David Arthur DePonte v. Bowman

District Court, E.D. California·Decided January 30, 2026·No. 2:24-cv-01262·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVID ARTHUR DEPONTE, No. 2:24-cv-01262-DJC-CSK 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 BOWMAN, 15 Defendant. 16 17 On May 22, 2025, the parties to this case stipulated to voluntary dismissal with 18 prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) (see ECF No. 80) after 19 entering a written settlement agreement. (See Settlement Agreement (ECF No. 83-1).) 20 The Settlement Agreement settled Plaintiff’s claims in both this action and another 21 action filed in the Eastern District of California, DePonte v. Stohl (No. 1:24-cv-00695- 22 KES-HBK). 23 Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw and Resettle or Proceed to 24 Trial (ECF No. 82), Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement (ECF No. 84), Request 25 to Remove False Documentation (ECF No. 87), and Request to Remove the Settlement 26 Amount from the docket (ECF No. 88). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s 27 motions are denied. 28 1 MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 2 The Court lacks jurisdiction to enforce Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce the 3 Settlement Agreement (Mot. Enforce (ECF No. 84)). Enforcement of a settlement 4 agreement “is more than just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and 5 hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 6 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994). “A district court lacks jurisdiction to enforce a 7 settlement agreement that is the basis for a dismissal unless the court expressly 8 incorporates the terms of the settlement agreement in an order to dismiss the case.” 9 Covves, LLC v. Target Brands, Inc., No. 21-55077, 2022 WL 193208, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 10 21, 2022). Here, the Court did not issue an order reserving jurisdiction over the case 11 or incorporating the settlement terms into the order. (See ECF No. 81 (dismissing the 12 case).) Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. 13 See Covves, 2022 WL 193208, at *1 (holding that “[b]ecause the district court did not 14 issue an order that reserved jurisdiction over the case or incorporated the settlement 15 terms, it did not retain jurisdiction after the dismissal” to enforce the settlement 16 agreement). 17 Courts ordinarily construe motions to enforce settlement agreements by pro se 18 plaintiffs as motions for relief from dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of 19 Civil Procedure 60(b), over which the Court does have jurisdiction. See, e.g., 20 Thompson v. Baca, No. 22-16702, 2025 WL 720893, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2025) 21 (“[B]earing in mind that ‘[w]e construe liberally the filings and motions of a pro se 22 inmate,’ we interpret Plaintiff's ‘motion to reset the settlement agreement’ as a Rule 23 60(b)(6) motion for relief from the district court's order dismissing his case with 24 prejudice.”). However, it is unnecessary to do so here as Plaintiff has filed a separate 25 Withdraw and Resettle or Proceed to Trial, which the Court will now address. 26 MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND RE-SETTLE OR PROCEED TO TRIAL 27 Plaintiff seeks to reopen this action and proceed to trial. Briefing on this Motion 28 is now complete. (See Mot. Withdraw (ECF No. 82); Opp’n to Mot. Withdraw (ECF No. 1 85).)1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a district court may relieve a party 2 “from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for the following reasons: 3 (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, 4 could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 5 trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an 6 opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment 7 has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or 8 applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. 9 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “Generally, only ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justify relief 11 under this rule.” Keeling v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union 162, 937 F.2d 12 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Sparks, 685 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 13 1982). 14 As a threshold matter, this Court has jurisdiction where, as here, “a party seeks 15 relief from dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(6) on the basis 16 of ‘extraordinary circumstance[s].’” Thompson, 2025 WL 720893, at *1. 17 Turning to the merits, Plaintiff has not identified any basis for relief under this 18 rule. Plaintiff first asserts that he is “entitled to greater relief” and “demands if there is 19 not a better offer by defendants” that this case “proceed to trial.” (Mot. Withdraw at 20 2.) However, “Rule 60(b)(1) is not intended to provide relief from an otherwise 21 enforceable settlement agreement or ‘to remedy the effects of a deliberate and 22 independent litigation decision that a party later comes to regret.’” Lee v. City of 23 Sacramento, No. 20-17003, 2021 WL 4948932, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2021) (quoting 24 Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006)). In other 25 words, the fact that Plaintiff now desires a greater offer cannot serve as a basis for 26 relief under this Rule.

27 1 Given the Court’s obligation to liberally construe the filings of pro se litigants, the Court will also 28 consider ECF No. 84 in deciding this Motion. See Thompson, 2025 WL 720893, at *1. 1 The only other basis for relief Plaintiff identifies is that Defendant had not yet 2 paid Plaintiff the settlement amount. (Mot. Enforce at 1.) “Repudiation of a settlement 3 agreement that terminated litigation pending before a court constitutes an 4 extraordinary circumstance, and it justifies vacating the court's prior dismissal order.” 5 Keeling, 937 F.2d at 410. The terms of the Settlement Agreement require the 6 California Department of Corrections (“CDCR”) to “make a good-faith effort to pay the 7 settlement amount” within “180 days from the date Plaintiff delivers to Defendants a 8 signed settlement agreement.” (Settlement Agreement at 2.) According to 9 Defendant, Plaintiff delivered the signed documents to Defendant on April 1, 2025, 10 setting the deadline for payment as September 28, 2025, three months after Plaintiff 11 filed this Motion. (ECF 85 at 2.) Plaintiff notified this Court on November 7, 2025, that 12 he still had not been paid. (See ECF No. 88 at 1.) Filings in the other case settled by 13 this agreement indicate CDCR has now paid Plaintiff. See Order Directing Pl. to File 14 Reply or Advise if Mot. is Moot at 1–2, DePonte v. Stohl, No. 1:24-cv-00695-KES-HBK, 15 2025 WL 3292409, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025). Therefore, this Court has no reason 16 to doubt that payment has now been made and that Defendant acted in good faith as 17 required by the Settlement Agreement. (See Settlement Agreement at 2.) 18 Accordingly, the Court does not find that the delay in payment of the settlement 19 amount qualifies as an extraordinary circumstance warranting relief under Rule 60(b). 20 See Lipsey v. Davey, No.

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