Opinion issued April 21, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00316-CV ——————————— DAVID ANTHONY DEPINA, Appellant V. JASON A. GIBSON, P.C. D/B/A THE GIBSON LAW FIRM, JASON A. GIBSON, AND CASEY GIBSON, Appellees
On Appeal from the 190th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2023-60937
MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal from a summary judgment ruling for the defendants in a
legal malpractice case. Before the trial court, the plaintiff, David DePina, alleged
that a law firm and its attorneys1 failed to timely pursue claims for him against a
1 We refer to the appellees collectively as “the law firm” or “the firm.” railroad company concerning flood damage to DePina’s property. To prevail on his
legal malpractice claim, DePina must prove that, but for the law firm’s negligence,
he would have obtained a more favorable result in the underlying case. Rogers v.
Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d 394, 404–05 (Tex. 2017).
The law firm sought summary judgment, arguing that the record showed as a
matter of law that DePina’s claims were already time-barred when he brought them
to the firm—so DePina could not prevail in showing that he would have obtained a
more favorable result but for any alleged negligence. On appeal, the law firm argues
this is the case because, it says, as a matter of law, DePina alleged a permanent
nuisance (as opposed to a temporary one), so limitations had already run. The parties
do not dispute that whether limitations had run depends on whether the alleged
flooding nuisance was permanent or temporary.2
This appeal thus turns on whether the record shows as a matter of law that the
nuisance DePina asserted—flooding to his property that DePina says is caused by
an unmaintained railroad culvert combined with certain very heavy rain—was
permanent, as opposed to temporary (and thus whether limitations had run).
2 For limitations purposes, a permanent nuisance claim accrues when injury first occurs or is discovered, while a temporary nuisance claim accrues anew upon each injury. Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 270 (Tex. 2004). 2 Under binding precedent, a nuisance may be considered temporary if, among
other factors, it is sporadic and contingent upon an irregular force such as rain, or if
it is uncertain if any future injury will occur. See Huynh v. Blanchard, 694 S.W.3d
648, 677–78 (Tex. 2024); Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264,
272 (Tex. 2004). A permanent nuisance, by contrast, is one that involves an activity
of such a character and existing under such circumstances that it will be presumed
to continue indefinitely. See Huynh, 694 S.W.3d at 678 & n.35; Schneider, 147
S.W.3d at 272.
Applying the Texas Supreme Court’s description of a temporary versus
permanent nuisance to this summary judgment record, we conclude that the record
does not show as a matter of law that the alleged nuisance was permanent, and
therefore the law firm did not establish that the statute of limitations expired. We
thus reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
express no opinion on any other issue in the underlying case.
BACKGROUND
A. The law firm agreed to represent DePina for potential property damage and flooding claims.
DePina owns property in Splendora, Texas, consisting of undeveloped land
and a commercial building leased to a school. A railroad runs alongside the property.
Beneath the railroad tracks is a culvert (a drainage tunnel) that allows water from the
property to drain into a nearby ditch.
3 DePina asserts that the railroad company failed to maintain the culvert and
provide adequate drainage, which caused flooding during some, but not all,
rainstorms. As discussed in greater detail below, it is undisputed that DePina’s
property flooded in March 2017 and at least two times before then. It is also
undisputed that the property flooded during Hurricane Harvey in August 2017, again
soon thereafter, and during Tropical Storm Imelda in September 2019. Unlike the
previous floods, the flooding that occurred during Imelda caused significant water
damage to the building on the property.3
DePina alleged that the railroad company was responsible for the 2019
flooding and damage to his property; he asserted that the railroad company’s failure
to maintain and clear the culvert prevented proper drainage from his property. He
also believed the railroad company needed to add a second culvert to improve
drainage and prevent future flooding.
In August 2020, DePina contacted the law firm about pursuing potential
claims against the railroad company for the flooding damage. That month, the law
firm agreed to take the case and sent DePina a contract stating that it would represent
him in pursuing claims for “Property Damage and Flooding.”
