GORMAN, J.
[¶ 1] David Bordetsky appeals from a judgment in favor of JAK Realty Trust entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County,
Mullen, J.)
after a nonjury trial on Bordetsky’s foreclosure complaint. Bor-detsky argues that the court erred by applying the requirements for a notice of default and right to cure contained in 14 M.R.S. § 6111 (2012)
to his attempt to
foreclose. We agree and vacate the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] On October 3,2013, Bordetsky filed a complaint for foreclosure against the Trust, alleging that on April 13, 2009, Gregory O’Halloran — as trustee of the Trust — executed a promissory note in the amount of $140,000, secured by a mortgage on property located in Benton; that the Trust had defaulted on the note as of August 13, 2011; and that the total amount due on the note, including principal, interest, and late charges, was $193,625.42.
[¶3] After a nonjury trial, the court issued a judgment dated April 15, 2016, containing the following findings of fact, which are supported by competent record evidence. O’Halloran is trustee of the JAK Realty Trust; the Trust’s beneficiaries are O’Halloran’s four daughters. On April 13, 2009, the Trust — through O’Halloran, as trustee — executed a document entitled “COMMERCIAL NOTE” in the amount of $140,000 in favor of Bordetsky. The note states that it is secured by a mortgage on real estate located at 157 Wyman Road in Benton, and lists the same address as the “Borrower’s Address.” 157 Wyman Road, Benton, is O’Halloran’s address. The note also states, “This note evidences a loan for business and commercial purposes and not for personal, household, or family purposes.”
[¶ 4] On the same day, the Trust executed a mortgage in favor of Bordetsky on real property at 157 Wyman Road in Benton. The mortgage mentions no commercial purposes, and states only that the mortgage is to secure payment “in accordance with the terms of a certain promissory note of even date.”
[¶ 5] The court determined that “the language of the agreement between the parties was ambiguous” as to whether it was residential or commercial in nature, and therefore considered extrinsic evidence— O’Halloran’s testimony in particular — regarding the parties’ intent in executing the note and mortgage. Based on O’Halloran’s testimony, the court further found that, at the time the note and mortgage were executed, Bordetsky knew that O’Halloran and his children were residing, at the Wy-man Road property.- O’Halloran has continued to reside there. Of the $140,000 loaned to the Trust, $67,421.68 was used to purchase the “Beckris, LLC loan,” a “business involvement” in which the Trust was purchasing a different note and mortgage from Bordetsky. Most of the remaining loan proceeds — $61,491.89—were used to pay O’Halloran as trustee; of that amount, O’Halloran used roughly $30,000 to $40,000 to fix up the Wyman Road property, and the remainder was used for O’Halloran’s living expenses, including food, utilities, and clothing. Bordetsky was aware when the note and mortgage were executed that O’Halloran intended to use the loan proceeds for both commercial and household
purposes. On these facts, the court con-eluded that Bordetsky was required to— but did not — comply with the requirements for a notice of default and right to cure contained in 14 M.R.S. § 6111, and issued a judgment in favor of the Trust. Bordet-sky timely appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶6] A party seeking to foreclose a mortgage on a residential property pursuant to 14 M.R.S.' § 6111 must first comply with certain notice requirements.
More particularly, “[a] mortgagee may not accel
erate maturity of the unpaid balance of [an] obligation or otherwise enforce [a] mortgage because of a default” unless and until a notice of default and right to cure has been provided to the mortgagor. 14 M.R.S. § 6111(1);
see Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf,
2014 ME 89, ¶¶ 18, 29, 96 A.3d 700 (requiring, as an element of a foreclosure, “evidence of [a] properly served notice of default and mortgagor’s right to cure” in compliance with 14 M.R.S. § 6111 (quotation marks omitted));
Chase Home Fin. LLC v. Higgins,
2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508 (same).
[IT 7] Not all attempts to foreclose are subject to section 6111, however; pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 6111(1), only “[w]ith respect to mortgages upon residential property located in this State when the mortgagor is occupying all or a portion of the property as the mortgagor’s primary residence and the mortgage secures a loan for personal, family or household use” must a mortgagee satisfy the requirements for a notice of default , and right to cure contained in 14 M.R.S. § 6111. In short, section 6111(1) applies when three discrete facts are true: (1) the mortgage is on residential property in Maine; (2) the mortgagor occupies the property as his primary residence; and (3) the mortgage secures a loan for personal, family, or household use. Thus, the first two facts regard the nature and use of the property that is the subject of the mortgage, and the third fact regards the nature of the loan that the mortgage secures.
