David Cramer v. City of Auburn

Ninth Circuit

David Cramer v. City of Auburn

688 F. App'x 483

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedApril 24, 2017

Docket16-15234

StatusUnpublished

This text of 688 F. App'x 483 (David Cramer v. City of Auburn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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David Cramer v. City of Auburn, 688 F. App'x 483 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

David Cramer appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims in connection with his arrest and prosecution for battery. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Whitaker v, Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Cramer’s claims alleging false arrest and imprisonment as iieefc-barred because success on Cramer’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Cramer failed to show that his conviction had been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”); see also Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Heck barred false arrest and false imprisonment claims under § 1983 until conviction was invalidated).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

David Cramer appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims in connection with his arrest and prosecution for battery. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Whitaker v, Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Cramer’s claims alleging false arrest and imprisonment as iieefc-barred because success on Cramer’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Cramer failed to show that his conviction had been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”); see also Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Heck barred false arrest and false imprisonment claims under § 1983 until conviction was invalidated).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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688 F. App'x 483, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-cramer-v-city-of-auburn-ca9-2017.

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