3 According to this record, DePina’s property did not flood between Tropical Storm Imelda in 2019 and the filing of the current case in 2023. 4 What occurred after that is disputed. For purposes of summary judgment, we
accept DePina’s account that, after some initial communication, the law firm stopped
communicating with him and did not return his calls until September 2021, when the
firm sent him a letter stating the firm no longer represented him in this case.
B. DePina filed this legal malpractice lawsuit against the law firm; the trial court granted summary judgment to the law firm.
DePina filed this malpractice lawsuit against the law firm for negligence and
gross negligence, alleging that the firm failed to timely investigate and file DePina’s
claims against the railroad company within the statute of limitations, or alternatively
that it failed to decline representation within a reasonable time period to allow
DePina to secure new counsel to investigate and pursue the claims against the
railroad company. DePina alleged that he would have secured a settlement or
collectable judgment against the railroad company but for the law firm’s negligence.
The law firm moved for traditional summary judgment, arguing that DePina
could not establish causation on his malpractice claim as a matter of law because his
underlying flooding claims constituted a permanent nuisance, and the statute of
limitations therefore expired at least one year before DePina ever contacted the firm.
The law firm attached several exhibits, including the deposition testimony of
DePina.
In response, DePina disputed that the law firm had proven a permanent
nuisance as a matter of law. He argued that a fact issue exists as to causation because,
5 he says, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether his underlying
flooding claims constituted a temporary or permanent nuisance. DePina attached his
declaration in support of his opposition.
After a hearing, the trial court granted the law firm’s motion for summary
judgment and dismissed DePina’s lawsuit. The trial court did not provide a basis for
its ruling. DePina appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a trial court’s order granting summary judgment. Hillis v.
McCall, 602 S.W.3d 436, 439 (Tex. 2020). Under traditional summary judgment
procedure, the movant bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of
material fact exists, and the court should grant a judgment as a matter of law. See id.
at 439–40; TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).4 A defendant-movant may obtain summary
judgment by conclusively negating at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of
action. See Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co.-USA v. Adams, 560 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex.
2018); Stanfield v. Neubaum, 494 S.W.3d 90, 96 (Tex. 2016). If a defendant
produces evidence demonstrating summary judgment is proper, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to present evidence creating a fact issue. Stanfield, 494 S.W.3d. at 97.
4 The Texas Supreme Court recently amended Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a. See Order, Misc. Docket No. 26-9012 (Tex. Feb. 27, 2026). The Court specified that “[t]he amendments apply only to a motion for summary judgment filed on or after March 1, 2026.” Id. The law firm filed its motion for summary judgment before that date, and we apply the version of Rule 166a in effect at the time of the filing. 6 In evaluating whether a fact issue precludes summary judgment, a court takes
all evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true and indulges every reasonable
inference in the nonmovant’s favor. Id.
When a trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the
grounds on which its order is based, the appellant must negate each ground upon
which the judgment could have been based. Rosetta Res. Operating, LP v. Martin,
645 S.W.3d 212, 226 (Tex. 2022). Otherwise, the summary judgment may be
affirmed on any one meritorious ground alleged. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407
S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013).5
DISCUSSION
Applying Texas law to this summary judgment record—which we construe in
the light most favorable to DePina—we agree with DePina that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment to the law firm. We therefore reverse.
5 In addition to the nuisance/limitations argument made by the law firm discussed herein, the law firm also argued on summary judgment that DePina was impermissibly attempting to relitigate the same claims adjudicated in an earlier State Bar proceeding (in which the law firm prevailed). DePina challenged that issue, too, on appeal, and the law firm abandoned its argument. Because the law firm has abandoned this argument on appeal, we need not address it. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 445 S.W.3d 790, 798 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). In any event, we note that the disciplinary proceedings would not have a preclusive effect on the subsequent civil litigation. See, e.g., Charles v. Diggs, No. 14-19- 00725-CV, 2020 WL 6326422, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 2020, pet. denied) (rejecting lawyer’s res judicata defense; Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure prohibit res judicata or collateral estoppel effects from disciplinary actions). 7 A. Causation is an element of a legal malpractice claim—and that is the element in dispute here.
