David Cash Moore v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 28, 2005
• Docket: 13-04-00425-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

            NUMBER 13-04-425-CV

                         COURT OF APPEALS

                     THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                         CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

DAVID CASH MOORE,                                                                   Appellant,

                                                             v.                               

TDCJ-CID, ET AL.,                                                                          Appellees.

         On appeal from the 156th District Court of Bee County, Texas.

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

                          Before Justices Yañez, Castillo, and Garza

                            Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza                      

Appellant, David Cash Moore, appeals the trial court=s dismissal of his pro se, in forma pauperis petition for property damages.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.002 (Vernon 2002).  By two issues, appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdictional amount, and (2) construing his petition as a Alawsuit@ rather than an appeal from an adverse administrative decision.  We affirm the decision of the trial court. 

Appellant is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal JusticeBInstitutional Division.  Appellant initially filed a grievance with the TDCJ complaining of the alleged loss of property.^[1]  After exhausting his administrative remedies, appellant then filed a claim in district court seeking review of the adverse administrative decision.^[2]  Appellant sought a declaratory judgment (1) to find the evidence legally and factually insufficient to sustain the agency=s decision, (2) declaring that petitioner=s constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated,^[3] and (3) to vacate the agency decision.  In addition, appellant sought monetary awards for the loss of his property in the amount of $51.68, mental suffering, mental anguish and punitive damages.  Appellee filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming that the amount sought was not within the jurisdictional limits of the court and asserted the defense of sovereign immunity.  After a hearing on defendant=s plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction.

We review a trial court's dismissal of an inmate's lawsuit in forma pauperis under an abuse of discretion standard.  Thomas v. Knight, 52 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2001, pet. denied).  A court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules or principles.  Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985); Knight, 52 S.W.3d at 294-95.  Where the trial court has not specified the grounds for dismissal in its order, the order will be affirmed if any of the theories advanced in the motion to dismiss supports the dismissal.  Walker v. Gonzales County Sherrif=s Dep=t., 35 S.W.3d 157, 162 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2000, pet. denied).  The order dismissing appellant=s suit recites that the court considered defendant=s  plea to the jurisdiction and pleadings on file in dismissing appellant=s suit.  Therefore, if either of appellee=s theories of failure to meet the jurisdictional limit or sovereign immunity supports the dismissal, we will affirm. 

For purposes of our review, we will address appellant=s second issue first.  In his second issue, appellant claims that the trial court erred by construing his claim as a lawsuit when it is actually an appeal from an administrative decision.  We disagree.  The statute under which appellant sought relief states that an inmate may not file a claim in state court regarding operative facts for which the grievance system provides the exclusive administrative remedy until all remedies are exhausted.  See Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 501.008 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (emphasis added).  AClaim@ is defined as a cause of action governed under this chapter.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.001(1) (Vernon 2002).  The applicable statute does not refer to the right to seek relief in state court as an appeal from an administrative order, it refers to it as a claim.  See Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 501.008.    The plethora of cases pertaining to inmate litigation under chapter fourteen of the civil practice and remedies code and sections 501.007 and 501.008 all construe claims brought pursuant to these statutes as lawsuits.  See Thompson v. Mannix, 814 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tex. App.BWaco 1991, no writ) (appellant inmate claimed in his suit that the defendants confiscated and converted some of his property) (emphasis added); Chapa v. Spivey, 999 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex. App.BTyler 1999, no pet.) (appellant prisoner filed suit in the district court to recover damages pursuant to government code section 501.007) (emphasis added); Spurlock v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733, 735 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (appellant inmate brought a suit for damages against appellee official and other employees of the state for damages stemming from loss to his personal property) (emphasis added).  We find that the trial court did not err in classifying appellant=s claim as a lawsuit.          

In his first issue, appellant asserts that, because his claim is an appeal from an administrative decision, he had a right to challenge the decision of the TDCJ in district court without having to comply with its jurisdictional limits.  Appellant=s argument is without merit.  We have already concluded that his claim is a lawsuit and is therefore subject to jurisdictional requirements.  Appellant sought relief under the statute governing inmate claims for lost or damaged property.  See Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 501.007 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).  This statute does not specifically provide that suit is to be filed in district court.  Instead, it provides that a claim may be brought in state court.  See Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 501.008(d) (emphasis added).  This means that suit may be brought in district, county, justice of the peace, or small claims court, depending on the amount in controversy and the jurisdictional limit of the court.  The amount in controversy is determined by the plaintiff=s petition.  Villarreal v. Elizondo, 831 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1992, no writ) (citations omitted).  As stated in his petition, the purported value of the property in question is $51.68.  The minimum amount needed to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court is $500.  See Barnes V. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 495 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Tex. Civ. App.BAmarillo 1973, writ ref=d n.r.e.) (district court did not have jurisdiction where claimant sought to recover only $424); Chapa v. Spivey, 999 S.W.2d at 836 (dismissing appellant prisoner=s suit where he alleged property damages in the amount of $262.50 and where the district court=s minimum amount in controversy requirement was $500).  Our interpretation of the statute and case law leads us to conclude that although a prisoner may file suit in state court, he must do so in the court with appropriate jurisdiction.  Here, appellant should have filed suit in Justice of the Peace court in Bee County.  See Tex. Const. art. V, ' 19.  

            In reviewing the trial court=s dismissal on a plea to the jurisdiction, we examine the plaintiff=s pleadings to determine whether he has affirmatively shown that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction.  See Texas Ass=n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993).  AUnless the petition affirmatively demonstrates that no cause of action exists or that plaintiff=s recovery is barred, we require the trial court to give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend before granting a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.@  Peek v. Equipment Serv. Co. of San Antonio, 779 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. 1989).  In this case, appellant affirmatively pleaded himself out of district court.  The amount sought was far less than the minimal jurisdictional limit of the district court.  Further, appellant has presented no alternate theory of liability that he could have pleaded for which appellee could not assert sovereign immunity.^[4] 

We overrule the issues presented and affirm the trial court=s judgment dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction. 

_______________________

DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,

Justice

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this the 28th day of July, 2005.

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^[1] The property consisted of one radio, one pair of headphones, one night light, one alarm clock, two pilot pens, one pair of leather gloves, one set of headphone covers, and one light bulb. 

^[2] The Texas Legislature provides an administrative remedy to pay a claim for lost or damaged property via '' 501.007 and 501.008 of the Texas Government Code.  Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. '' 501.007, 501.008 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).

^[3] See Murphy v. Collins, 26 F. 3d 541, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that deprivations of property caused by the misconduct of state officials do not infringe upon notions of constitutional due process if adequate state post-deprivation remedies exist and in Texas the tort of conversion is such a remedy); see also Aguilar v. Chastain, 923 S.W.2d 740, 743‑44 (Tex. App.‑Tyler 1996, writ denied) (holding that a prison official's unauthorized deprivation of an inmate's property is not a constitutional violation since the Texas Legislature has provided an administrative remedy to pay a claim for lost or damaged property via '' 501.007 and 501.008 of the Texas Government Code).

^[4] We note that appellee raised the defense of sovereign immunity and find that this theory also supports the trial court=s dismissal.  The statutory provisions for pursuing inmate claims for lost or damaged property does not affect any immunity that otherwise exists for a department of the state.  See Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. '501.008(f).  The allegations in appellant=s petition are pursuant to section 501.007,and appellant does not provide any other claims for which appellee would not be entitled to claim sovereign immunity.