation is an issue that is not ripe for our
review, and we need not address the merits of Jensen’s claims. We therefore
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Jensen’s PCR application.
AFFIRMED.
2 Jensen registered as a sex offender when he was released from prison in November 2010. A ten-year period would not expire until November 2020. See Iowa Code § 692A.103(1)(c) (2009) (stating time begins to run from the date of release from incarceration). Since the ten-year period has not yet expired, we question whether the time is now ripe for Jensen to pursue his administrative remedies.