Legal malpractice claims are based on negligence principles and require the
client to establish: (1) the lawyer owed a duty of care to the client; (2) the lawyer
breached that duty; and (3) the lawyer’s breach proximately caused damage to the
client. Rogers, 518 S.W.3d at 400.
The parties here focus on causation. They dispute whether the law firm
negated the causation element of DePina’s malpractice cause of action. See
Stanfield, 494 S.W.3d at 96.
The law firm argues it was entitled to summary judgment because it
conclusively negated causation. The law firm says it did so by showing that the
statute of limitations on DePina’s underlying claims expired as a matter of law before
DePina retained the firm. So, the law firm argues, any alleged negligence on its part
could not possibly have harmed him.
Thus, the causation issue turns on whether the law firm proved as a matter of
law that the underlying nuisance was permanent (and thus whether the law firm
negated causation by establishing that limitations expired before DePina retained the
firm).
8 B. The limitations period for a nuisance action depends on whether the nuisance is temporary or permanent.
A nuisance is a condition that substantially interferes with the use and
enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of
ordinary sensibilities. Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 269. For these purposes, the parties
do not dispute whether this record reflects a nuisance. The parties also agree that a
two-year statute of limitations applies to DePina’s underlying nuisance claim. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a); Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 270.
The question of when a nuisance claim accrues for statute of limitations
purposes depends on whether the alleged nuisance is permanent or temporary.
Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 270. “A permanent nuisance claim accrues when injury
first occurs or is discovered; a temporary nuisance claim accrues anew upon each
injury.” Id. (emphasis in original).
As applied here, this matters. If the nuisance alleged was permanent, then
limitations had run when DePina first approached the law firm. If the nuisance was
temporary, it had not.
9 C. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment: the summary judgment record does not show as a matter of law that the nuisance alleged was permanent (and thus that limitations had run when DePina approached the law firm).
The dispositive question is: Does the record show as a matter of law that the
alleged nuisance at issue was permanent? On this record, applying Texas law, it does
not.
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court reiterated that a nuisance may be
considered temporary:
(1) if it is uncertain if any future injury will occur,
(2) if future injury is liable to occur only at long intervals,
(3) if the nuisance is occasional, intermittent or recurrent, or
(4) if it is sporadic and contingent upon some irregular force such as rain. Huynh, 694 S.W.3d at 677–78 (cleaned up) (quoting Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 272).
As the Court stated, “a nuisance that is occasional, recurrent, or affected by
irregular weather forces in a manner that makes future damages difficult to quantify
with reasonable certainty can be classified as temporary even though it is also
imminent or likely to recur.” Id. at 678 (footnote omitted). Under Texas law, “a
nuisance as to which any future impact remains speculative at the time of trial must
be deemed ‘temporary.’” Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 280.
10 By contrast, a permanent nuisance is one that involves an activity of such a
character and existing under such circumstances that it will be presumed to continue
indefinitely. See Huynh, 694 S.W.3d at 678 n.35; Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 272. A
“nuisance should be deemed permanent if it is sufficiently constant or regular (no
matter how long between occurrences) that future impact can be reasonably
evaluated.” Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 281.
“[A] permanent nuisance may be established by showing that either the
plaintiff’s injuries or the defendant’s operations are permanent.” Id. at 283. When
the structure or source allegedly causing the nuisance is permanent, a presumption
is raised that the nuisance is also permanent. See Huynh, 694 S.W.3d at 678 & n.35.
