Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
August 25, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
DAVID CROMP, No. 61678-5-II
Appellant,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNNY HARKRIDER, MONIQUE HARKRIDER, and their Marital Community, dba ABLE PLUMBING PLUS,
Respondents.
CHE, J. — David Cromp appeals the dismissal of his 2024 case following the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in the defendants’ favor.
In 2024, Cromp filed a lawsuit against defendants Johnny Harkrider, Monique Harkrider, and their business, Able Plumbing Plus, (collectively, Able) based on Able’s conduct in an insurance claim process following discovery of leaks in toilets Able had installed. Able moved for summary judgment, claiming that Cromp’s claims were barred under res judicata and collateral estoppel. Specifically, Able argued that Cromp’s claims were precluded by a 2022 case involving the same parties.
In the 2022 case, Cromp had sued Able for breach of contract based on Able’s installation of the toilet that subsequently leaked. Cromp moved for leave to amend the 2022 complaint to
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add claims nearly identical to those in his 2024 case, but the superior court denied his motion. The superior court thereafter dismissed with prejudice Cromp’s 2022 breach of contract claim on summary judgment based on a finding that the claim was time-barred.
In Cromp’s 2024 case, the superior court granted Able’s motion for summary judgment based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court accordingly dismissed Cromp’s claims with prejudice. The superior court also struck a motion to compel discovery Cromp had brought prior to the summary judgment proceeding, seemingly based on mootness.
Cromp argues that the superior court erred in concluding that res judicata and collateral estoppel precluded Cromp’s 2024 claims. Cromp also assigns error to the superior court’s striking of his motion to compel.
We hold that Able was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Cromp’s 2024 lawsuit constituted impermissible claim splitting barred by res judicata. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s summary judgment dismissal of Cromp’s claims and its decision to strike Cromp’s motion to compel discovery as moot.
FACTS
In 2018, Cromp hired Able to provide plumbing installation services at Cromp’s residence, including the installation of two toilets. In August 2019, Cromp found a leak coming from one of the toilets. A month later, Cromp noticed the other toilet exhibiting signs of leakage. Claims were submitted to an insurance carrier through Able’s contractor policy, but the insurer eventually closed one of the claims “at the request of [Able].” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 200. The insurer reopened the claims after the Washington Insurance Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
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received a complaint. The insurer denied the claims in June 2021. Cromp filed a second complaint with the ICO. A. 2022 Case In September 2022, Cromp and his LLC that owned the residence, filed a complaint against Able for breach of contract. Cromp alleged that Able performed defective work, completed in a negligent and reckless manor, which caused damage to the residence. Cromp sought damages and any other relief the superior court deemed “just and equitable” from Able for the alleged breach in contract. CP at 36. Cromp’s complaint also raised a “collection upon bond” claim against Able’s insurer; however, the insurer was not named as a party in the suit. CP at 32. Cromp filed the complaint pro se.
In November 2022, while the lawsuit proceeded, Able’s insurer responded to Cromp’s complaint to the ICO, explaining its denial of the claims. In its response, the insurer stated, “[Able] disputed this claim and stated that Mr. Cromp must have had the toilets detached and reset to install the tile in the bathroom. The tile work was completed after [Able’s] work was already done.” CP at 52.
In October 2023, Cromp emailed interrogatories and requests for production to Able.1 Among other things, Cromp requested the following:
1 The record only includes “Plaintiffs’ First Interrogatories and Requests for Production Directed to Defendants with Answers and Objections Thereto” attached as an exhibit to Able’s motion for summary judgment in this case and filed by Able with the superior court in the 2022 lawsuit. CP at 74. Because Cromp does not contest the interrogatories and requests for production described in the attachment, we rely on it to derive the facts for these interrogatories and requests for production.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Did you contact [the insurer] on 8/13/2019 to request them to start the claim? If so, please explain why in detail.
....
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: On September 27, 2019, did you request the claim to be closed? If so, please explain in detail why.
....
