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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 DARYL EDWARD MCWILLIAMS, CASE NO. 26-5269 BHS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 CITY OF CASTLE ROCK, et al., 11 Defendant. 12
13 THIS MATTER is before the Court on pro se plaintiff Daryl Edward 14 McWilliams’s motion to appoint counsel, Dkt. 13, McWilliams’ motion to enforce stay 15 of lower court proceedings, Dkt. 14, and McWilliams’ “formal notice of intent,” Dkt. 18. 16 Defendant City of Castle Rock’s response to McWilliam’s motion to enforce stay asks 17 this Court to stay this case pending the resolution of the underlying state court criminal 18 case. Dkt. 20. 19 McWilliams, and plaintiffs Logan Fields, Ayden McWilliams and Teagan 20 McWilliams, sued the City of Castle Rock in Cowlitz County Superior Court, asserting 21 that it unlawfully modified its noise ordinance, and then unlawfully utilized it to 22 maliciously and selectively prosecute McWilliams. Dkt. 1-1. McWilliams asserts that 1 “Defendant’s law enforcement officers systematically issued criminal noise citations 2 without conducting required objective decibel measurements using calibrated equipment, 3 relying instead on subjective, retaliatory complaints from private neighbors.” Id. at 4. He
4 lists nine such “selective enforcement cases,” and further that the City “actively 5 coordinated” with four private parties to “facilitate” eight “retaliatory Protection Order 6 cases” against him. Id. He asserts that the City’s misconduct directly caused “custodial 7 interference” by “intentionally disrupting lawful custody and visitation exchanges” in 8 another Cowlitz County Superior Court case, McWilliams v. McWilliams, No. 17-3-
9 00004-8. Id. at 5. McWilliams assert that these acts violated his constitutional rights. 10 Castle Rock removed the case based on the federal claim. Dkt. 1. McWilliams 11 filed an amended complaint, Dkt. 12, naming several Castle Rock law enforcement 12 officers. He also explains that the other plaintiffs are “Master Sergeant Charles Jeremy 13 Fields,” who is “guardian by adoption for McWilliams, and as designated agent under
14 durable power of attorney for Logan Fields;” Logan Fields, a vulnerable adult; and 15 McWilliams minor children, A.M. and T.M. Dkt. 12 at 1 and 3–4. 16 McWilliams now asks the Court to appoint his attorney in the state criminal cases, 17 Longview Law Group, to represent him in this case. Dkt. 13. He asks the Court to “find 18 on the face of the amended pleadings the need for disability access of the court, and equal
19 fair judiciary representations as the facts of this case are of challenge in the District Cases 20 of Cowlitz.” Dkt. 13 at 2. He also asserts that an assistant attorney general emailed him 21 and “confirmed that the allegations in his complaint are valid.” Id. It is worth noting that 22 1 Longview Law opposes McWilliams’ request that the court appoint it to represent 2 McWilliams in this civil case. Dkt. 24. 3 In exceptional circumstances, a court may ask an attorney to represent any person
4 unable to afford counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 5 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984). A finding 6 of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the likelihood of success on 7 the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 8 complexity of the legal issues involved. Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th
9 Cir. 1986) (citing Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). These factors 10 must be viewed together before reaching a decision on whether to appoint counsel under 11 § 1915(e)(1). Id. 12 The pro se plaintiffs and their non-attorney representatives cannot establish that 13 they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, and therefore cannot meet this
14 standard. There are numerous problems with the plaintiffs’ claims as currently asserted. 15 First, a non-attorney cannot represent another person or entity in this court, and 16 that rule cannot be overcome by an allegation that the actual plaintiff is disabled or 17 vulnerable, or by the fact that the purported representative is and “attorney in fact” under 18 a durable power of attorney. A non-attorney may represent only himself in court.
19 Representing another person or entity in court is the practice of law. To practice 20 law, one must be an attorney. RCW 2.48.170. Thus, Washington, like all federal courts, 21 follows the common law rule that corporations appearing in court proceedings must be 22 represented by an attorney. There is a pro se exception to this general rule, under which a 1 person “‘may appear and act in any court as his own attorney without threat of sanction 2 for unauthorized practice.’” Cottringer v. State, Dep’t of Employment Sec., 162 Wn. App. 3 782, 787 (2011) (quoting Wash. State Bar Ass’n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. &
4 Loan Ass’n, 91 Wn.2d 48, 56 (1978)). 5 The pro se exception is, however, extremely limited and applies “only if the 6 layperson is acting solely on his own behalf” with respect to his own legal rights and 7 obligations. Cottringer, 162 Wn. App. at 787–88 (quoting Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 91 8 Wn.2d at 57). Although a non-attorney may appear in propria persona in his own behalf,
9 that privilege is personal to him. McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 10 1966). He has no authority to appear as an attorney for anyone other than himself. Russell 11 v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962); Collins v. O'Brien, 208 F.2d 44, 45 12 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 944 (1954); see also LCR 83.2(b)(4) (“A 13 business entity, except a sole proprietorship, must be represented by counsel.”).
