Daryl McGee v. State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: September 17, 2025
• Docket: 3D2025-1488
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed September 17, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-1488 Lower Tribunal Nos. F18-18956, F20-10326, & F25-6441 ________________

Daryl McGee, Petitioner,

vs.

The State of Florida, Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Laura Anne Stuzin and Zachary James, Judges.

Carlos Martinez, Public Defender, and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant Public Defender for Petitioner.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

Before EMAS, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

MILLER, J. Petitioner, Daryl McGee, seeks a writ of certiorari quashing an order

involuntarily committing him for competency restoration treatment pursuant

to section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2025), and Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.212. In his petition, McGee asserts that the trial court departed

from the essential requirements of law causing him irreparable harm

because the evidence adduced below did not establish a substantial

probability his competency was restorable in the reasonably foreseeable

future. We deny the petition.

I

McGee has a lengthy mental health history. He is the subject of

charges in three separate pending felony cases. The first two cases involve

an attempt to perpetrate a sexual battery on a stranger in the public domain

and a battery on an on-duty correctional officer following an altercation over

medical treatment. Following his release from custody into a community-

based living facility, McGee is alleged to have again attempted to commit a

sexual battery on a stranger in public.

McGee was evaluated by court-appointed experts at the Turner

Guilford Knight Correctional Center, and the trial court convened a

competency hearing. McGee waived his presence at the hearing, and two

forensic psychologists testified.

2 The first, Dr. Brenda Rivera, stated she first evaluated McGee in 2019,

and she has since conducted six evaluations. The most recent evaluation

occurred some two months before the competency hearing.

Dr. Rivera met with McGee in an interview room. After ten minutes,

she terminated the face-to-face portion of the interview because McGee was

“grossly psychotic,” mumbling, and unable to coherently respond to

questions or maintain eye contact. She noted that McGee was “more

decompensated” than at any prior evaluation.

Dr. Rivera determined McGee was incompetent to proceed after

evaluating the Dusky 1 criteria, as codified in section 916.12, Florida Statutes.

She concluded that each of his deficits was attributable to active psychosis

resulting from bipolar schizoaffective disorder. She further observed that he

had a documented history of substance abuse and although he was

prescribed Olanzapine to manage his symptoms, his medication compliance

was inconsistent.

Dr. Rivera stated that targeting McGee’s symptoms with medication

would yield improvement, and allowing his release into the community

previously had resulted in substance abuse relapse. She concluded

competency restoration hinged on consistent and proper medication, along

1 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).

3 with providing a more structured setting. She further found that McGee had

previously been restored to competency in the state forensic hospital, and

he met the statutory criteria for involuntary hospitalization.

The second expert, Dr. Vanessa Archer, stated that she evaluated

McGee twice, the most recent of which was approximately two and a half

months before the competency hearing. The latter interview occurred by

video conference and spanned less than thirty minutes due to McGee’s

active psychosis. According to Dr. Archer, McGee was hyperverbal,

tangential, and delusional and made sexually inappropriate comments.

Like Dr. Rivera, Dr. Archer opined that McGee suffered from

schizophrenia. She further stated his condition was complicated by

borderline intellectual functioning. Having examined the established

competency factors, she concluded that McGee was incompetent to

proceed. Her opinion, however, came with the caveat that his symptoms

would diminish with proper medication and abstinence from controlled

substances.

She further observed that McGee had previously been adjudicated

competent following placement in a structured setting. Restoration, in her

view, rested on achieving an established baseline. She found that he

4 presented a danger to others, particularly women, and recommended

involuntary commitment in the state forensic hospital.

II

A

Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that should be sparingly granted.

See Valencia v. PennyMac Holdings, LLC, 317 So. 3d 178, 180 (Fla. 3d DCA

2012). To obtain a writ of certiorari, a petitioner must demonstrate a

departure from the essential requirements of law, resulting in material injury

for the remainder of the case, that cannot be corrected on plenary appeal.

See University of Florida Board of Trustees v. Carmody, 372 So. 3d 246, 252

(Fla. 2023). Involuntary commitment orders are reviewable by certiorari.

See D.L.D. v. State, 397 So. 3d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).

B

Section 916.13(1)(c), Florida Statutes, authorizes a court to

involuntarily commit an incompetent criminal defendant upon clear and

convincing evidence that “[t]here is a substantial probability that the mental

illness causing the defendant’s incompetence will respond to treatment and

the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably

foreseeable future.” § 916.13(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2025). It is axiomatic that a

“finding that [a defendant] 'might' be restored to competency . . . does [not]

5 satisfy the statutory requirement of clear and convincing evidence that there

be a 'substantial probability' that the [defendant] will regain competency in

the foreseeable future.” Horton v. Judd, 80 So. 3d 439, 440 (Fla. 2d DCA

2012). Conversely, where there is evidentiary support as to amenability to

treatment, as evidenced by historical factors, an accepted methodology, or

both, an involuntary commitment order is entitled to deference by the

reviewing court.

C

In this case, the experts, both of whom had examined McGee on

multiple occasions, confirmed that McGee suffers from schizoaffective

disorder, along with a documented history of substance abuse. They

unanimously agreed that his condition would be responsive to treatment.

Both specifically opined his symptoms would improve in a structured setting,

like the state forensic hospital, where he would receive proper medication

management and be restricted from accessing illicit substances.

We are cognizant that any prediction as to future events necessarily

entails a certain degree of speculation. But here, each expert tethered her

forecast to McGee’s specific diagnosis and failure to consistently adhere to

his medication regime.

6 Finally, neither expert opined McGee was not restorable. Indeed, both

noted that he was previously restored to competency several years ago

under similar circumstances. 2 Given these unique facts, the cases cited by

petitioner are distinguishable. See Dep’t of Children and Families v. Pierre,

373 So. 3d 1272, 1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (noting that first expert did not

offer an opinion as to restorability and second concluded the “prognosis for

achieving competency is guarded given his apparent neurocognitive

deficits”); see also Dep’t of Children and Families v. Rodriguez, 267 So. 3d

1087, 1088 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (“Because the evaluating psychologist

opined that Rodriguez [who was intellectually disabled] was not likely

restorable to competency, he could not be committed under section

916.13(1).”); Dep’t of Children and Families v. Musa, 321 So. 3d 908, 910

(Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (“At best, there is no evidence that Mr. Musa is

restorable.”). Accordingly, we find no departure from the essential

requirements of law and deny the petition.

Petition denied.

2 McGee’s arrest affidavits, hospitalization history, and expert reports were before the trial court. See Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 677 (Fla. 2014).