U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 22-2300
DAVID CAMARGO GOMEZ; EDITH PONCE CORDERO, Petitioners,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _______________
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (A206-072-810, A206-072-811) Immigration Judge: Tamar Wilson
Before: KRAUSE, FREEMAN, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 29, 2026;
Decided January 30, 2026 _______________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Petitioners David Camargo Gomez and Edith Ponce Cordero, who are a married
couple and citizens of Mexico, challenge the denial of their application for
cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The Immigration Judge (IJ)
concluded that Petitioners failed to show their removal would cause their U.S.-citizen
children “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), and the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. In this petition for review, Petitioners
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. argue that (1) the IJ and BIA failed to adequately consider the hardship factors in analyzing
their cancellation-of-removal claim; (2) the IJ and BIA erred in refusing to admit untimely
supplemental evidence; and (3) Petitioners were denied a full and fair hearing before a
neutral factfinder, in violation of their Fifth Amendment due process rights. None of these
arguments entitles them to relief.
I. DISCUSSION1
A. Hardship Determination
Our review of an IJ’s hardship determination is circumscribed in two ways. First,
“[t]he facts underlying any determination on cancellation of removal,” including an IJ’s
findings on “the seriousness of a family member’s medical condition,” are
“unreviewable.” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024). We can only review
“whether those established facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard.” Id. Second, we
conduct that review only to ascertain whether “substantial evidence” supports the IJ’s
conclusion, and under that deferential standard of review, “we will uphold the IJ’s
determination ‘unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
1 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15. We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision because the IJ’s application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to the facts is a justiciable question of law under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 217 (2024) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)). We will review both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions where, as here, the BIA “adopts the [IJ’s] findings . . . and discusses some of the bases for the IJ’s decision” in a reasoned opinion. Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). 2 contrary.’” Wilkinson v. Att’y Gen., 131 F.4th 134, 142 (3d Cir. 2025) (quoting Nasrallah
v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020)).
Petitioners’ argument rests in large part on the hardship that would befall their son
if they were deported. The IJ’s treatment of the evidence regarding their son, who has
insulin resistance, hypothyroidism, anxiety, depressive mood disorder, and other medical
conditions, was undoubtedly concerning. For example, the IJ stated that there were “no
medical, physical, psychological, or developmental reasons . . . why [the son] [could not]
adequately care for himself.” A.R. 52. But that finding is at odds with the report of
psychologist Dr. Paula Madrid, whose credibility the IJ did not question and who detailed
the son’s lack of independent functioning. That finding is also contravened by evidence in
the timely, credible report from Yanela Stephenson, the children’s therapist.2
Unfortunately for Petitioners, however, they failed to properly raise the argument
that the IJ and BIA did not adequately consider the hardship factors in their petition for
review. Their brief contains a heading with that assertion. But the two-paragraph section
that follows and the other sections of their brief that mention the hardship determination
actually address a different claim—that the IJ erred in denying Petitioners’ request to
submit supplemental evidence out-of-time. That is insufficient to preserve their hardship
argument before our Court. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 532 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005)
2 The IJ expressed some credibility concerns with the evidence Stephenson presented but did not ultimately “make an adverse credibility determination” as to her submissions. A.R. 976. 3 (concluding petitioner forfeited an argument to which she only alluded, in a single
paragraph of her briefing); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir.
1993) (noting that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a party abandons any arguments
on appeal that he fails to develop in his opening brief).
B. Exclusion of Untimely Evidence
Petitioners next contend that the IJ erred in refusing to consider their untimely
supplemental evidence. IJs have discretion to set deadlines for the submission of
documents, subject to relevant local rules. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) (2019). If a
document is untimely filed, the “opportunity to file [it] . . . shall be deemed waived,” unless
the noncitizen demonstrates “good cause” for filing late “and a likelihood of substantial
prejudice from enforcement of the deadline,” Dedji v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 187, 191-92
(2d Cir. 2008) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c)). We review the IJ’s decision to exclude
evidence for abuse of discretion. Id.
Petitioners did not show good cause for their delay in filing supplemental evidence.
They were notified in June 2018 to file all their evidence by March 11, 2019—30 days
before their merits hearing on April 11, 2019. Yet they did not file the supplemental
evidence with the Immigration Court until more than two months after that deadline, on
May 24, 2019, the day that their merits hearing was scheduled to continue. Even then,
Petitioners offered no excuse for their delay, and none is apparent on the face of the
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U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 22-2300
DAVID CAMARGO GOMEZ; EDITH PONCE CORDERO, Petitioners,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _______________
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (A206-072-810, A206-072-811) Immigration Judge: Tamar Wilson
Before: KRAUSE, FREEMAN, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 29, 2026;
Decided January 30, 2026 _______________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Petitioners David Camargo Gomez and Edith Ponce Cordero, who are a married
couple and citizens of Mexico, challenge the denial of their application for
cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The Immigration Judge (IJ)
concluded that Petitioners failed to show their removal would cause their U.S.-citizen
children “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), and the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. In this petition for review, Petitioners
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. argue that (1) the IJ and BIA failed to adequately consider the hardship factors in analyzing
their cancellation-of-removal claim; (2) the IJ and BIA erred in refusing to admit untimely
supplemental evidence; and (3) Petitioners were denied a full and fair hearing before a
neutral factfinder, in violation of their Fifth Amendment due process rights. None of these
arguments entitles them to relief.