14 The real party in interest must be the person who “by substantive law has the right 15 sought to be enforced.” See C.E. Pope Equity Tr. v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th 16 Cir. 1987); see also McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966) (the 17 privilege to represent oneself pro se provided by section 1654 is personal to the litigant 18 and does not extend to other parties or entities). A non-lawyer representative cannot
19 litigate claims that are not personal to him. 20 McWilliams cannot represent his children, and Charles Fields cannot represent 21 McWilliams, the minors, or his father, Logan Fields, in this Court. 22 1 Second, it is clear from both versions of the complaint (and from McWilliams’ 2 “emergency motion to stay state court criminal proceedings,” Dkt. 14), that the aim of 3 this litigation is to stop, alter, or reverse various state court proceedings.
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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 DARYL EDWARD MCWILLIAMS, CASE NO. 26-5269 BHS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 CITY OF CASTLE ROCK, et al., 11 Defendant. 12
13 THIS MATTER is before the Court on pro se plaintiff Daryl Edward 14 McWilliams’s motion to appoint counsel, Dkt. 13, McWilliams’ motion to enforce stay 15 of lower court proceedings, Dkt. 14, and McWilliams’ “formal notice of intent,” Dkt. 18. 16 Defendant City of Castle Rock’s response to McWilliam’s motion to enforce stay asks 17 this Court to stay this case pending the resolution of the underlying state court criminal 18 case. Dkt. 20. 19 McWilliams, and plaintiffs Logan Fields, Ayden McWilliams and Teagan 20 McWilliams, sued the City of Castle Rock in Cowlitz County Superior Court, asserting 21 that it unlawfully modified its noise ordinance, and then unlawfully utilized it to 22 maliciously and selectively prosecute McWilliams. Dkt. 1-1. McWilliams asserts that 1 “Defendant’s law enforcement officers systematically issued criminal noise citations 2 without conducting required objective decibel measurements using calibrated equipment, 3 relying instead on subjective, retaliatory complaints from private neighbors.” Id. at 4. He
4 lists nine such “selective enforcement cases,” and further that the City “actively 5 coordinated” with four private parties to “facilitate” eight “retaliatory Protection Order 6 cases” against him. Id. He asserts that the City’s misconduct directly caused “custodial 7 interference” by “intentionally disrupting lawful custody and visitation exchanges” in 8 another Cowlitz County Superior Court case, McWilliams v. McWilliams, No. 17-3-
9 00004-8. Id. at 5. McWilliams assert that these acts violated his constitutional rights. 10 Castle Rock removed the case based on the federal claim. Dkt. 1. McWilliams 11 filed an amended complaint, Dkt. 12, naming several Castle Rock law enforcement 12 officers. He also explains that the other plaintiffs are “Master Sergeant Charles Jeremy 13 Fields,” who is “guardian by adoption for McWilliams, and as designated agent under
14 durable power of attorney for Logan Fields;” Logan Fields, a vulnerable adult; and 15 McWilliams minor children, A.M. and T.M. Dkt. 12 at 1 and 3–4. 16 McWilliams now asks the Court to appoint his attorney in the state criminal cases, 17 Longview Law Group, to represent him in this case. Dkt. 13. He asks the Court to “find 18 on the face of the amended pleadings the need for disability access of the court, and equal
19 fair judiciary representations as the facts of this case are of challenge in the District Cases 20 of Cowlitz.” Dkt. 13 at 2. He also asserts that an assistant attorney general emailed him 21 and “confirmed that the allegations in his complaint are valid.” Id. It is worth noting that 22 1 Longview Law opposes McWilliams’ request that the court appoint it to represent 2 McWilliams in this civil case. Dkt. 24. 3 In exceptional circumstances, a court may ask an attorney to represent any person
4 unable to afford counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 5 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984). A finding 6 of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the likelihood of success on 7 the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 8 complexity of the legal issues involved. Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th
9 Cir. 1986) (citing Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). These factors 10 must be viewed together before reaching a decision on whether to appoint counsel under 11 § 1915(e)(1). Id. 12 The pro se plaintiffs and their non-attorney representatives cannot establish that 13 they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, and therefore cannot meet this
14 standard. There are numerous problems with the plaintiffs’ claims as currently asserted. 15 First, a non-attorney cannot represent another person or entity in this court, and 16 that rule cannot be overcome by an allegation that the actual plaintiff is disabled or 17 vulnerable, or by the fact that the purported representative is and “attorney in fact” under 18 a durable power of attorney. A non-attorney may represent only himself in court.
