David Alvarez v. Ltf Club Operations Company Inc

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 29, 2016
Docket328221
StatusUnpublished

This text of David Alvarez v. Ltf Club Operations Company Inc (David Alvarez v. Ltf Club Operations Company Inc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
David Alvarez v. Ltf Club Operations Company Inc, (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

DAVID ALVAREZ and ELENA ALVAREZ, UNPUBLISHED November 29, 2016 Plaintiff-Appellants,

v No. 328221 Oakland Circuit Court LTF CLUB OPERATIONS COMPANY INC., LC No. 2014-140282-NO doing business as LIFETIME FITNESS CENTER,

Defendant-Appellee, and

JANE DOE,

Defendant.

DAVID ALVAREZ and ELENA ALVAREZ,

Plaintiff-Appellees,

v No. 328985 Oakland Circuit Court LTF CLUB OPERATIONS COMPANY INC., LC No. 2014-140282-NO doing business as LIFETIME FITNESS CENTER,

Defendant-Appellant, and

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and MURRAY and BORRELLO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

-1- In Docket No. 328221, plaintiffs, David Alvarez and his wife Elena Alvarez, appeal as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant, LTF Club Operations Company, Inc., doing business as Lifetime Fitness Center (Lifetime). In Docket No. 328985, Lifetime appeals as of right the order denying its request for case evaluation sanctions and for taxation of costs. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition and remand for further proceedings.

This litigation arises from David’s fall from a rock climbing wall at Lifetime’s facility in Novi. Plaintiffs were at Lifetime, where they are members, with their minor daughter to allow her the opportunity to use the rock climbing wall. Neither the plaintiffs, nor their daughter, had previously attempted to use the rock climbing wall. After David signed the requisite forms, Karina Montes Agredano, a Lifetime employee, provided David with a harness, he climbed to the top of the rock wall, and attempted to lower himself back down via the automatic belay system. However, because David’s harness was on backwards and incorrectly hooked to the belay system, it broke and he fell to the ground suffering multiple injuries.

Plaintiffs argued that, as an employee of Lifetime, Agredano was grossly negligent1 in failing to ascertain whether David had properly attached his harness and the belay system before permitting him to climb the rock wall or descend. Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition arguing the assumption of risk and waiver of liability provision within the paperwork David signed barred plaintiffs’ claims because Agredano’s asserted conduct constituted only ordinary negligence and not gross negligence. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition finding plaintiffs failed to “present any evidence establishing that defendant was grossly negligent in failing to take precautions for plaintiff’s safety.”

Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in dismissing their claim of gross negligence against Lifetime, arguing a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Agredano was grossly negligent. We agree.

The trial court granted summary disposition in accordance with MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10). This Court reviews “de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition.” In re Mardigian Estate, 312 Mich App 553, 557; 879 NW2d 313 (2015). Specifically:

When considering a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court must view the evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence submitted might permit inferences contrary to the facts as asserted by the movant. When entertaining a summary disposition motion under Subrule (C)(10), the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing

1 Plaintiffs had signed a waiver of any negligence based liability.

-2- the evidence. [Id. at 557-558, quoting Dillard v Schlussel, 308 Mich App 429, 444-445; 865 NW2d 648 (2014) (quotation marks omitted).]

In addition:

In determining whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), a court must accept as true a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, affidavits, or other documentary evidence and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor. Where there are no factual disputes and reasonable minds cannot differ on the legal effect of the facts, the decision regarding whether a plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. [Terrace Land Dev Corp v Seeligson & Jordan, 250 Mich App 452, 455; 647 NW2d 524 (2002) (citation omitted).]

To establish a claim for gross negligence, it is incumbent on a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant acted or engaged in “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” Xu v Gay, 257 Mich App 263, 269; 668 NW2d 166 (2003) (citations omitted). “Evidence of ordinary negligence is insufficient to create a material question of fact regarding the existence of gross negligence.” Woodman v Kera, LLC, 280 Mich App 125, 152; 760 NW2d 641 (2008), aff’d 486 Mich 228 (2010). “The issue of gross negligence may be determined by summary disposition only where reasonable minds could not differ.” Id. “Simply alleging that an actor could have done more is insufficient under Michigan law, because, with the benefit of hindsight, a claim can always be made that extra precautions could have influenced the result.” Tarlea v Crabtree, 263 Mich App 80, 90; 687 NW2d 333 (2004). However, gross negligence will often be exhibited by a “willful disregard of precautions or measures to attend to safety[.]” Id.

As evidence of Agredano’s gross negligence, plaintiffs offered their deposition testimony. In his deposition testimony, David indicated that Agredano provided him with a harness and was present as he put it on and prepared to climb the wall:

Q. And where was [Agredano] when you were placing the harness on yourself?

A. She was in front of us. We were here. She was in front of us.

Q. So she’s staring directly at your as you’re putting the harness on?

A. She was, yeah, in front of us. We were here, and she was – I mean, we could show the picture if you want.

Q. But I want to know if she was facing you when you were putting this harness on?
A. Yes.

***

-3- Q. How much time elapsed between the time that you had your harness on and began climbing from the time when your wife began climbing?

A. Okay. So they walked over to the wall, and then, as soon as I put on my harness, I walked over to the wall adjacent to [Agredano], and I watched my wife. She was already up the wall. So whatever time it took for her to get up the eight feet, which is probably a couple minutes. I mean, a minute maybe.

Q. All right. And when you walked over to the wall, was [Agredano] standing to your right?

A. When I walked over to the wall, she was on my right.
Q. And would you say she was within three or four feet of you?
A. I could touch her. She was right there.

Further, David stated that Agredano spoke to him after he had inadvertently placed the harness on backwards and directed him to a climbing area, but did not warn him that the red loop on his harness should be on his front before he began to climb the wall:

Q. When were you told to hook into something between your legs?

A. Sure. So I had trouble putting on the harness, right? They walked over to the wall. I followed . . .

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Related

Woodman v. Kera LLC
785 N.W.2d 1 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2010)
Terrace Land Development Corp. v. Seeligson & Jordan
647 N.W.2d 524 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2002)
Xu v. Gay
668 N.W.2d 166 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2003)
Woodman v. KERA, LLC
760 N.W.2d 641 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2008)
Tarlea v. Crabtree
687 N.W.2d 333 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2004)
Dillard v. Schlussel
865 N.W.2d 648 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2014)
in Re Mardigian Estate
879 N.W.2d 313 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
David Alvarez v. Ltf Club Operations Company Inc, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-alvarez-v-ltf-club-operations-company-inc-michctapp-2016.