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: On October 21, 2019, did you once again call [the insurer] and request a claim to be re-opened? I[f] so, please explain why in detail.
....
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: On June 10, 2021, did you speak with [the insurer]
and tell them that the toilets were removed to finish tile?
....
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Are you aware of the fact that [the insurer] denied liability of this claim based on the allegations that you said, the tile was incomplete when you set the toilets and that they must have been removed to finish [t]he tile and then reset?
CP at 81-82 (boldface omitted).
Then, in January 2024, Cromp served requests for admission on Able. Alongside others, Cromp made the following requests:
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 16: Admit that on or around 8/13/2019 you contacted [the insurer] and requested that Plaintiffs claim to be opened.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17: Admit that on or around 9/27/2019 you contacted [the insurer] and requested that Plaintiffs claim to be closed.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18: Admit that on or around 10/21/2019 you contacted [the insurer] once again and requested that Plaintiffs claim to be reopened.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 19: Admit that on or around 6/10/21 you told [the insurer] that the tile was unfinished on both upstairs bathroom floors at the time of your Trim Out and that the toilets must have been removed for the tiling to have been finished at Plaintiffs house.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20: Admit that you are aware that [the insurer]
denied Plaintiffs claims based on allegations of the tile not being finished on bathroom floors when you set the toilets.
CP at 92-93 (boldface and underscore omitted).
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Able sought a protective order to prevent Able from having to answer most of the interrogatories, certain requests for document production, and specific requests for admission. Among other things, Able argued that Interrogatories Nos. 17-21 and Requests for Admission Nos. 16-20 sought information regarding privileged communications with their “liability insurer” and were made in anticipation of litigation. CP at 761.
Cromp responded and sought relief, requesting that the superior court deny Able’s motion for protection, order Able to answer Interrogatories Nos. 17-21, remove the LLC from the case, and award Cromp sanctions. In a reply, Able argued, among other things, that Cromp’s response and request for relief should be stricken as untimely. Able also argued that those pleadings should be stricken pursuant to CR 11 because CR 11 required all pleadings and motions of a represented party to be signed by their attorney, Washington law required an LLC to be represented by an attorney, and Cromp, who was proceeding pro se at this stage in the litigation, was not an attorney.
The superior court granted Able’s motion for a protective order, finding good cause for the order and finding that Interrogatories Nos. 17-21 and Requests for Admission Nos. 16-192 sought information regarding privileged communications that was not discoverable. The superior court struck Cromp’s request for relief as untimely and in violation of CR 11.
Over a month after the protective order, Cromp moved for leave to amend his complaint, requesting to remove the LLC as a plaintiff and to add three new causes of actions: “Fraud, Tortious Conduct, and Bad Faith.” CP at 119. It also appears that Cromp sought to amend his
2 From the record before us, it appears that the superior court made no ruling as to Request for Admission No. 20.
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breach of contract claim against Able to also be based on Able’s conduct during the insurance claim process.
In a proposed amended complaint attached to Cromp’s motion, Cromp alleged that Able’s actions underlying these new claims began after Cromp notified Able of damages from the toilets and Able initiated the insurance claim process. Cromp alleged that Able breached their contract by opening an insurance claim on behalf of Cromp but then later closing the claim. Additionally, Cromp alleged that Able acted tortiously and in bad faith by initially opening a claim with its insurer, later closing it “with no reason given and no request to inspect,” and then having the claim reopened a month later. CP at 126. Moreover, Cromp alleged that Able engaged in fraud by lying to the insurer about whether the bathroom tile had been installed at the time of the toilets’ installation. Finally, Cromp listed a cause of action for “Collection upon Bond,” alleging that Able’s insurer, who was not a party, was liable for payment under a specific bond. CP at 127.
