Darwin Shun Taylor v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 25, 2024
• Docket: 05-23-00848-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED and Opinion Filed June 25, 2024

S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00848-CR

DARWIN SHUN TAYLOR, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F21-59590

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Garcia

Appellant Darwin Shun Taylor appeals his conviction for arson, arguing in a

single issue that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We modify

the judgment to correct some errors and affirm the judgment as modified.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant was indicted for arson with intent to damage a habitation. The

indictment included two enhancement paragraphs. Appellant pleaded not guilty and

not true as to the enhancements. A jury found appellant guilty of arson and found that he used a deadly weapon

during the commission of the crime. Punishment was tried to the bench, and after

hearing evidence the trial judge found the enhancement paragraphs true and

sentenced appellant to thirty years in prison.

Appellant timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

In a single issue on appeal, appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the

evidence to support his conviction.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

As relevant to this case, a person commits arson if he starts a fire with intent

to destroy or damage a habitation knowing that the habitation was within the city

limits of an incorporated city or town. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a)(2)(A).

Evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction if any rational juror could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

McPherson v. State, 677 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We consider the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we may not reweigh the

evidence, substitute our judgment for the jury’s, or act as a thirteenth juror. Id. This

standard gives full play to the jury’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the

testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to

ultimate facts. Id.

–2– B. Evidence

1. General Evidence About the Fire

At trial, the State adduced evidence that on the night of October 4, 2021, there

was a fire at a duplex on Elsie Faye Heggins Street in Dallas, Texas. The duplex had

a small porch facing the street, with about four steps leading from the porch to

ground level. The unit on the right side of the duplex, viewed from the street, was

occupied by Ola Ruth Daniels and her adult son Gregory Daniels. Because Ola had

no legs and used a wheelchair, a ramp covered the right side of the porch steps.

Gregory testified that unit on the left side of the duplex was occupied by “Mr. Lee”

and his daughter Delilah. Gregory also testified that Delilah was a prostitute.

Ola testified that on the night of October 4, 2021, she was sitting in her unit’s

front room watching television when she saw a fire outside on the porch through an

open front window. Within seconds, her curtains caught on fire. She screamed for

Gregory, who was in the unit’s back room. He did not have time to put Ola in her

wheelchair but instead dragged her from her chair, out the front door, and down the

wheelchair ramp. The fire was already at the front door by that time, and Ola suffered

burns on her neck and her right arm. Gregory also testified about these facts, and his

testimony generally matched Ola’s. Neither Ola nor Gregory saw who started the

fire.

Kevin Gallegos, an arson investigator with Dallas Fire Rescue, testified that

the fire department responded to a call about this fire “roughly just before midnight.”

–3– Dallas firefighter Michael Tomlinson testified that he and other firefighters

arrived at the scene within about two minutes of the call about the fire. The front

room of the Danielses’ unit was fully engulfed in fire, but the outside was not on

fire. Tomlinson was the first person to enter the Danielses’ unit, and he hosed down

the floor so that the firefighters could push further into the residence. He testified,

“There seemed to be an accelerant on the floor, and it splashed onto my legs. My

pants caught on fire. My gloves caught on fire. My shoulder.” Although he had

fought hundreds of fires, he had never caught on fire before. Based on his training

and experience, he believed there was an ignitable liquid in the house.

Gallegos arrived at the premises when it was still “a hot fire,” and he

investigated the scene. He collected some debris to be tested for flammable liquids.

Based on his training and background, Gallegos testified that it looked like the fire

started “right below the front living room window between that and the doorway.”

He further testified that there was no evidence that the fire was accidental or natural.

His conclusion was that the fire was an “incendiary fire,” which means “a set fire.”

Forensic scientist Aaron Lewis testified that he tested some of the debris from

the fire, and he concluded that no “ignitable liquids” were detected. He further

testified that it was possible that ignitable liquids were used but were not detectable

in the debris because the liquids entirely burned up in the fire or because the water

used to fight the fire washed all of the liquids away.

–4– 2. Evidence About Appellant’s Conduct

Dallas police officer Rebecca Glass testified that on October 4, 2021, she

responded to a traffic accident that occurred at around 8:47 p.m. Appellant was one

of the drivers involved in the accident, and his girlfriend Delilah Andrews was his

passenger. The vehicles involved in the accident were towed away, and the police

transported appellant and Andrews in separate vehicles to Andrews’s address “on

Elsie Faye.” During the ride, appellant told Glass that appellant and Andrews had

been dating about six years. Glass testified, “[Appellant] asked me if my future

husband would cheat on me and then started to imply that he had seen us at a

restaurant and saw my husband talking to another female.” When asked whether

appellant seemed to be concerned about cheating, Glass answered, “A little bit,

yeah.” On cross-examination, Glass said that appellant also mentioned an episode of

the television show “Cheaters.” Glass also agreed with defense counsel that she and

appellant were “having a lighthearted conversation to pass the time.” A video from

Glass’s body camera showed that the police dropped appellant off right at 10:00 p.m.

