David Catanzaro v. Walmart.com

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 12, 2024
• Docket: 24-1247
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-1247 ___________

DAVID J. CATANZARO, Appellant

v.

DOES 1 THROUGH 50; WALMART, INC.; WALMART.COM ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (M.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-01754) District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 9, 2024 ___________

Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 12, 2024) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Appellant David Catanzaro, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s

dismissal of his civil action for failure to identify Doe defendants 1 through 50. For the

reasons that follow, we will vacate the order of the District Court and remand for further

proceedings.

Catanzaro’s operative second amended complaint asserted claims for patent

infringement against Walmart, Inc., Walmart.com, and Does 1-50. On August 2, 2023,

Catanzaro filed a Stipulation of Dismissal “dismiss[ing] with prejudice all claims asserted

in this action by Plaintiff as against Walmart, Inc. and Walmart.com.” D.Ct. ECF No. 23

at 1. The stipulation indicated that it would “in no way affect Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendants Does 1 through 50.” Id. Walmart, Inc. and Walmart.com were terminated as

parties and, on August 10, 2023, the District Court ordered Catanzaro to identify Does 1-

50 within thirty (30) days. Catanzaro was warned that failure to do so would result in

dismissal of the action. See D.Ct. ECF No. 24 at 1.

Catanzaro did not respond within the allotted time frame. Instead, on September

14, 2023, he filed a “Motion for Reconsideration,” in which he indicated that he did not

receive the District Court’s August 10 order through the mail and only learned of it on

September 13, 2023, when viewing the case docket online. See D.Ct. ECF No. 25 at 1.

Based upon his failure to receive timely notice of the order, Catanzaro asked the court to

terminate or vacate the August 10 order and allow him thirty days “to identify Does 1-50,

and to amend the complaint to add said defendants.” Id. at 3.

2 Almost four months later, the District Court denied the motion and dismissed the

case. It noted that Catanzaro “failed to file a brief in support of his motion pursuant to

the provisions of [Local Rule] 7.5, which itself mandates dismissal of the motion.” D.Ct.

ECF No. 26 at 1. It further noted that, despite Catanzaro’s request for additional time and

his assertion that he did not receive the District Court’s August 10 order, he still, as of the

date of the dismissal, failed to file anything identifying the Doe defendants. Id. at 1-2.

Catanzaro appeals.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 1 We review for abuse of

discretion “a district court’s application and interpretation of its own local rules.”

Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018). Catanzaro argues,

inter alia, that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his motion without

consideration for his pro se status.

We agree that the District Court abused its discretion in its consideration of

Catanzaro’s motion. While pro se litigants “must abide by the same rules that apply to all

other litigants,” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013), their

filings should be construed liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and

based upon substance rather than label or title, see Lewis v. Att’y Gen., 878 F.2d 714,

722 n.20 (3d Cir. 1989). Here, while Catanzaro titled his motion as one for

1 Although the District Court did not indicate whether its dismissal of the Doe defendants was with or without prejudice, a without prejudice dismissal nevertheless constitutes a “final” decision under § 1291 where the statute of limitations would prevent refiling. See Green v. Humphrey Elevator & Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 878 n.4 (3d Cir. 1987). 3 reconsideration, it is more properly construed as a motion for an extension of time. As

the District Court’s own standing order in pro se cases makes clear, such motions do not

require a brief “if the reasons for the request are fully stated in the motion.” D.Ct. ECF

No. 4 at 1. Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to deny

Catanzaro’s motion on the grounds that he failed to include a separate brief. We further

conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to deny Catanzaro’s motion because he failed

to file anything identifying the Doe defendants while he waited on the District Court to

rule on his motion. Catanzaro should not be penalized for waiting on the Court’s

consideration of his extension request to determine whether such a filing would be both

permissible and timely.

Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order denying Catanzaro’s motion

and dismissing the case. We will remand for the District Court to consider, in the first

instance, whether Catanzaro’s motion, properly construed as a motion for an extension of

time, should be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b).