But the presumption can be “rebutted by evidence that a defendant’s noxious
operations cause injury only under circumstances so rare that, even when they occur,
it remains uncertain whether or to what degree they may ever occur again.” Id. at
678 n.35 (quoting Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 283). As Schneider explained, “Texas
law has long recognized there may be a discontinuity between source and injury, as
when injury occurs only after a heavy rain in regions where that is a rare
commodity.” Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 283.
Texas law also explains that a jury should decide factual questions underlying
the temporary or permanent nature of a nuisance to the extent the evidence presents
“a dispute regarding what interference has occurred or whether it is likely to
11 continue.” Id. at 281; see also Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines (E. Tex.),
L.P., 449 S.W.3d 474, 480–81 (Tex. 2014) (same). As the Texas Supreme Court has
stated, “questions regarding the facts that underlie the temporary-versus-permanent
distinction must be resolved by the jury upon proper request.” Huynh, 694 S.W.3d
at 676 (cleaned up) (quoting Gilbert Wheeler, 449 S.W.3d at 481). Along those lines,
the Texas Supreme Court has explained that jurors settle “disputes as to whether
similar conditions are reasonably certain to continue in the future.” Schneider, 147
S.W.3d at 281; see also Huynh, 694 S.W.3d at 676. And “material factual disputes
about frequency, duration, and extent of nuisance conditions” are questions for the
jury. Schneider, 147 S.W.3d. at 274–75; see also Huynh, 694 S.W.3d at 677.
Applying that law to this record (construed in the light most favorable to
DePina, as the law instructs), we must reverse the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the law firm: this record does not show as a matter of law a permanent
nuisance. See Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 272–75; see also Huynh, 694 S.W.3d at 677–
78.
DePina argues that this record does not establish a permanent nuisance, and
he asserts that questions remain for the jury as to the nuisance he alleges. He
contends that the flooding he complains of was contingent on both the culvert being
unmaintained and also certain very heavy rain. And he argues that fact questions
12 exist as to the nature of the interference and whether and to what extent the
interference is likely to continue.
DePina testified to the following flooding history, occurring over a period of
almost 20 years:
• From the time DePina purchased the property (between 2002 and 2004) until March 2017, DePina testified that the property flooded “maybe two times.”6
• March 2017 – The property flooded.
• August 2017 – The property flooded during Hurricane Harvey.
• After August 2017 – A rainstorm following Hurricane Harvey flooded the property.
• September 2019 – The property flooded during Tropical Storm Imelda, damaging the building.
According to DePina, his property had not flooded since Tropical Storm Imelda, in
2019, through the time of his filing of the current lawsuit in 2023.
DePina testified that his property does not flood with every hard rain.7 Instead,
under his testimony, the property flooded only in certain rainstorms and when “the
[culvert] isn’t doing its job.”
6 DePina did not identify specific years or dates for the two floods. 7 As DePina stated: Q. And as a result of that, whenever there is a hard rain over your property, the property floods? A. That’s not correct.