Gregory Daniels testified that on October 4, 2021, before the fire broke out,

he was visiting Lee and watching television in the front room of Lee’s unit when the

police dropped Delilah Andrews and a man off at the duplex. Gregory did not know

the man’s name at the time, but he identified appellant as the person who was

dropped off with Andrews. Appellant and Andrews went to the back room of Lee’s

–5– unit, and at some point Gregory went back to his adjacent unit to get ready to go to

work. He showered and was getting dressed when Ola yelled at him about the fire.

Witness Rodney Hicks testified that he lived in the duplex next door and to

the left of the duplex where the fire broke out. On the night of the fire, he saw

appellant leaning against Hicks’s pick-up truck, which was parked between the two

duplexes. Hicks and appellant had a brief conversation about Hicks’s truck, and

afterwards appellant started walking from the side of the duplex towards the front.

Hicks testified, “[I]t looked like he [appellant] had something in his hand with light,”

and appellant sat on the porch of the duplex where the fire later broke out. Then

Hicks testified, “Well, I seen him walk from the side of the house, looked like

something alight in his hand? [sic]” When the State’s attorney asked Hicks what he

meant by “something alight,” he answered:

I don’t know if it was one of them candle things what you keep the food warm or something. I don’t know. I can’t exactly see what it was, but he had something light in his hand. He’s sitting down on the porch, and there was a light.

And when the State’s attorney pressed Hicks further, he clarified that the light was

a fire of some kind:

A. I don’t know what it is, but I seen some fire in his hand.

Q. But there was fire?

A. Yeah.

Q. Definitely flame?

A. Yes, sir.

–6– Q. How confident are you about that?

A. I’m confident because he sat down on the porch with it.

Hicks later testified that “he set it down right beside him.” Hicks further testified

that he had a good look at the front porch and no one else was on the porch with

appellant; moreover, nobody was out walking around the neighborhood. Hicks then

shut his door, and when he looked outside again about ten minutes later, “the house

was blazing.” Hicks also testified that it “wasn’t even 10, 15 minutes” from the time

he shut his door to the time he looked outside again and saw the fire. He also saw

appellant on the other side of the street, watching the fire burn. He described

appellant’s demeanor as “kind of calm.”

Gregory Daniels testified that after he pulled his mother from the burning

building, he saw a man sitting across the street with a gas can. Hicks indicated to

Gregory that the man across the street had started the fire, and Gregory crossed the

street towards the man. When Gregory did that, the man stood up and started

walking. Gregory saw that the man “had kind of a crazy look in his eyes” and that it

looked like “he was high on something.” At this point in his testimony, Gregory

identified the man as appellant. He testified that appellant walked towards a gas

station, and Gregory followed him, asking him why he had set the house on fire.

Appellant told Gregory to get away and denied setting the fire. He was carrying a

yellow gas can in his hand. Gregory followed appellant as far as a traffic light, at

–7– which point Hicks pulled up in his truck and told Gregory to go back to his mother.

Gregory did so, and Hicks followed appellant to a gas station.

Hicks testified that he saw Gregory cross the street and confront appellant.

Then Hicks got into his truck and followed appellant, who had a white bag and a gas

can. At some point, Hicks passed appellant, pulled into a gas station, and parked. He

also called the police. Then appellant arrived at the gas station and went inside. Hicks

waited for the police to arrive, and when they did, Hicks told them to go into the gas

station. He was still there when they “got him.”

Detective Darren Burch of the Dallas Police Department testified that at about

11:40 p.m. on the night of the fire, he and a trainee were dispatched to the fire and

then changed course when they received word that a witness was following a

potential suspect to a gas station. Burch and the trainee went to a Valero gas station,

and Burch met the witness, who described the suspect. Burch then went inside and

asked appellant if he had a gas can. Appellant said he did not have a gas can, but he

had his tools, and he pointed to “a yellow gas can or Pennzoil can full of tools.” The

trainee searched appellant and found a lighter. Then appellant was taken into

custody.

Arson investigator Gallegos testified that he and the attorneys tested the

lighter that was collected from appellant and “it did light.”

