David Alan Thomas v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 6th District (Texarkana)
• Decided: February 18, 2026
• Docket: 06-25-00076-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00076-CR

DAVID ALAN THOMAS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 6th District Court Lamar County, Texas Trial Court No. 28216

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pursuant to a plea agreement, David Alan Thomas pled guilty to manufacturing, delivery,

or possession of a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1, a first-degree felony. See TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(d) (Supp.). Thomas also pled true to both of the

State’s habitual punishment enhancement paragraphs. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d)

(Supp.). The trial court placed Thomas on deferred adjudication community supervision. The

State moved to adjudicate on the basis that Thomas had violated the terms of his community

supervision by failing to pay certain fees and failing to perform community supervision. Thomas

pled true to both allegations, and the trial court moved forward with a hearing on punishment.

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the allegations true, revoked Thomas’s

deferred adjudication community supervision, and adjudicated him guilty of manufacturing,

delivery, or possession of a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1. The trial court sentenced

Thomas to thirty-five years’ imprisonment, plus court costs of $163.00 and $122.00 of “Appt

Atty Fees.” Thomas appeals.

Thomas’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as Thomas’s counsel on appeal, stating that

he thoroughly read and reviewed the entire appellate record and researched the potential grounds

for appeal, but was unable to advance any error warranting a reversal of the trial court’s

adjudication of Thomas’s guilt, or any other form of relief. Thomas’s counsel also filed a brief

in support of his motion to withdraw (the Anders brief). See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,

743–44 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig.

proceeding); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 509–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); High v. State,

2 573 S.W.2d 807, 812–13 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). In the Anders brief, counsel set

out the procedural history of the case. Counsel also provided a review of the sufficiency of the

State’s allegations and of the evidence supporting revocation and the legality of the sentence

imposed, with citations to the record and applicable case law. Counsel concluded there was no

non-frivolous argument to be raised with respect to any of these issues.

Counsel filed a separate certification stating that he sent a letter to Thomas explaining the

meaning and effect of an Anders brief, a copy of the brief, the motion to withdraw, and the

clerk’s and reporter’s records. Also, in his motion to withdraw, counsel informed Thomas that

he had a right to file a pro se response to the motion to withdraw, which was due within thirty

days of July 31, 2025, and instructed Thomas on how to file such a response.

On August 1, 2025, we informed Thomas that his pro se brief was due on or before

September 2. On September 11, 2025, we informed Thomas that the case would be submitted on

October 2. We did not receive a pro se brief from Thomas nor a motion requesting an extension

of time in which to file such a brief.

Counsel’s actions comply with an appointed counsel’s responsibilities when filing an

Anders brief and a motion to withdraw in accordance with Kelly v. State. See Kelly v. State, 436

S.W.3d 313, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Counsel’s professional evaluation of the record

demonstrates why there are no arguable grounds to be raised on appeal and meets the

requirements of Anders. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 743–44; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–20.

After our independent review of the entire appellate record, we have independently

determined “that there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal.” See Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318

3 n.16. In the Anders context, once we determine that the appeal is without merit, we must affirm

the trial court’s judgment. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005). Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.1

Jeff Rambin Justice

Date Submitted: October 2, 2025 Date Decided: February 18, 2026

Do Not Publish

1 Since we agree that this case presents no reversible error, we also, in accordance with Anders, grant counsel’s request to withdraw from further representation of Appellant in this case. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Appellant desire to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Appellant must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review (1) must be filed within thirty days from either the date of this opinion or the date on which the last timely motion for rehearing was overruled by this Court, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2, (2) must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3, and (3) should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4. 4