David Andrews v. Office of Personnel Management

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided August 16, 2023·No. DE-844E-21-0177-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DAVID R. ANDREWS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-844E-21-0177-I-1

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: August 16, 2023 MANAGEMENT, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Leah B. Kille, Esquire, Lexington, Kentucky, for the appellant.

Jo Bell, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review, and the appellant has filed a cross petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the final decision of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) denying the appellant’s application for a Federal Employees’ Retirement System disability retirement

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

annuity. On petition for review, the agency argues that the appellant’s condition was “situational” and that he failed to prove that any disability was expected to continue for 1 year from the date of his disability retirement application. In his cross petition for review, the appellant requests interim relief. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and the cross petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to decline to consider an argument the agency raises for the first time on review and to find that our final decision renders moot the appellant’s request for interim relief, we AFFIRM the initial decision. ¶2 In her initial decision, the administrative judge concluded, as relevant here, that the appellant proved that his medical conditions were incompatible with useful and efficient service in his position. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 25, Initial Decision (ID) at 10-13. She also found that he established that his condition was expected to continue for at least 1 year from the date he filed his disability retirement application. ID at 13-14. For the first time on review, OPM challenges the probative value of an August 3, 2021 letter from the appellant’s treating physician. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 10 -11. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board generally will not consider evidence or argument 3

submitted for the first time with a petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record was closed before the administrative judge despite the party’s due diligence. See Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 213-14 (1980). OPM has not explained why it did not raise this argument below . The letter appeared in the record below, and the administrative judge specifically explained that OPM could address the issue in written closing arguments. ID at 12 & n.5; IAF, Tab 17 at 16-18. Therefore, OPM has not shown that the newly submitted argument was unavailable before the close of record despite its due diligence, and we decline to consider it on review. ¶3 The appellant has filed a cross petition for review, seekin g interim relief while the agency’s petition for review was pending. PFR File, Tab 3 at 12-14. The agency has not responded to the cross petition for review. ¶4 The administrative judge declined to order interim relief despite the appellant’s status as a prevailing party, citing Steele v. Office of Personnel Management, 57 M.S.P.R. 458 (1993), aff’d per curiam, 50 F.3d 21 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Table). ID at 16. As the Board explained in Steele, 57 M.S.P.R. at 463, under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(i), an administrative judge has discretion regarding whether to order interim relief. In making her decision, she must balance the benefits and burdens to the parties anticipated by the process of effecting the order. Id. ¶5 Here, we need not consider the propriety of the administrative judge’s decision not to order interim relief, because by virtue of this order, the appellant is receiving the only remedy to which he is entitled, i.e., an order that OPM award him a disability retirement annuity. By statute, such an annuity “commences on the day after separation from the service or the day after pay ceases .” 5 U.S.C. § 8464(a)(1)(C). Here, the appellant began an extended period of leave without pay in December 2019. IAF, Tab 10 at 78. He states that he has not worked since that time. PFR File, Tab 3 at 7. A qualified disability annuitant like the appellant may be entitled to receive benefits retroactive to a date prior to his 4

separation if his pay ceased. See Young v. Office of Personnel Management, 99 M.S.P.R. 563, ¶ 10 (2005). Therefore, any matter related to an interim relief order appears to be moot. Coffey v. U.S. Postal Service, 77 M.S.P.R. 281, 285-86 (1998) (explaining that because an appellant received full relief, any matter related to its alleged noncompliance with an interim relief order was moot). Accordingly, we decline to consider the issue further.

ORDER ¶6 For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the initial decision and ORDER OPM to award the appellant disability retirement benefits. OPM must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision. ¶7 We also ORDER OPM to tell the appellant promptly in writing when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and to describe the actions it took to carry out the Board’s Order. We ORDER the appellant to provide all necessary information OPM requests to help it carry out the Boar d’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask OPM about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b). ¶8 No later than 30 days after OPM tells the appellant it has fully carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant believes that OPM did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes OPM has not fully car ried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of any communications with OPM. See 5 C.F.R.

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David Andrews v. Office of Personnel Management, (Miss. 2023).

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