1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 David Alan Carr, No. CV-25-03889-PHX-DJH
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Arizona Department of Child Safety, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff David Alan Carr (“Plaintiff”) has filed an Application to Proceed in District 16 Court Without Prepaying Fees or Cost (Doc. 2). Upon review, Plaintiff’s Application, 17 signed under penalty of perjury, indicates that he is financially unable to pay the filing fee. 18 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application and allow him to proceed in forma pauperis 19 (“IFP”). The Court will proceed to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 20 1915(e)(2). (Doc. 1). 21 I. Legal Standard 22 When a party has been granted IFP status, the Court must review the complaint to 23 determine whether the action: 24 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 25 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 26 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 In conducting this review, “section 1915(e) not only 28 1 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, 1 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” 2 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 3 II. Plaintiff’s Complaint 4 On October 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit against the Arizona Department of Child 5 Safety, Semson Nip-Hung, Kris Mayes, Pinal County Superior Court, Judge Karen Palmer, 6 and unknown parties acting in concert (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1 at 1). Therein, 7 Plaintiff alleges that in or around September 13, 2024, Defendant Arizona Department of 8 Child Safety (“DCS”) initiated dependency and neglect proceedings, in Pinal County 9 Superior Court of Arizona, against Plaintiff and the mother of his minor child C.R.C. 10 (Id. at ¶¶ 4–6). He alleges various constitutional violations arising from these proceedings. 11 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges: 12 • “Arizona lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 13 and Enforcement Act” (id. at ¶ 5); 14 • “DCS obtained an order claiming Plaintiff had abandoned or neglected 15 C.R.C., even though Plaintiff was in Colorado, remained in contact with his 16 daughter, and had never abandoned her” (id. at ¶ 6); 17 • “In her written order, Judge Karen Palmer stated that Plaintiff did not provide 18 proof of a drug test,” despite the caseworker’s testimony that Plaintiff 19 provided clean hair follicle test results (id. at ¶¶ 8–10); 20 • “The court declined to require the child’s mother to undergo any drug 21 testing” (id. at ¶ 11); and 22 • “Plaintiff was denied a jury trial and a truly public proceeding despite 23 requesting both.” (Id. at ¶ 12). 24 Following these proceedings, “the state court awarded guardianship of C.R.C. to the 25
26 §1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.” Long v. Maricopa Cmty. College Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012) 27 (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies 28 to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”)). 1 maternal grandmother.” (Id. at ¶ 13). Plaintiff has now brought First Amendment, Ninth 2 Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, declaratory relief, and injunctive 3 relief claims against all Defendants. (Id. at 2–3). Plaintiff asks the Court to “[d]eclare that 4 the Defendants lacked jurisdiction over the custody of minor child [C.R.C.];” “[v]acate all 5 orders entered in Pinal County Superior Court Case No. S1100JD201200046;” “[o]rder the 6 immediate return of C.R.C. to Plaintiff’s custody;” and award money damages. 7 (Id. at ¶¶ A–E). 8 III. Discussion 9 This Court lacks the jurisdiction to grant Plaintiff’s requested relief. Under the 10 Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction 11 to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 12 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). “If a plaintiff brings a de facto appeal from a state court 13 judgment, Rooker-Feldman requires that the district court dismiss the suit for lack of 14 subject matter jurisdiction.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 15 2004). Rooker-Feldman applies when a federal plaintiff claims the state court’s legal errors 16 as their injury and seeks relief from a state court judgment as their remedy. Id. at 1140. 17 Here, Plaintiff’s requested relief primarily concerns prior state court actions and 18 orders. (See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ A–C). For example, Plaintiff asks the Court to declare that 19 Defendants lacked jurisdiction over him, declare that “related Arizona orders are void,” 20 vacate all orders entered in the Pinal County Superior Court case, and order the immediate 21 return of the minor child to his custody. (Id.) These requests seek relief from state court 22 judgments and are clearly barred under Rooker-Feldman. The alleged errors in Plaintiff’s 23 state court proceedings do not change this conclusion. (See id. at ¶¶ 5–12). “The clearest 24 case for dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine occurs when ‘a federal plaintiff 25 asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief 26 from a state court judgment based on that decision....’” Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 27 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164). 28 Furthermore, courts have routinely held that Rooker-Feldman bars claims for money 1 damages. