Davalos v. Allan Industries, Inc.

CourtSuperior Court of Delaware
DecidedMarch 31, 2021
DocketN19A-10-006 CEB
StatusPublished

This text of Davalos v. Allan Industries, Inc. (Davalos v. Allan Industries, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davalos v. Allan Industries, Inc., (Del. Ct. App. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CLAUDIA DAVALOS, an individual, ) ) Claimant-Appellant, ) ) v. ) C.A. No.: N19A-10-006 CEB ) ALLAN INDUSTRIES INC., ) ) Employer-Appellee. )

ORDER

Submitted: December 15, 2020 Decided: March 31, 2021

Upon Consideration of Claimant’s Appeal of the Decision of the Industrial Accident Board, AFFIRMED.

Cynthia H. Pruitt, Esquire, DOROSHOW, PASQUALE, KRAWITZ & BHAYA, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Claimant-Appellant.

Andrew Lukashunas, Esquire, TYBOUT REDFEARN & PELL, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Employer-Appellee, Allan Industries, Inc.

BUTLER, R.J. INTRODUCTION

On February 22, 2018, Claudia Davalos (“Claimant”) injured her lumbar

spine in a work accident while working for Allen Industries Inc. (“Employer”).

Employer acknowledged that Claimant sustained a work-related injury and has paid

workers’ compensation benefits, including medical expenses and total disability.

Approximately one year later, Employer filed a petition to terminate benefits

with the Industrial Accident Board (“ the IAB”), alleging Claimant was no longer

totally disabled because Claimant’s work injury had resolved. Claimant argued that

her work injuries were ongoing and that she continues to remain totally disabled.

In July, 2019, the IAB conducted a hearing to consider the Employer’s

petition. In September, 2019, the IAB ruled that Claimant’s lumbar spine work

injury had resolved by January, 2019 and she reached maximum medical

improvement, granting Employer’s termination petition.

In October, 2019, Claimant filed with this Court an appeal of the IAB ruling.

Claimant urges that the IAB erred because its conclusions were not supported by

substantial evidence and was an abuse of discretion.

FACTS

A. The Accident

Claimant was employed as a housekeeper for Employer at the time of her

work accident. On February 22, 2018, Claimant lifted a bag of trash out of a can to

1 throw into a dumpster when she felt pain and pressure in her mid to low back.

Claimant continued to work until the pain became severe while mopping the floor,

and then she went home. The following day, Claimant went to the emergency room

and, according to the CT report, had several disc bulges but no acute fractures or

dramatic malalignment of the lumbar spine. She was given an injection for pain and

was discharged. In June, 2018, Claimant was examined by Dr. Jonathan Kates, at

the Employer’s request.

B. Dr. Kates’ First Evaluation

In her initial June, 2018 examination with Employer’s expert, Dr. Kates,

Claimant indicated she had back pain, describing it as pain in the middle of her back

and pressure and cramping sensations in her low back. Additionally, she stated she

had occasional 1) pain radiating to her lower right extremity and 2) numbness in her

right leg. Claimant reported the pain was worse when standing or sitting too long

and disturbed her sleep but could be reduced by lying on her stomach and applying

ice.

Dr. Kates observed that Claimant walked with a left sided limp, moving

slowly and deliberately. Claimant did not use a walker. Dr. Kates’ other

observations included 1) she was able to stand on her leg and had normal spine

alignment, 2) she had tenderness in the lumbar spine, 3) her lumbar range was

limited due to pain, 4) she had pain with resistance, affecting her strength, 5) she had

2 intact reflexes, 6) she had decreased sensation in the right foot and lower leg, and 7)

straight leg raising in sitting and supine positions resulted in low pain without leg

pain. Based upon these observations and Claimant’s prior medical records, Dr.

Kates opined that Claimant sustained a lumbosacral sprain and strain in the work

accident.

Dr. Kates also believed that Claimant had signs of symptom exaggeration,

with her complaints out of proportion to her physical examination finding.

According to Dr. Kates, Claimant 1) had a limp on the left side, inconsistent with

her lumbar spine injury, 2) she was able to stand on her toes and heels, indicating

normal strength in lower extremities from below the knee (even though Claimant

indicated pain and did not test as normal strength when Dr. Kates evaluated those

areas), and 3) she had an extremely limited range of motion of her lumbar spine,

which was out of proportion to her work injury because the nerve roots in the lumbar

spine are not circumferential.1 Dr. Kates noted that if all of Claimant’s nerve roots

were injured, she would experience numbness above her knee, which she did not.

Dr. Kates recommended physical therapy and later, a transition to a work

conditioning program. Dr. Kates believed that at the time, Claimant could work but

with restrictions. Dr. Kates recommended restrictions including 1) limiting the

1 Nerve roots that are not circumferential are, in layman’s terms, nerve roots that do not sit on the outside edge of the spine. Circumferential, Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (4th ed. 2013).

3 amount of time she could stand and walk, 2) limiting the amount she could lift, 3)

limiting her ability to push and pull, and 4) never bending or climbing and to squat

or kneel occasionally.

C. Dr. Eskander’s Evaluation

Claimant’s expert witness was Dr. Eskander. Dr. Eskander began treating

Claimant on April 3, 2018. On Claimant’s first visit, she complained of back pain

radiating to the right leg and right-middle of the back. She indicated she had never

had prior back pain or treatments. She informed Dr. Eskander that she previously

saw Dr. Ginsberg, who recommended physical therapy and was considering

injections.

Dr. Eskander’s examination revealed a normal neurologic exam and normal

strength, sensation and reflexes. At this point, Dr. Eskander diagnosed Claimant

with a lumbar radiculopathy. Dr. Eskander ordered other doctors to perform

ultrasound evaluations and injections in the affected areas. Dr. Eskander’s office

later performed more injections into the lumbar spine and joints around the pelvis

and hip, without significant breakthroughs.

Dr. Eskander’s final diagnosis was that Claimant has soft tissue and structural

injuries. He believed that the most likely scenario was that she had a degenerative

condition of her lumbar spine that was made symptomatic by the work accident. Dr.

4 Eskander stated that although there is typically a strain or sprain component in

injuries like Claimant’s, a strain or sprain was not the main issue.

On the question of whether Claimant can return to work, Dr. Eskander stated

that he did not believe Claimant was functional enough to return to work. He

indicated that her disability score was 62 percent – not full disability, as she was able

to perform some tasks, albeit with pain. Because the goal was to return her to work

and keep her functional, Dr. Eskander believed that putting her back to work would

be counterproductive.

D. Dr. Kates’ Second Evaluation

Dr. Kates examined Claimant a second time on January 7, 2019 with the

assistance of an interpreter. During the examination, Claimant expressed pain in any

position she was in, whether standing, sitting, walking, or lying down. She had a

limp on the left side. When sitting in a chair, Claimant had to shift from one side to

the other.

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