19 Representing another person or entity in court is the practice of law. To practice 20 law, one must be an attorney. RCW 2.48.170. Thus, Washington, like all federal courts, 21 follows the common law rule that corporations appearing in court proceedings must be 22 represented by an attorney. There is a pro se exception to this general rule, under which a 1 person “‘may appear and act in any court as his own attorney without threat of sanction 2 for unauthorized practice.’” Cottringer v. State, Dep’t of Employment Sec., 162 Wn. App. 3 782, 787 (2011) (quoting Wash. State Bar Ass’n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. &
4 Loan Ass’n, 91 Wn.2d 48, 56 (1978)). 5 The pro se exception is, however, extremely limited and applies “only if the 6 layperson is acting solely on his own behalf” with respect to his own legal rights and 7 obligations. Cottringer, 162 Wn. App. at 787–88 (quoting Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 91 8 Wn.2d at 57). Although a non-attorney may appear in propria persona in his own behalf,
9 that privilege is personal to him. McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 10 1966). He has no authority to appear as an attorney for anyone other than himself. Russell 11 v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962); Collins v. O'Brien, 208 F.2d 44, 45 12 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 944 (1954); see also LCR 83.2(b)(4) (“A 13 business entity, except a sole proprietorship, must be represented by counsel.”).
14 The real party in interest must be the person who “by substantive law has the right 15 sought to be enforced.” See C.E. Pope Equity Tr. v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th 16 Cir. 1987); see also McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966) (the 17 privilege to represent oneself pro se provided by section 1654 is personal to the litigant 18 and does not extend to other parties or entities). A non-lawyer representative cannot
19 litigate claims that are not personal to him. 20 McWilliams cannot represent his children, and Charles Fields cannot represent 21 McWilliams, the minors, or his father, Logan Fields, in this Court. 22 1 Second, it is clear from both versions of the complaint (and from McWilliams’ 2 “emergency motion to stay state court criminal proceedings,” Dkt. 14), that the aim of 3 this litigation is to stop, alter, or reverse various state court proceedings. As the City
4 points out, federal courts should abstain from staying or enjoining pending state criminal 5 prosecutions absent extraordinary circumstances. 6 The “Younger” abstention doctrine applies where (1) there is an ongoing state 7 judicial proceeding, (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests, (3) there is an 8 adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise constitutional challenges, and (4) the
9 requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state 10 judicial proceeding. See Credit One Bank v Hestrin, 60 F.4th 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2023). 11 This Court cannot and will not review or reverse decisions made in state 12 court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes “cases brought by state-court losers 13 complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting district court
14 review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 15 Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “[W]hen a losing plaintiff in state court brings a suit in 16 federal district court asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly erroneous legal rulings of the 17 state court and seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of that court, the federal suit is a 18 forbidden de facto appeal.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003); Carmona
19 v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). The place to argue that a criminal 20 proceeding is unconstitutional is in the court where it is pending, or in a direct appeal of 21 any adverse result, or, when one is convicted and incarcerated, through a §2254 habeas 22 corpus petition. 1 This Court cannot stay ongoing state court criminal cases. As a result, McWilliams 2 cannot establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim seeking to do so, as 3 required for the appointment of pro bono counsel. His motion for a court appointed
4 attorney, Dkt. 13, is DENIED. For the same reason, McWilliams’ motion to stay those 5 state court proceedings, Dkt. 14, is DENIED. The City’s motion to stay this case pending 6 the resolution of the state court criminal proceedings, Dkt. 20, is GRANTED. The parties 7 shall inform this Court when the state court case is completed. 8 * * *
9 The Court notes that though the case is stayed, and beyond the deficiencies 10 described above, McWilliams has not stated a plausible claim. He has not articulated 11 facts supporting the reasonable inference that the noise complaints against him are 12 unconstitutional. He instead describes a broad conspiracy and asserts in conclusory 13 fashion that the City and its officers and his neighbors have violated and are violating his
14 constitutional rights. 15 A plaintiff’s complaint must allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible 16 on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim has “facial plausibility” 17 when the party seeking relief “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 18 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although
19 courts must accept as true the complaint’s well-pled facts, conclusory allegations of law 20 and unwarranted inferences will not defeat an otherwise proper Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 21 dismiss. Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007); Sprewell v. 22 Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to 1 provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 2 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. 3 Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). This requires a 5 plaintiff to plead “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 6 accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 7 McWilliams’ amended complaint does nothing more than state the defendants 8 unlawfully harmed him. He does not articulate the who, what, when, where, why, or how
9 of a factual narrative allowing the Court to draw the reasonable inference that any 10 defendant is liable to McWilliams for any misconduct. 11 McWilliams’ “formal notice of intent to file a second amended complaint, addition 12 of parties, appointment of a magistrate and forthcoming motions under seal” is 13 procedurally improper. The Court does not act on notice of future intent; it acts on
14 motions properly filed, served, and noted for consideration according to the Federal Rules 15 of Civil Procedure and this District’s Local Rules. This includes motions to seal 16 documents that the filing party believes should be sealed; a party cannot unilaterally 17 inform the Court that the documents shall be sealed. 18 After the stay is lifted, the Court is likely to permit and require McWilliams to file,
19 on his own behalf only, a second amended complaint stating a plausible claim consistent 20 with this Order. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 // 1 Dated this 10th day of April, 2026. A 2 3 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 4 United
S tates District Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22