David Cassidy v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedOctober 28, 2022
DocketDC-3443-17-0666-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of David Cassidy v. Department of the Army (David Cassidy v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
David Cassidy v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DAVID K. CASSIDY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-3443-17-0666-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: October 28, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

David K. Cassidy, Lacey, Washington, pro se.

Richard L. Schwartz, APO, AE, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his pay disparity appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 The appellant filed the initial appeal alleging that he was paid approximately $13,000 less annually than his younger female subordinate who has less service. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 3. The appellant alleged this was a personnel action or decision by the agency and that the agency failed to follow merit pay principles. Id. ¶3 In an Order to Show Cause, the administrative judge notified the appellant of his burden of proof to establish Board jurisdiction over an adverse action appeal under chapter 75. IAF, Tab 3. The appellant did not respond to this order. IAF, Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID) at 2. Because the appellant failed to raise a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction, the administrative judge determined that he was not entitled to a hearing and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 1. ¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, and the agency has responded. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 4. In his petition for review, the appellant asserts that he did not timely receive the Order to Show 3

Cause or the initial decision due to mail delays and his deployment to temporary active duty. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. The appellant further asserts that “[t]he Board’s jurisdiction in this case is clearly outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).” Id. Lastly, the appellant lists various scenarios in which the Board may review pay issues, apparently asserting that this establishes Board jurisdiction over his appeal. Id. at 2.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶5 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to areas specifically granted by law, rule, or regulation. Todd v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 55 F.3d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995). An appellant has the burden to establish jurisdiction over his appeal . 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). ¶6 Although the appellant indicates that he received the administrative judge’s jurisdictional order and the initial decision late, we find that his petition for review was timely filed. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. Further, because jurisdiction may be raised at any time during Board proceedings, we consider the appellant’s arguments on review, regardless of his failure to respond to the order below. Morgan v. Department of the Navy, 28 M.S.P.R. 477, 478 (1985); ID at 2. ¶7 Nonetheless, we find that the administrative judge properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A claim under the Equal Pay Act, such as this one, does not fall within the Board’s original or appellate jurisdiction. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.2-1201.3 (listing claims over which the Board has jurisdiction). The appellant’s reference to three circumstances in which pay issues may come before the Board, seemingly arguing that this establishes Board jurisdiction over all pay issues, misses the mark. The appellant first notes that an Equal Pay Act claim may be raised as an affirmative defense in a mixed case before the Board in which the Board has jurisdiction over an adverse action. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(1)(C) and 7702(a)(1)(B)(ii)). However, the appellant did not allege that he suffered from an adverse action 4

under chapter 75. IAF, Tab 1 at 3. Adverse actions are limited to removals, suspensions exceeding 14 days, reductions in grade, reductions in pay, and furloughs of 30 days or less. 5 U.S.C. § 7512(1)-(5). The Board generally lacks jurisdiction over discrimination claims in the absence of an otherwise appealable action. Rosario-Fabregas v. Department of Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 468, ¶ 20 (2015), aff’d, 833 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2016). ¶8 The appellant additionally states that pay issues may come before the Board in situations where the Board has ordered corrective action for employees. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2 (citing Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). This situation is not applicable here, however, as there is no such order in this matter. ¶9 Finally, the appellant states that pay issues may come before the Board in whistleblower reprisal cases because “a decision concerning pay” is a “personnel action” as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix). PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. This too is not applicable here as the appellant has alleged neither that he is a whistleblower nor that the decision concerning his pay was made in response to a protected disclosure.

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Related

John H. Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts
726 F.2d 730 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Debra J. Todd v. Merit Systems Protection Board
55 F.3d 1574 (Federal Circuit, 1995)
Rosario-Fabregas v. Merit Systems Protection Board
833 F.3d 1342 (Federal Circuit, 2016)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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David Cassidy v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-cassidy-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2022.