(Emphasis added.) 13 Additionally, in his declaration, DePina attested that the flooding is
“uncertain,” “unpredictable,” and “intermittent,” occurring only “when there is a
very heavy rainstorm, like Hurricane Harvey and Tropical Storm Imelda,” and
depending on the “condition of the culverts” at the time of the heavy rainstorm.8
DePina further attested that “when the culverts are cleaned out and properly
maintained by [the railroad company], the Property does not flood.”9
8 In the trial court, the law firm objected and moved to strike DePina’s declaration under the “sham affidavit rule,” arguing that it contradicted DePina’s earlier deposition testimony. The trial court never ruled on the objection. In its appellate briefing, the law firm similarly argues that we should strike or disregard DePina’s declaration as a “sham.” But under controlling precedent, as the law firm acknowledged at argument, this complaint is not preserved for our review. Our Court previously held that: “Absent a timely objection and a ruling from the trial court on the objection, however, a complaint that a summary-judgment affidavit is a sham is waived for purposes of appellate review.” Lee v. Galleria Loop Note Holder LLC, No. 01-22-00160-CV, 2023 WL 5436434, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 24, 2023, no pet.); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Seim v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 551 S.W.3d 161, 164, 166 (Tex. 2018). DePina’s declaration remains as competent summary judgment evidence. See Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 164; Lee, 2023 WL 5436434, at *8. 9 The law firm argues this statement (which DePina begins with the word “thus”) is conclusory. Texas courts have rejected arguments that statements were conclusory when the statements were based on personal knowledge and asserted facts. See Chagoya v. Vilchis, No. 01-22-00864-CV, 2024 WL 3417049, at *6 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh’g) (treating declarant’s descriptions of specific events—payments, loan amounts, nonperformance, and nonreturn of property—as “assertions of fact, not unsupported conclusions or inferences”); see also Eberstein v. Hunter, 260 S.W.3d 626, 629 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (affidavit calculating amounts of unpaid alimony payments and stating aggregate amount was not conclusory because statements recited facts based on personal knowledge). In any event, this sentence is also only one piece of the summary-judgment record at issue. 14 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to DePina and looking to the
Texas Supreme Court’s definition of a temporary versus permanent nuisance, we
cannot conclude that this record shows a permanent nuisance as a matter of law. The
record raises a genuine issue of material fact about whether and to what extent this
nuisance is likely to continue. This record also presents questions about whether the
nuisance is “sporadic and contingent upon some irregular force such as rain.” Huynh,
694 S.W.3d at 677–78 (quoting Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 272). Further, the fact that
flooding occurred previously does not necessarily render the alleged nuisance
permanent as a matter of law: indeed, a nuisance that has recurred can still potentially
qualify as temporary under certain conditions, including if it is “affected by irregular
weather forces in a manner that makes future damages difficult to quantify with
reasonable certainty.” Id. at 678 (footnote omitted).
The parties dispute whether a presumption of permanence applies. See id. at
678 n.35; Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 283. The law firm argues that the nuisance
should be presumed permanent because the railroad track and culvert are permanent
structures (they are), and because, the firm argues, there is no evidence the culvert
has ever been cleared or cleaned.10 DePina, on the other hand, takes the position
that—unlike, for instance, a nuisance caused by an ever-present, permanent wall—
10 The law firm acknowledges that there is no evidence either way on this point; they do not take the position that evidence affirmatively establishes that the culvert has never been cleared. 15 the alleged nuisance here is contingent on the (in his view, nonpermanent) condition
of the culvert and the extent to which it is maintained (as well as on certain heavy
rain; he asserts that the nuisance is contingent on both the culvert’s status and certain
heavy rain). DePina testified that the culvert drains into a ditch, and that it is the
“ditches [that] had never been cleaned out.” He also averred below that “when the
culverts are cleaned out and properly maintained by [the railroad company], the
Property does not flood.” DePina emphasizes that all reasonable inferences must go
his way at this stage. See Stanfield, 494 S.W.3d at 97 (on summary judgment review,
we must indulge every reasonable inference in the nonmovant’s favor).
We need not resolve that dispute. Even assuming a presumption of
permanence here, the law firm was not entitled to summary judgment because there
are issues of material fact as to whether DePina has rebutted that presumption. See
Huynh, 694 S.W.3d at 678 & n.35; Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 283. On this record,
there is a genuine dispute over whether the railroad company’s alleged conduct
caused DePina’s property to flood “only under circumstances so rare that, even when
they occur, it remains uncertain whether or to what degree they may ever occur
again.” Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 281, 283 (jury decides factual disputes “regarding
what interference has occurred or whether it is likely to continue”); see also Huynh,
694 S.W.3d at 676 (“[Q]uestions regarding the facts that underlie the
16 temporary-versus-permanent distinction must be resolved by the jury upon proper
request.” (emphasis in original) (quoting Gilbert Wheeler, 449 S.W.3d at 481)).
Other courts have recognized that similar facts preclude summary judgment.
