David Dager v. City of Phoenix

Ninth Circuit

David Dager v. City of Phoenix

380 F. App'x 688

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMay 28, 2010

Docket09-15356

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 380 F. App'x 688 (David Dager v. City of Phoenix) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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David Dager v. City of Phoenix, 380 F. App'x 688 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

David Dager, Greg Iiams, Danny Boyd, and other similarly situated police officers in Phoenix, Arizona (together “Dager”) appeal from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of Phoenix, holding that donning and doffing required police uniforms and protective gear is not compensable work under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir.2009). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

This appeal is squarely controlled by Bamonte v. City of Mesa, 598 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir.2010). There, as here, appellants — -police officers in Mesa, Arizona-argued that time spent donning and doffing uniforms and protective gear at the beginning and the end of the workday was compensable under the FLSA. Id. at 1219. *689 There, as here, the defendant municipality maintained lockers at the stations for patrol officers for storage of uniforms and equipment, but did not require that the officers change at the work site. Id. at 1220. Analyzing the governing statutes, and giving Skidmore deference to a 2006 Department of Labor memorandum discussing the compensability of donning and doffing gear and clothing at home, we held in Bamonte, id. at 1233, that because “[n]o requirement of law, rule, the employer, or the nature of the work mandates donning and doffing at the employer’s premises, and none of the other factors articulated in Alvarez [v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.2003),] weigh in favor of a conclusion of compensability,” the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Mesa.

Dager offers no material facts to distinguish this case from Bamonte. Accordingly, the district court’s summary judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

David Dager, Greg Iiams, Danny Boyd, and other similarly situated police officers in Phoenix, Arizona (together “Dager”) appeal from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of Phoenix, holding that donning and doffing required police uniforms and protective gear is not compensable work under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir.2009). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

This appeal is squarely controlled by Bamonte v. City of Mesa, 598 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir.2010). There, as here, appellants — -police officers in Mesa, Arizona-argued that time spent donning and doffing uniforms and protective gear at the beginning and the end of the workday was compensable under the FLSA. Id. at 1219. *689 There, as here, the defendant municipality maintained lockers at the stations for patrol officers for storage of uniforms and equipment, but did not require that the officers change at the work site. Id. at 1220. Analyzing the governing statutes, and giving Skidmore deference to a 2006 Department of Labor memorandum discussing the compensability of donning and doffing gear and clothing at home, we held in Bamonte, id. at 1233, that because “[n]o requirement of law, rule, the employer, or the nature of the work mandates donning and doffing at the employer’s premises, and none of the other factors articulated in Alvarez [v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.2003),] weigh in favor of a conclusion of compensability,” the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Mesa.

Dager offers no material facts to distinguish this case from Bamonte. Accordingly, the district court’s summary judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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