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128019, *34 2 (“Even if Plaintiff sought only damages, Rooker-Feldman would bar his claims stemming 3 from alleged injuries from the state court’s decisions.”); Grimes v. Alameda County Soc. 4 Servs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120259, *8 (“Even if plaintiff were to abandon his request 5 for the return of his children and instead pursue only money damages, his claims still would 6 require review of the relevant state-court decisions. Such review is barred.”). Therefore, 7 because Plaintiff’s claims for money damages are based on injuries from state court 8 actions, they are barred by Rooker-Feldman. 9 In addition to Rooker-Feldman, Eleventh Amendment, judicial, and prosecutorial 10 immunity prohibit Plaintiff’s claims as the Complaint only speaks to Defendants’ actions 11 in their official capacities. See Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 12 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff cannot state a claim against [Arizona Superior Courts] (or 13 its employees), because such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Olsen v. 14 Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Absolute immunity is 15 generally accorded to judges and prosecutors functioning in their official capacities.”). 16 Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to reverse or alter rulings in his 17 state court case, it is dismissed as the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent 18 Plaintiff claims error in the state court proceedings, his relief lies in an appeal to a higher 19 state court, not with a federal district court. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1154. Given the Court’s 20 lack of jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary 21 Restraining Order (Doc. 3) is denied. 22 IV.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 David Alan Carr, No. CV-25-03889-PHX-DJH
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Arizona Department of Child Safety, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff David Alan Carr (“Plaintiff”) has filed an Application to Proceed in District 16 Court Without Prepaying Fees or Cost (Doc. 2). Upon review, Plaintiff’s Application, 17 signed under penalty of perjury, indicates that he is financially unable to pay the filing fee. 18 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application and allow him to proceed in forma pauperis 19 (“IFP”). The Court will proceed to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 20 1915(e)(2). (Doc. 1). 21 I. Legal Standard 22 When a party has been granted IFP status, the Court must review the complaint to 23 determine whether the action: 24 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 25 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 26 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 In conducting this review, “section 1915(e) not only 28 1 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, 1 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” 2 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 3 II. Plaintiff’s Complaint 4 On October 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit against the Arizona Department of Child 5 Safety, Semson Nip-Hung, Kris Mayes, Pinal County Superior Court, Judge Karen Palmer, 6 and unknown parties acting in concert (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1 at 1). Therein, 7 Plaintiff alleges that in or around September 13, 2024, Defendant Arizona Department of 8 Child Safety (“DCS”) initiated dependency and neglect proceedings, in Pinal County 9 Superior Court of Arizona, against Plaintiff and the mother of his minor child C.R.C. 10 (Id. at ¶¶ 4–6). He alleges various constitutional violations arising from these proceedings. 11 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges: 12 • “Arizona lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 13 and Enforcement Act” (id. at ¶ 5); 14 • “DCS obtained an order claiming Plaintiff had abandoned or neglected 15 C.R.C., even though Plaintiff was in Colorado, remained in contact with his 16 daughter, and had never abandoned her” (id. at ¶ 6); 17 • “In her written order, Judge Karen Palmer stated that Plaintiff did not provide 18 proof of a drug test,” despite the caseworker’s testimony that Plaintiff 19 provided clean hair follicle test results (id. at ¶¶ 8–10); 20 • “The court declined to require the child’s mother to undergo any drug 21 testing” (id. at ¶ 11); and 22 • “Plaintiff was denied a jury trial and a truly public proceeding despite 23 requesting both.” (Id. at ¶ 12). 24 Following these proceedings, “the state court awarded guardianship of C.R.C. to the 25