[¶ 8] The court’s decision here rests entirely on its determination that the notice requirements of section 6111 applied to Bordetsky’s foreclosure action and that Bordetsky failed to meet his burden of establishing that those requirements were satisfied. There is no dispute — and Bordet-sky stipulated — that he, as mortgagee, did not comply with section 6111. Bordetsky
challenges the court’s determination that section 6111 applies to this foreclosure.
[¶ 9] As to the first two requirements, the court found that the mortgage is on real property located at 157 Wyman Road in Benton, Maine; O’Halloran “has been residing at the subject property” at least since 2009; and O’Halloran’s four daughters also resided there as well.' These findings are supported by O’Halloran’s testimony and indeed, Bordetsky has never challenged that a residential home is situated on the Wyman Road property. The crux of the appeal is the trial court’s detér-mination as to the third requirement — that the mortgage “secures a loan for personal, family or household use.” 14 M.R.S. § 6111(1).
[¶ 10] Because the note is the document that memorializes the loan,
see Harbor Funding Corp. v. Kavanagh,
666 A.2d 498, 499 (Me. 1995), the court must interpret the note to determine whether a loan is for “personal, family or household use,” 14 M.R.S. § 6111(1). If the note is unambiguous, the court interprets it according to' the language within “the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence.”
Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. Acadia Ins. Co.,
2003 ME 6, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 989 (quotation marks omitted);
see Coastal Ventures v. Alsham Plaza, LLC,
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GORMAN, J.
[¶ 1] David Bordetsky appeals from a judgment in favor of JAK Realty Trust entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County,
Mullen, J.)
after a nonjury trial on Bordetsky’s foreclosure complaint. Bor-detsky argues that the court erred by applying the requirements for a notice of default and right to cure contained in 14 M.R.S. § 6111 (2012)
to his attempt to
foreclose. We agree and vacate the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] On October 3,2013, Bordetsky filed a complaint for foreclosure against the Trust, alleging that on April 13, 2009, Gregory O’Halloran — as trustee of the Trust — executed a promissory note in the amount of $140,000, secured by a mortgage on property located in Benton; that the Trust had defaulted on the note as of August 13, 2011; and that the total amount due on the note, including principal, interest, and late charges, was $193,625.42.
[¶3] After a nonjury trial, the court issued a judgment dated April 15, 2016, containing the following findings of fact, which are supported by competent record evidence. O’Halloran is trustee of the JAK Realty Trust; the Trust’s beneficiaries are O’Halloran’s four daughters. On April 13, 2009, the Trust — through O’Halloran, as trustee — executed a document entitled “COMMERCIAL NOTE” in the amount of $140,000 in favor of Bordetsky. The note states that it is secured by a mortgage on real estate located at 157 Wyman Road in Benton, and lists the same address as the “Borrower’s Address.” 157 Wyman Road, Benton, is O’Halloran’s address. The note also states, “This note evidences a loan for business and commercial purposes and not for personal, household, or family purposes.”
[¶ 4] On the same day, the Trust executed a mortgage in favor of Bordetsky on real property at 157 Wyman Road in Benton. The mortgage mentions no commercial purposes, and states only that the mortgage is to secure payment “in accordance with the terms of a certain promissory note of even date.”
[¶ 5] The court determined that “the language of the agreement between the parties was ambiguous” as to whether it was residential or commercial in nature, and therefore considered extrinsic evidence— O’Halloran’s testimony in particular — regarding the parties’ intent in executing the note and mortgage. Based on O’Halloran’s testimony, the court further found that, at the time the note and mortgage were executed, Bordetsky knew that O’Halloran and his children were residing, at the Wy-man Road property.- O’Halloran has continued to reside there. Of the $140,000 loaned to the Trust, $67,421.68 was used to purchase the “Beckris, LLC loan,” a “business involvement” in which the Trust was purchasing a different note and mortgage from Bordetsky. Most of the remaining loan proceeds — $61,491.89—were used to pay O’Halloran as trustee; of that amount, O’Halloran used roughly $30,000 to $40,000 to fix up the Wyman Road property, and the remainder was used for O’Halloran’s living expenses, including food, utilities, and clothing. Bordetsky was aware when the note and mortgage were executed that O’Halloran intended to use the loan proceeds for both commercial and household
purposes. On these facts, the court con-eluded that Bordetsky was required to— but did not — comply with the requirements for a notice of default and right to cure contained in 14 M.R.S. § 6111, and issued a judgment in favor of the Trust. Bordet-sky timely appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶6] A party seeking to foreclose a mortgage on a residential property pursuant to 14 M.R.S.' § 6111 must first comply with certain notice requirements.