Able opposed Cromp’s motion for leave to amend the complaint, arguing that Cromp’s motion should be denied because his proposed amendments would be futile. In support of futility, Able argued that Cromps’ bond claims were time-barred, Cromp failed to allege a bad faith claim against either the non-party insurer or Able, Cromp failed to allege a fraud claim, Cromp was not a proper party to the lawsuit in general, and Cromp could not voluntarily withdraw or dismiss the LLC’s claims. In reply, Cromp clarified, among other things, that he was not trying to add the insurer to the amended complaint.
The superior court denied Cromp’s motion for leave to amend the complaint. The order did not list a basis for the court’s decision.
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Cromp sought discretionary review of the superior court’s grant of Able’s motion for a protective order and its denial of Cromp’s motion for leave to amend the complaint, among other decisions from the court. A commissioner of our court denied Cromp’s motion for discretionary review, concluding that, as relevant to the superior court’s protective order, Able’s motion for discretionary review was untimely. Regarding the denial of Cromp’s motion to amend, our court concluded that Cromp failed to show that the superior court “obviously or probably manifestly abuse[d] its discretion or significantly depart[ed] from the usual course of judicial proceedings.” CP at 235 (citing RAP 2.3(b)(1)-(3)). Thereafter, Cromp moved for discretionary review by the Washington Supreme Court of our court’s decision, and the Court denied review.
In August 2024, Able moved for summary judgment, arguing that Cromp’s breach of contract claim was untimely because the statute of limitations for an oral contract is three years. The superior court granted Able’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice Cromp’s claim. A few days later, the superior court amended the order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, seemingly to remove language from the order.3 From the record before us, it appears that Cromp never appealed either order.
3 The amended order appears to remove the following language at the end of the originally signed order:
Alternatively: ordered that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part, and denied in part, to wit: To the extent Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal of the claims of Plaintiff Hannah H. Marie, LLC, the motion is granted with prejudice, and the remaining relief sought in Defendants’ Motion is denied.
CP at 284. (Some capitalization omitted.) This appears to relate to an alternative argument Able made in its motion for summary judgment that all claims against the LLC should be dismissed because the LLC was not represented by an attorney.
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B. 2024 Case The same day as the superior court’s first order granting summary judgment and dismissing Cromp’s 2022 claim, Cromp filed a 2024 complaint against Able, which is the genesis for the current appeal.4 Cromp raised five claims against the defendants.
Under a breach of contract cause of action, Cromp alleged:
3.1 The defendant, Johnny Harkrider, was contracted by the plaintiff for the installation of plumbing in the plaintiff’s residence. The defendant initially violated the contract by delivering substandard or negligent work. Specifically, two toilets located on the upper floor leaked sewage incrementally with each flush, leading to the gradual contamination of the residence.
3.2 Upon receiving notice of the defective work and resulting damages, Johnny Harkrider committed a breach of duty by the initiating [of] a claim with his insurance provider, only to terminate it a month later, thereby failing to rectify the defects. Subsequent to reopening the claim nearly a month later, Johnny Harkrider once again violated his duty of good faith and fair dealings 22 months later by making a fraudulent misrepresentation of material facts to the insurance provider, resulting in claim denial.
CP at 7-8.
Cromp claims he discovered Able’s “deceptive actions” in November 2022.5 CP at 7.
Cromp also alleged that Able’s misrepresentation to its insurer amounted to “insurance fraud” and “fraudulent misrepresentation,” caused the denial of the insurance claims, and imposed the financial burden of repair on Cromp. CP at 8-9. Finally, Cromp raised a negligence claim and an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim related both to Able’s installation work for the
4 This complaint did not list the LLC as a plaintiff.
5 Cromp’s complaint states that Cromp discovered Able’s “deceptive actions” on “November 7, 2024.” CP at 67. However, other parts of Cromp’s 2024 complaint and Cromp’s briefing below clarify that Cromp alleges he discovered these facts on November 7, 2022.
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toilets and Able’s representations to its insurer. Cromp sought damages and any other relief the superior court deemed “just and proper” from Able for all these claims. CP at 12.
Cromp served Able with discovery, specifically interrogatories and requests for production. Able provided answers and objections in response.