–8– C. Application of the Law to the Facts

According to appellant’s issue statement, he challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to prove “that he intentionally started the fire.” Although the argument

section of his brief appears to be limited to attacking the sufficiency of the evidence

that he started the fire, we will construe his brief liberally and assume that he intends

to challenge both the actus reus and the mens rea elements of arson.

We address the actus reus first. Appellant argues that the evidence in this case

shows no more than that he was present in the vicinity of the fire shortly before it

started, and he contends that evidence of mere opportunity to commit a crime is

insufficient. He also argues that the State produced effectively no evidence of

motive, discounting the evidence of appellant’s conversation with Officer Glass

about cheating because Glass agreed that the conversation was lighthearted and

because appellant did not know the Danielses, who were the principal victims of the

fire. And he argues that although he was seen on the duplex’s porch with some sort

of flame, the fire did not originate where he was sitting.

The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to allow a rational juror to

find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant started the fire.

We agree with the State. The evidence does not show merely that appellant

was present in the vicinity of the fire both before and after it started. Rather, the jury

heard evidence that only ten minutes before the fire began, appellant was present in

the immediate vicinity of the fire’s apparent origin point with a fire or flame of some

–9– kind in his hand. Although appellant denies that the fire originated in the area where

he was seen on the duplex porch, we disagree. The evidence showed that the porch

was small, and the apparent origin of the fire—the area between the Danielses’ front

window and front door—was only a few feet from where Hicks testified that he saw

appellant sitting with a flame. And Hicks testified that no one else was in the area

only ten minutes before the fire was burning strongly enough to be visible to Hicks

from his residence next door. Finally, there was evidence that appellant had a

working lighter in his possession when he was arrested shortly after the fire began.

And although we agree with appellant that the State’s evidence of appellant’s

possible motive for the crime—jealousy arising from knowledge or a belief that his

girlfriend was a prostitute—was not particularly strong, “motive is not an essential

element of a crime.” Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).

We conclude that the other evidence, taken as a whole, went beyond proof of mere

opportunity to commit the crime and that a reasonable juror could conclude beyond

a reasonable doubt that appellant started the fire in question.

We likewise conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the mens rea

element of arson. The offense required proof that appellant started the fire with intent

to damage or destroy a habitation. See PENAL § 28.02(a)(2). The jury could

reasonably infer that appellant knew the duplex was a habitation from the evidence

that his girlfriend and her father lived there and that he visited their unit shortly

before the fire. See id. § 28.01(1) (defining “habitation”). And the jury could

–10– reasonably infer that appellant ignited a flame, took it to the front porch of the

duplex, and used it to set the duplex on fire. Intent can be inferred from a person’s

acts, and the law presumes that a person intends the natural and probable

consequences of his voluntary acts. Farrell v. State, 837 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1992), aff’d, 864 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Thus, the jury

could reasonably infer that appellant intended to damage or destroy the duplex as

the natural and probable consequence of setting it on fire. Additionally, firefighter

Tomlinson’s testimony supported an inference that a flammable liquid was present

on the floor of the Danielses’ front room at the time of the fire, which suggests that

whoever set the fire intended to damage or destroy the duplex.

For all these reasons, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support

the challenged elements of arson, and we accordingly overrule appellant’s sole issue

on appeal.

III. ERRORS IN THE JUDGMENT

We notice some clerical errors in the judgment and correct them sua sponte.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc).

The judgment is entitled “Judgment of Conviction by Court—Waiver of Jury

Trial.” This is incorrect, so we modify the title to read “Judgment of Conviction by

Jury.” We also modify the body of the judgment to add the notation “Punishment

Assessed by the Court.”

–11– Additionally, the judgment recites “N/A” in the blank for “Findings on Deadly

Weapon.” This is incorrect because the jury found that appellant used a deadly

weapon—fire—in the course of committing the crime. Accordingly, we change the

notation “N/A” to “Yes, fire.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.054(c),

(d); Davidson v. State, No. 05-20-00181-CR, 2021 WL 1438305, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Apr. 16, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

IV. DISPOSITION

We modify the trial court’s judgment as discussed above and affirm the

judgment as modified.

/Dennise Garcia/ DENNISE GARCIA JUSTICE

Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 230848F.U05

–12– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

DARWIN SHUN TAYLOR, On Appeal from the Criminal District Appellant Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F21-59590. No. 05-23-00848-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. Justices Reichek and Goldstein THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:

We change the title of the judgment to “Judgment of Conviction by Jury.”

We add the notation “Punishment Assessed by the Court.”

In the blank labeled “Findings on Deadly Weapon,” we delete “N/A” and replace it with the words “Yes, fire.”

We AFFIRM the trial court’s judgment as modified.

Judgment entered June 25, 2024.

–13–