26 §1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.” Long v. Maricopa Cmty. College Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012) 27 (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies 28 to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”)). 1 maternal grandmother.” (Id. at ¶ 13). Plaintiff has now brought First Amendment, Ninth 2 Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, declaratory relief, and injunctive 3 relief claims against all Defendants. (Id. at 2–3). Plaintiff asks the Court to “[d]eclare that 4 the Defendants lacked jurisdiction over the custody of minor child [C.R.C.];” “[v]acate all 5 orders entered in Pinal County Superior Court Case No. S1100JD201200046;” “[o]rder the 6 immediate return of C.R.C. to Plaintiff’s custody;” and award money damages. 7 (Id. at ¶¶ A–E). 8 III. Discussion 9 This Court lacks the jurisdiction to grant Plaintiff’s requested relief. Under the 10 Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction 11 to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 12 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). “If a plaintiff brings a de facto appeal from a state court 13 judgment, Rooker-Feldman requires that the district court dismiss the suit for lack of 14 subject matter jurisdiction.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 15 2004). Rooker-Feldman applies when a federal plaintiff claims the state court’s legal errors 16 as their injury and seeks relief from a state court judgment as their remedy. Id. at 1140. 17 Here, Plaintiff’s requested relief primarily concerns prior state court actions and 18 orders. (See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ A–C). For example, Plaintiff asks the Court to declare that 19 Defendants lacked jurisdiction over him, declare that “related Arizona orders are void,” 20 vacate all orders entered in the Pinal County Superior Court case, and order the immediate 21 return of the minor child to his custody. (Id.) These requests seek relief from state court 22 judgments and are clearly barred under Rooker-Feldman. The alleged errors in Plaintiff’s 23 state court proceedings do not change this conclusion. (See id. at ¶¶ 5–12). “The clearest 24 case for dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine occurs when ‘a federal plaintiff 25 asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief 26 from a state court judgment based on that decision....’” Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 27 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164). 28 Furthermore, courts have routinely held that Rooker-Feldman bars claims for money 1 damages. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128019, *34 2 (“Even if Plaintiff sought only damages, Rooker-Feldman would bar his claims stemming 3 from alleged injuries from the state court’s decisions.”); Grimes v. Alameda County Soc. 4 Servs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120259, *8 (“Even if plaintiff were to abandon his request 5 for the return of his children and instead pursue only money damages, his claims still would 6 require review of the relevant state-court decisions. Such review is barred.”). Therefore, 7 because Plaintiff’s claims for money damages are based on injuries from state court 8 actions, they are barred by Rooker-Feldman. 9 In addition to Rooker-Feldman, Eleventh Amendment, judicial, and prosecutorial 10 immunity prohibit Plaintiff’s claims as the Complaint only speaks to Defendants’ actions 11 in their official capacities. See Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 12 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff cannot state a claim against [Arizona Superior Courts] (or 13 its employees), because such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Olsen v. 14 Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Absolute immunity is 15 generally accorded to judges and prosecutors functioning in their official capacities.”). 16 Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to reverse or alter rulings in his 17 state court case, it is dismissed as the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent 18 Plaintiff claims error in the state court proceedings, his relief lies in an appeal to a higher 19 state court, not with a federal district court. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1154. Given the Court’s 20 lack of jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary 21 Restraining Order (Doc. 3) is denied. 22 IV. Leave to Amend 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) requires that leave to amend “shall be freely 24 given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15(a). The Court “may exercise its 25 discretion to deny leave to amend due to ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on [the] 26 part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed 27 undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . [and] futility of amendment.’” Carvalho v. 28 Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, (1962)). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. vy. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Put differently, leave to amend “is properly denied [where] 5 || amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 6|| 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). 7 Here, there are no other consistent factual allegations that could cure □□□□□□□□□□□ 8 || Complaint of the foregoing deficiencies. The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear □□□□□□□□□□□ || claims because they wholly regard alleged errors in his state court case. The proper remedy || for Plaintiff is an appeal to the state court of appeals. Bringing an amended complaint to 11 || this Court would risk futility and therefore, leave to amend is denied. 12 Accordingly, 13 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is GRANTED but his Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. The 15 || Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment and terminate this matter. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining || Order (Doc. 3) is DENIED as moot. 18 Dated this 21st day of October, 2025. 19 oC. . fo 20 norable' Diang4. Huretewa 1 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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