Able then moved for summary judgment, arguing that Cromp’s claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. In addition to responding to Able’s motion, Cromp moved to compel Able to respond to his discovery requests and moved for sanctions according to alleged discovery rule violations.
After a hearing on Able’s motion for summary judgment, the superior court concluded that Cromp’s complaint was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, granted Able’s motion, and dismissed Cromp’s claims with prejudice. The superior court then struck Cromp’s motion to compel. It appears that the superior court struck Cromp’s motion to compel because the motion became moot following the court’s decision to grant Able’s motion for summary judgment.
Cromp appeals.
ANALYSIS
Cromp assigns error to the superior court’s decision to grant Able’s motion for summary judgment and the court’s decision to strike Cromp’s motion to compel discovery. We address each in turn below.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Cromp argues that the superior court erred in granting Able’s motion for summary judgment. We disagree because Cromp’s 2024 case was barred by res judicata.
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A. Legal Principles We review de novo a superior court’s order granting summary judgment, engaging in the same inquiry as the superior court. Fite v. Mudd, 19 Wn. App. 2d 917, 926, 498 P.3d 538 (2021). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Better Bus. Bureau Great West v. Dep’t of Revenue, 32 Wn. App. 2d 748, 757, 561 P.3d 266 (2024), review denied 4 Wn.3d 1017 (2025); CR 56(c).
In considering whether summary judgment was appropriate, “[w]e consider the facts and the inferences from the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fite, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 926. If reasonable minds could disagree on the facts controlling the outcome of the case, a genuine issue of material fact exists and summary judgment is not appropriate. Better Bus. Bureau, 32 Wn. App. 2d at 757.
Washington law prohibits filing two separate lawsuits based on the same event, or “‘claim splitting.’” Ofuasia v. Smurr, 198 Wn. App. 133, 142, 392 P.3d 1148 (2017) (quoting Ensley v. Pitcher, 152 Wn. App. 891, 898, 222 P.3d 99 (2009)). If claim splitting were permitted, the practice would lead to multiple suits and force a defendant to incur the cost and effort of defending multiple suits. Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn. App. 779, 782, 976 P.2d 1274 (1999). The prohibition on claim splitting generally arises under the doctrine of res judicata, also commonly known as claim preclusion. See Ofuasia, 198 Wn. App. at 142; Ensley, 152 Wn. App. at 898-99; Landry, 95 Wn. App. at 782-83. We review de novo whether res judicata bars an action. Dep’t of Labor and Indus. v. Fowler, 23 Wn. App. 2d 509, 525, 516 P.3d 831 (2022).
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Res judicata bars claim splitting if the claims between two separate lawsuits are based on the same cause of action. Ofuasia, 198 Wn. App. at 142. The doctrine ensures that “‘every party [is] afforded one, but not more than one, fair adjudication of his or her claim.’” Cowan v. Cowan, 29 Wn. App. 2d 355, 369-70, 540 P.3d 158 (2023) (quoting Reeves v. Mason County, 22 Wn. App. 2d 99, 115, 509 P.3d 859 (2022)), review denied 2 Wn.3d 1020 (2024).
Res judicata “‘rests upon the ground that a matter which has been litigated, or on which there has been an opportunity to litigate, in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, should not be permitted to be litigated again. It puts an end to strife, produces certainty as to individual rights, and gives dignity and respect to judicial proceedings.’” Ensley, 152 Wn. App. at 899 (quoting Marino Prop. Co. v. Port Comm’rs, 97 Wn.2d 307, 312, 644 P.2d 1181 (1982)).
Accordingly, res judicata applies “‘not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at that time.’” Gourde v. Gannam, 3 Wn. App. 2d 520, 526-27, 417 P.3d 650 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kelly-Hansen v. Kelly- Hansen, 87 Wn. App. 320, 329, 941 P.2d 1108 (1997)). Thus, res judicata bars a party from filing separate lawsuits if claims are based on the same cause of action as a matter litigated or a matter the party had an opportunity to litigate in a prior suit. Ofuasia, 198 Wn. App. at 142; Ensley, 152 Wn. App. at 899.
