David Boyce Cornett v. the State of Texas
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Opinion
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-24-00032-CR ___________________________
DAVID BOYCE CORNETT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 297th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1764157
Before Wallach, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Walker, J. Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant David Boyce Cornett attempts to appeal his conviction for indecency
with a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11. Under a charge bargain, Cornett pled
guilty in exchange for the State’s waiving a second count of indecency with a child. See
Harper v. State, 567 S.W.3d 450, 455 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no pet.)
(discussing charge bargains). As part of his written plea agreement, Cornett waived
any right of appeal, and he was admonished that if the trial court followed the
agreement, he would have to obtain permission from the trial court before he could
“prosecute an appeal on any matter in the case except for matters raised by written
motion filed prior to trial.”
In accordance with the parties’ agreement, the trial court found Cornett guilty
of one count of indecency with a child, sentenced Cornett to fifteen years’
confinement, and recorded on the judgment that the State had waived the second
count. However, the trial court’s certification of Cornett’s right of appeal stated that
this was not a plea-bargain case and that Cornett had a right of appeal. Cornett then
filed his notice of appeal. Because the certification did not reflect the record, we
abated the appeal and ordered the trial court to amend the certification to comport
with the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 34.5(c)(2); Harper, 567 S.W3d at 455.
The trial court’s amended certification notes that this is a plea-bargain case and
that Cornett has no right of appeal, and Cornett has offered no indication that he is
2 appealing from a written pretrial motion.1 We therefore notified Cornett that we had
received the trial court’s amended certification stating that this is a plea-bargain case
and that he has no right of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2) (providing that in a
plea bargain case, “a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by
written motion filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s
permission to appeal, or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by
statute”); Harper, 567 S.W.3d at 455 (applying Rule 25.2(a)(2) to charge bargains and
holding that we had no jurisdiction over issues not raised in pretrial motions and for
which the trial court had not given permission to appeal). We warned him that this
appeal could be dismissed unless he or another party filed a response showing
grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3.
We have received no response. Thus, in accordance with the trial court’s
certification, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d),
43.2(f).
1 Cornett signed “Written Waivers of Defendant” in connection with the plea agreement, and in that document, he stated that he was “giv[ing] up and waiv[ing] all pretrial motions that may have been filed in [his] case.”
3 Per Curiam
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: August 1, 2024
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