I. DISCUSSION1
A. Hardship Determination
Our review of an IJ’s hardship determination is circumscribed in two ways. First,
“[t]he facts underlying any determination on cancellation of removal,” including an IJ’s
findings on “the seriousness of a family member’s medical condition,” are
“unreviewable.” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024). We can only review
“whether those established facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard.” Id. Second, we
conduct that review only to ascertain whether “substantial evidence” supports the IJ’s
conclusion, and under that deferential standard of review, “we will uphold the IJ’s
determination ‘unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
1 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15. We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision because the IJ’s application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to the facts is a justiciable question of law under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 217 (2024) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)). We will review both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions where, as here, the BIA “adopts the [IJ’s] findings . . . and discusses some of the bases for the IJ’s decision” in a reasoned opinion. Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). 2 contrary.’” Wilkinson v. Att’y Gen., 131 F.4th 134, 142 (3d Cir. 2025) (quoting Nasrallah
v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020)).
Petitioners’ argument rests in large part on the hardship that would befall their son
if they were deported. The IJ’s treatment of the evidence regarding their son, who has
insulin resistance, hypothyroidism, anxiety, depressive mood disorder, and other medical
conditions, was undoubtedly concerning. For example, the IJ stated that there were “no
medical, physical, psychological, or developmental reasons . . . why [the son] [could not]
adequately care for himself.” A.R. 52. But that finding is at odds with the report of
psychologist Dr. Paula Madrid, whose credibility the IJ did not question and who detailed
the son’s lack of independent functioning. That finding is also contravened by evidence in
the timely, credible report from Yanela Stephenson, the children’s therapist.2
Unfortunately for Petitioners, however, they failed to properly raise the argument
that the IJ and BIA did not adequately consider the hardship factors in their petition for
review. Their brief contains a heading with that assertion. But the two-paragraph section
that follows and the other sections of their brief that mention the hardship determination
actually address a different claim—that the IJ erred in denying Petitioners’ request to
submit supplemental evidence out-of-time. That is insufficient to preserve their hardship
argument before our Court. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 532 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005)
2 The IJ expressed some credibility concerns with the evidence Stephenson presented but did not ultimately “make an adverse credibility determination” as to her submissions. A.R. 976. 3 (concluding petitioner forfeited an argument to which she only alluded, in a single
paragraph of her briefing); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir.
1993) (noting that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a party abandons any arguments
on appeal that he fails to develop in his opening brief).
B. Exclusion of Untimely Evidence
Petitioners next contend that the IJ erred in refusing to consider their untimely
supplemental evidence. IJs have discretion to set deadlines for the submission of
documents, subject to relevant local rules. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) (2019). If a
document is untimely filed, the “opportunity to file [it] . . . shall be deemed waived,” unless
the noncitizen demonstrates “good cause” for filing late “and a likelihood of substantial
prejudice from enforcement of the deadline,” Dedji v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 187, 191-92
(2d Cir. 2008) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c)). We review the IJ’s decision to exclude
evidence for abuse of discretion. Id.
Petitioners did not show good cause for their delay in filing supplemental evidence.
They were notified in June 2018 to file all their evidence by March 11, 2019—30 days
before their merits hearing on April 11, 2019. Yet they did not file the supplemental
evidence with the Immigration Court until more than two months after that deadline, on
May 24, 2019, the day that their merits hearing was scheduled to continue. Even then,
Petitioners offered no excuse for their delay, and none is apparent on the face of the
documents: the untimely evidence related to their son’s existing medical conditions and so
presumably would have been previously available at the time of their initial hearing. Under
4 these circumstances, the exclusion of the untimely medical evidence was well within the
IJ’s discretion.
C. Due Process Claim
Lastly, Petitioners claim their due process rights were violated. To make out a due
process claim, a petitioner must show both that (1) she was denied the “opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542,
549 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)), and (2) the
denial resulted in “substantial prejudice,” Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448
(3d Cir. 2005). In this case, Petitioners failed to establish either prong.
Petitioners’ theory that the IJ was biased rests on a false premise. They point to the
IJ’s statement, made in connection with denying their motion for an enlargement of time
for additional expert testimony and submission of updated expert reports, and before
Petitioner Gomez had testified: “I haven’t had a chance to review any of this and I intend
on issuing an oral decision today.” A.R. 208. Petitioners reason that “[b]ecause IJs are
precluded from issuing an oral decision if the IJ intends on granting” cancellation of
removal under Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) Regulations, the IJ’s
statement shows that she had already decided to deny their case, before the record even
closed. Opening Br. 8-9 (emphasis added) (citing EOIR, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Operating
Policies and Procedures Memorandum 17-04: Applications for Cancellation of Removal or
Suspension of Deportation that are Subject to the Cap (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/HLX7-LF2D).
5 The EOIR regulation, however, is inapplicable, because it is triggered only when
the statutory annual cap of 4,000 removal cancellations is about to be reached, which
Petitioners did not establish was the case here. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1);
8 C.F.R. § 1240.21(c). Nor have Petitioners established that they were denied the
opportunity to present evidence or suffered prejudice because of the IJ’s statement. Over
the course of the hearings, the IJ permitted Petitioners to make their legal arguments and
introduce testimony from each of them and their children’s psychotherapist. The IJ also
admitted into evidence over 600 pages of documentary evidence, encompassing tax returns,
country-conditions evidence, and medical evaluations. And the IJ then considered and ruled
on the basis of Petitioners’ “credible testimony [and] . . . Exhibits 1 through 11,” A.R. 49—
that is, on the basis of the entire record.
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.