More particularly, “[a] mortgagee may not accel
erate maturity of the unpaid balance of [an] obligation or otherwise enforce [a] mortgage because of a default” unless and until a notice of default and right to cure has been provided to the mortgagor. 14 M.R.S. § 6111(1);
see Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf,
2014 ME 89, ¶¶ 18, 29, 96 A.3d 700 (requiring, as an element of a foreclosure, “evidence of [a] properly served notice of default and mortgagor’s right to cure” in compliance with 14 M.R.S. § 6111 (quotation marks omitted));
Chase Home Fin. LLC v. Higgins,
2009 ME 136, ¶ 11, 985 A.2d 508 (same).
[IT 7] Not all attempts to foreclose are subject to section 6111, however; pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 6111(1), only “[w]ith respect to mortgages upon residential property located in this State when the mortgagor is occupying all or a portion of the property as the mortgagor’s primary residence and the mortgage secures a loan for personal, family or household use” must a mortgagee satisfy the requirements for a notice of default , and right to cure contained in 14 M.R.S. § 6111. In short, section 6111(1) applies when three discrete facts are true: (1) the mortgage is on residential property in Maine; (2) the mortgagor occupies the property as his primary residence; and (3) the mortgage secures a loan for personal, family, or household use. Thus, the first two facts regard the nature and use of the property that is the subject of the mortgage, and the third fact regards the nature of the loan that the mortgage secures.
[¶ 8] The court’s decision here rests entirely on its determination that the notice requirements of section 6111 applied to Bordetsky’s foreclosure action and that Bordetsky failed to meet his burden of establishing that those requirements were satisfied. There is no dispute — and Bordet-sky stipulated — that he, as mortgagee, did not comply with section 6111. Bordetsky
challenges the court’s determination that section 6111 applies to this foreclosure.
[¶ 9] As to the first two requirements, the court found that the mortgage is on real property located at 157 Wyman Road in Benton, Maine; O’Halloran “has been residing at the subject property” at least since 2009; and O’Halloran’s four daughters also resided there as well.' These findings are supported by O’Halloran’s testimony and indeed, Bordetsky has never challenged that a residential home is situated on the Wyman Road property. The crux of the appeal is the trial court’s detér-mination as to the third requirement — that the mortgage “secures a loan for personal, family or household use.” 14 M.R.S. § 6111(1).
[¶ 10] Because the note is the document that memorializes the loan,
see Harbor Funding Corp. v. Kavanagh,
666 A.2d 498, 499 (Me. 1995), the court must interpret the note to determine whether a loan is for “personal, family or household use,” 14 M.R.S. § 6111(1). If the note is unambiguous, the court interprets it according to' the language within “the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence.”
Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. Acadia Ins. Co.,
2003 ME 6, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 989 (quotation marks omitted);
see Coastal Ventures v. Alsham Plaza, LLC,
2010 ME 63, ¶ 26, 1 A.3d 416 (stating that “a contract is to be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties as reflected in the written instrument” (quotation marks omitted)). If the trial court determines that the note is ambiguous, that is, “reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation” it may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent in executing it.
Coastal Ventures,
2010 ME 63, ¶ 27, 1 A.3d 416 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 11] We review de novo both the trial court’s determination of whether a note is ambiguous or unambiguous, and its interpretation of an unambiguous note.
Thurston v. Galvin,
2014 ME 76, ¶ 11, 94 A.3d 16;
Coastal Ventures,
2010 ME 63, ¶ 30, 1 A.3d 416. The trial court’s factual findings regarding the intent of the parties in executing an ambiguous note are reviewed for clear error.
Coastal Ventures,
2010 ME 63, ¶¶ 28, 31, 1 A.3d 416.
[¶ 12] Here, the court found that the note is entitled “COMMERCIAL NOTE” and that it states that it “evidences a loan for business and commercial purposes and not for personal, household, or family purposes.” The court determined, however, that “the language of the agreement between the parties was ambiguous with respect to the existence and scope of integration” as between the note and the mortgage because although the note purported to be commercial in nature, the mortgage was silent as to any commercial purpose. On this basis, the court considered extrinsic evidence of O’Halloran’s intended use of the loan proceeds and Bor-detsky’s knowledge of those intended uses.
[¶ 13] Pursuant to the third requirement set forth in section 6111(1), the court’s task was to consider the nature of the
loan.
The nature of the loan is explained by the note alone, and the note unambiguously states that the loan was “not for personal, household, or family purposes.” Given the lack of any ambiguity in the note, we conclude that the court erred when it 'considered extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent in executing the note or any other instrument. The loan was unambiguously not “for personal, family or household use” within the meaning of section. 6111(1), and therefore the requirements for a notice of default and right to cure contained in section 6111 did not apply to Bordetsky’s foreclosure action against the Trust. We vacate the court’s entry of a judgment in favor of the Trust and remand the matter
for the court to consider the evidence already presented at the first trial in determining whether Bordetsky is entitled to judgment.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.