As a threshold requirement of res judicata, there must be a final judgment on the merits in the prior suit. State v. Stevens County Dist. Ct. Judge, 194 Wn.2d 898, 903, 453 P.3d 984 (2019). To determine whether there was a final judgment on the merits, Washington courts consider
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“whether the claim was properly resolved on the merits [as] opposed to [on] procedural grounds.” Campbell v. Fernandez, 14 Wn. App. 2d 769, 776, 473 P.3d 675 (2020). In addition to this threshold requirement, res judicata then applies if four elements are established: “a concurrence of identity in (1) subject matter, (2) cause of action, (3) persons and parties, and (4) quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.” Emeson v. Dep’t of Corr., 194 Wn. App. 617, 626-27, 376 P.3d 430 (2016). The party asserting that res judicata applies bears the burden of proof. Penner v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transit Auth., 25 Wn. App. 2d 914, 924, 525 P.3d 1010 (2023). B. Res Judicata Barred Cromp’s 2024 Claims Cromp argues that the superior court erred in granting Able’s motion for summary judgment because his 2024 claims were not barred by res judicata. We disagree.
Preliminarily, Cromp argues that the superior court erred in applying res judicata because there was never a final judgment on the merits for Cromp’s new cause of actions—breach of contract, insurance fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims related to Able’s conduct during the insurance claim process and separate from the breach of contract claim for the toilets’ installation. Able responds that a final judgment on the merits occurred through the superior court’s denial of Able’s motion to amend the complaint and its grant of summary judgment. We agree with Able that the dismissal of Cromp’s 2022 case under summary judgment satisfied res judicata’s threshold requirement of a final judgment on the merits.
For the purposes of res judicata, a grant of summary judgment constitutes a final judgment on the merits. Id. at 924. Moreover, the dismissal of certain claims with prejudice based on those
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claims being time-barred pursuant to a statute of limitations qualifies as a circumstance having a res judicata effect. Campbell, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 777-78, n. 4 (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s observations in Classic Auto Refinishing, Inc. v. Marino6 that dismissal on statute of limitations grounds can be treated as dismissal on the merits for res judicata purposes).
Below, Cromp sued Able in 2022 for conduct related to a contract between Cromp and Able for Able to install toilets. Able’s 2022 case was dismissed with prejudice through summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, there was a prior final judgment on the merits sufficient to satisfy res judicata’s threshold requirement. See Penner, 25 Wn. App. 2d at 924.
We turn next to the elements of res judicata and whether Cromp’s 2024 case was barred under the doctrine because of the final judgment in Cromp’s 2022 case. We conclude that all four elements of res judicata were met here and, therefore, Cromp’s 2024 claims were barred under res judicata due to the final judgment in his 2022 case.
1. Identity in Subject Matter The first requirement—whether the two actions involve the same subject matter—is met.
Even though claims may be stated differently, such claims may still involve the same subject matter. Kuhlman v. Thomas, 78 Wn. App. 115, 124, 897 P.2d 365 (1995). In both cases, Cromp sought damages and whatever relief the superior court found “just and proper” for circumstances following Able’s installation of the toilets. CP at 12, 35. While based in different types of claims, both actions involved Able’s alleged misconduct under the same context of Able’s actions while and after installing toilets for Cromp as part of a contact between them. Cromp’s claims
6 (In re Marino), 181 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 1999).
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between the 2022 and 2024 lawsuits are stated differently; however, they both involve the same subject matter and, thus, render this element satisfied. See Kuhlman, 78 Wn. App. at 124.
2. Identity in the Causes of Action There is no specific test for determining whether two actions share an identity of causes of action. Id. at 122. Washington courts generally address res judicata’s second element by considering the following criteria:
(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.
DeYoung v. Cenex Ltd., 100 Wn. App. 885, 892, 1 P.3d 587 (2000) (quoting Kuhlman, 78 Wn. App. at 122).