See, e.g., Scott v. S2S Domain Waco Assocs., LLC, No. 10-20-00133-CV, 2021 WL
5639086, at *9 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 1, 2021, pet. denied) (summary judgment
on limitations improper because “the flooding on the [plaintiffs’] property is caused
by intermittent rainfall and future injury cannot be estimated with reasonable
certainty”); Sullivan v. Brokers Logistics, Ltd., 357 S.W.3d 833, 838–41 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied) (summary judgment on limitations improper in a
flooding-related nuisance case where—although there had been silt buildup for more
than a decade due to improper drainage—historic flooding that precipitated the
plaintiff’s lawsuit raised fact issue as to whether the nuisance was temporary or
permanent); see also Pulaski v. Republic of India, 212 F. Supp. 2d 653, 656 (S.D.
Tex. 2002) (“Although rain is a persistent condition in Houston, the nuisance
suffered by [plaintiffs] is temporary because it is contingent on sporadic rain.”).
Two of our sister courts (one recently) examined instances when a flooding
nuisance was dependent on rain and also on a permanent structure, bringing a
presumption of permanence. See JLMH Invs., LLC v. Fam. Dollar Stores of Tex.,
LLC, 716 S.W.3d 770, 778–80 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2024, pet. granted);
Yalamanchili v. Mousa, 316 S.W.3d 33, 37–38 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
17 2010, pet. denied). In both cases, those courts found the flooding nuisances at issue
to be permanent as a matter of law when they happened with “every rain” (or every
heavy rain)—and thus they were not “contingent” and uncertain to occur again. See
JLMH, 716 S.W.3d at 779 (undisputed evidence established that plaintiff’s property
flooded “every time it rained”); Yalamanchili, 316 S.W.3d at 36–38 (plaintiff’s
property flooded “with every rain of any magnitude”).11
But, as the JLMH court explained, the result might have been different there
if the flooding only occurred “after abnormally and unexpectedly heavy rains”; the
court noted that such “occasional or sporadic” instances of rain might constitute a
temporary nuisance. JLMH, 716 S.W.3d at 779.
Applying the principles from those cases supports reversal of the summary
judgment here. As explained, the record (construed in the light most favorable to
DePina, the nonmovant) includes evidence that flooding happened here during some
major storms—but not every major storm—and certainly not with every rain or
every major rain. Moreover, here, DePina testified that flooding also depended on
the “condition of the culvert” in conjunction with certain very heavy rain. In
approximately 20 years, DePina says that six flooding events have occurred (and
none since 2019). On this record, such infrequent incidents (particularly in the
11 See also Mitchell v. Timmerman, No. 03-08-00320-CV, 2008 WL 5423268, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 31, 2008, no pet.) (flooding occurring “every time there is a significant rainfall” was permanent nuisance as a matter of law). 18 greater Houston area, where heavy rain is commonplace) could potentially be
characterized as “occasional” or “sporadic” and unlikely to occur again.
Under Texas law, “a nuisance may be considered temporary (1) if it is
uncertain if any future injury will occur, (2) if future injury is liable to occur only at
long intervals, (3) if the nuisance is occasional, intermittent or recurrent, or (4) if it
is sporadic and contingent upon some irregular force such as rain.” Huynh, 694
S.W.3d at 677–78 (cleaned up) (quoting Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 272); see also
Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 280 (“[A] nuisance as to which any future impact remains
speculative at the time of trial must be deemed ‘temporary.’”).
This record does not show a permanent nuisance as a matter of law, and fact
questions preclude summary judgment.
***
The accrual of the statute of limitations cannot be determined as a matter of
law if reasonable minds could differ about the conclusion to be drawn from the facts.
See Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 44–46 (Tex. 1998) (in legal malpractice
case, lawyer was not entitled to summary judgment on limitations grounds because
there was an issue of fact on when client’s underlying claim accrued). That is the
case here. We thus reverse and remand for further proceedings.
19 CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the law firm. We thus
reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Jennifer Caughey Justice
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Dokupil.