David Angelo Colon Jr. v. the State of Texas
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Opinion
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-22-00152-CR ___________________________
DAVID ANGELO COLON JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1539044D
Before Bassel, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant David Angelo Colon Jr. pleaded not guilty to murder. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 19.02. A jury found him guilty and assessed his punishment at 50 years’
confinement and a $5,000 fine, and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict.
See id. § 12.32 (stating first-degree-felony punishment range of five to ninety-nine
years or life and up to a $10,000 fine).
Colon’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief
under Anders v. California, 1 representing that he “can find no errors warranting reversal
that can be legitimately supported by the record” and has determined that the appeal
“is without merit and is frivolous.” Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements
of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why
there are no arguable grounds for relief. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
Colon filed a pro se response to the Anders brief. The State did not file a brief
but noted in a letter that it agreed with Colon’s counsel that there were no meritorious
grounds for appeal.
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney fulfills the requirements of Anders
and files a motion to withdraw on the ground that an appeal is frivolous, we must
independently examine the record. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.
386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). 1
2 Crim. App. 1991). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson
v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s Anders brief, as well as
Colon’s pro se response, which does not reveal any legitimate grounds for direct
appeal. We agree with counsel that the appeal is frivolous and without merit; we find
nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178
S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685
n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“We have held that such a memorandum opinion is
acceptable in the context of an appeal for which appellate counsel has filed an Anders
brief and the court of appeals has agreed that the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.”).
Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Per Curiam
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: July 27, 2023
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