David Brimer v. Department of the Navy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedNovember 30, 2023
DocketAT-0752-18-0449-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of David Brimer v. Department of the Navy (David Brimer v. Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
David Brimer v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DAVID SCOTT BRIMER, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-3330-21-0119-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: November 30, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

David Scott Brimer , Milton, Florida, pro se.

Carol M. Lynch and Daniel J. Watson , Esquire, Pensacola, Florida, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied corrective action in the appellant’s appeal under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to find jurisdiction over the appellant’s right-to-compete claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)(A)-(B) and to clarify the reason as to why the appellant is not entitled to corrective action under VEOA, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND ¶2 This appeal concerns the appellant’s nonselection for a merit promotion to a GS-14 Assistant Human Resources Officer position with the agency’s Naval Education and Training Command. The following facts are undisputed. The appellant is a preference-eligible disabled veteran. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 6, Tab 10 at 7, 10. At the time of his application for promotion, the appellant was employed by the agency’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery as a GS-13 Supervisory Human Resources Specialist. IAF, Tab 7 at 4. The vacancy announcement, advertised under Job Announcement ST-10905451-20-DM, was a merit promotion announcement open to current or former Federal employees, and the agency accepted applications from outside its workforce, including VEOA eligibles, and Military Spouse Preference (MSP) eligibles. IAF, Tab 6 at 9-10. ¶3 The appellant applied for the position; however, his application was not referred to the hiring official because the agency mistakenly believed that he did 3

not submit documents reflecting that he met the time-in-grade requirement for the position. Id. at 5, 38. The appellant filed a VEOA complaint with the Department of Labor (DOL), Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS), on October 20, 2020. IAF, Tab 10 at 12. After receiving notification of the appellant’s complaint, the agency reviewed the appellant’s application and informed VETS that the appellant was not among the most highly qualified candidates for the position. IAF, Tab 6 at 24. On December 2, 2020, VETS issued a letter closing the file on the appellant’s VEOA complaint and notified him of his appeal rights. IAF, Tab 1 at 7-8. ¶4 The appellant timely filed a Board appeal and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. In his appeal, he alleged that the agency obstructed his right to compete for employment and violated his veterans’ preference rights. Id. at 5. The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order, which notified the appellant that the Board may not have jurisdiction over his appeal, explained the jurisdictional requirements under VEOA, and ordered the appellant to file evidence and argument establishing Board jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 9. Both parties filed responses. IAF, Tabs 10-11. The administrative judge issued a decision on the merits, without holding a hearing, denying the appellant’s request for corrective action under VEOA and finding the Board otherwise lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s allegation of a prohibited personnel practice pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(4). IAF, Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID) at 5-7. ¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review, wherein he asserts that the administrative judge erred by adjudicating the VEOA claim on the merits after only requesting that the appellant submit evidence and argument as to jurisdiction over his claim. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5-8. He also submits additional argument regarding the merits of the nonselection. Id. at 8-15. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3. 4

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The Board has jurisdiction over the appellant’s right-to-compete claim. ¶6 Under VEOA, preference eligibles and certain veterans who unsuccessfully apply for a position being filled by a Federal agency for which the agency accepted applications from individuals outside of its own workforce under merit promotion procedures and who allege that they have been denied the opportunity to compete afforded to them under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) may seek administrative redress for a violation of their rights. 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)(A)-(B); Walker v. Department of the Army, 104 M.S.P.R. 96, ¶¶ 9-17 (2006). These are commonly referred to as right-to-compete claims. Prior to the passage of the Veterans Benefits Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-454, § 804, 118 Stat. 3598, 3626 (2004), preference-eligible applicants were permitted to file a right-to-compete claim pursuant to statutory provisions now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)(A). Walker, 104 M.S.P.R. 96, ¶¶ 16-17 (explaining that 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) is a statute relating to veterans’ preference for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)). The Veterans Benefits Improvement Act of 2004 extended that right to include covered veterans, who may file a claim pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)(B). Montgomery v. Department of Health and Human Services , 123 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶ 4 n.1 (2016).

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David Brimer v. Department of the Navy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-brimer-v-department-of-the-navy-mspb-2023.