However, critically, res judicata’s element of identity in causes of action “‘cannot be determined precisely by mechanistic application of a simple test.’” Rains v. State, 100 Wn.2d 660, 663-64, 674 P.2d 165 (1983) (quoting Abramson v. Univ. of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 206 (9th Cir. 1979)). “‘The crucial element underlying all of the standards is the factual predicate of the several claims asserted. For it is the facts surrounding the transaction or occurrence which operate to constitute the cause of action.’” Harris v. Jacobs, 621 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Expert Elec., Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d 1227, 1234 (2d Cir. 1977)). Accordingly, the criteria set out in DeYoung do not all have to be present for there to be identity in causes of action, and we focus our consideration on whether the actions arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts. See Kuhlman, 78 Wn. App. at 122; Harris, 621 F.2d at 343.
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Here, while the prior judgment did not determine necessarily any rights that would impair Cromp’s second case, the evidence necessary to both cases is nearly identical and the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts: Cromp and Able’s contract for the installation of toilets and the alleged conduct occurring as part of and as a result of that contract. Considering the DeYoung criteria and placing specific importance on whether the two actions arise from the same transactional nucleus of facts, we conclude the second element of identity of cause of action is met.
3. Identity in Persons and Parties, and the Quality of Persons for or Against Whom the Claims Are Made The last two elements of res judicata—(3) identity in the persons and parties and (4) the quality of persons for or against whom the claims are made—are also met. For the purpose of res judicata, “‘a judgment is binding upon parties to the litigation and persons in privity with those parties.’” Emeson, 194 Wn. App. at 635 (quoting Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 764, 887 P.2d 898 (1995)).
Here, Cromp and Able were parties in both cases, with Cromp being a named plaintiff in both cases and Able being the named defendant. Because the parties in the present case are identical to those in the 2022 case, there is concurrence of both identity in persons and parties and concurrence in the quality of the persons. See id. at 636 (concluding both elements met when the plaintiff and defendant are identical between the two cases).
Able met its burden of showing that the elements of res judicata applied to Cromp’s 2024 claims and, thus, his 2024 lawsuit constituted impermissible claim splitting. Accordingly, we
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hold that Able was entitled to summary judgment as a matter because Cromp’s claims were barred by res judicata and Cromp raised no genuine issue as to any material fact.7 II. MOTION TO COMPEL
Cromp also assigns error to the superior court’s decision to strike his motion to compel discovery under CR 37, which the court appeared to strike because the motion was moot following the grant of summary judgment. “An issue is moot if ‘a court can no longer provide effective relief.’” A Better Richland v. Chilton, 5 Wn.3d 931, 936, 583 P.3d 1 (2026) (quoting AURC III, LLC v. Point Ruston Phase II, LLC, 3 Wn.3d 80, 86, 546 P.3d 385 (2024)).
Because we affirm the superior court’s grant of summary judgment which dismissed all of Cromp’s claims based on res judicata, we conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in striking Cromp’s motion to compel discovery because further discovery was not necessary to resolve any of Cromp’s claims. See Green v. Pierce County, 197 Wn.2d 841, 858, 487 P.3d 499 (2021) (concluding that a trial court “did not abuse its discretion in denying [a] motion to compel discovery because further discovery [was] not necessary to resolve the issue.”). Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s decision to strike Cromp’s motion to compel.
7 The superior court also granted summary judgment to Able under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. However, because we hold that Cromp’s 2024 claims were barred by res judicata—a holding that is dispositive to Cromp’s appeal—we decline to consider whether collateral estoppel also barred Cromp’s 2024 claims.
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CONCLUSION
We hold that Able was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Cromp’s 2024 lawsuit constituted impermissible claim splitting barred by res judicata. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s summary judgment dismissal of Cromp’s claims and its decision to strike Cromp’s motion to compel discovery as moot.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Che, J.
We concur:
Veljacic, C.J.
Glasgow, J.