In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-22-00291-CR No. 07-22-00292-CR
DARWIN GEROD GRANT JR., APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 1610010D & 1700424D, Honorable Elizabeth Beach, Presiding
April 20, 2023 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Pending before this Court is a motion to withdraw supported by a brief filed
pursuant to Anders v. California.1 Pursuant to a plea agreement, in November 2021,
Appellant, Darwin Gerod Grant, Jr., was placed on deferred adjudication community
supervision for five years for possession of a controlled substance of four grams or more
but less than 200 in cause number 1610010D and for evading arrest or detention with a
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). vehicle in cause number 1700424D. In June 2022, the State moved to adjudicate guilt in
both causes alleging that Appellant had committed two new offenses, tested positive for
controlled substances, and failed to complete a drug assessment and screening, all
violations of his community supervision. At a contested hearing on the State’s motion,
Appellant entered pleas of “not true” to all four of the allegations. After presentation of
the testimony and evidence, the trial court found all the allegations to be true and found
Appellant guilty of the original offenses. The offenses were enhanced by prior felony
convictions.2 Punishment under the habitual offender statute was assessed as follows:
cause number 1610010D possession of methamphetamine, thirty years confinement four grams or more but less than 200 grams; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(d) cause number 1700424D evading arrest or detention with a thirty years confinement vehicle; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(b)(2)(A)
The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Based on the Anders brief, we affirm
both judgments and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has conducted a
conscientious examination of the records, and in his opinion, they reflect no potentially
plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s convictions. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Counsel candidly discusses why, under the controlling
authorities, the records support that conclusion. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813
2Under section 12.42 of the Penal Code, a habitual offender is punished at a higher level, but the degree of the offense remains the same. See Oliva v. State, 548 S.W.3d 518, 526–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Here, Appellant was sentenced under section 12.42 (d) which elevated the punishment range to a minimum of twenty-five years but not more than ninety-nine, or for life. 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel has demonstrated that he has complied with the
requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief to
Appellant, (2) notifying him of the right to file a pro se response if he desired to do so, and
(3) informing him of the right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408.3 By letter, this Court granted Appellant an opportunity to
exercise his right to file a response to counsel’s brief, should he be so inclined. Id. at 409
n.23. Appellant did file a response. The State did not favor us with a brief.
BACKGROUND
Appellant has an extensive criminal background and has a history of substance
abuse. During the relevant time period, Appellant was living with his fiancée at an
apartment complex where he had been employed as a maintenance person. He had
been fired on April 27, 2022.4
During the early morning hours of April 28, 2022, police officers were dispatched
to two separate calls at the apartment complex where Appellant lived. The first call
involved a home invasion, and the subsequent call was for a domestic dispute involving
3 Notwithstanding that Appellant was informed of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review upon execution of the Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal, counsel must comply with Rule 48.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure which provides that counsel shall within five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the opinion and judgment together with notification of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Id. at 408 n.22, 411. The duty to send the client a copy of this Court’s decision is an informational one, not a representational one. It is ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after the court of appeals has granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. Id. at 411 n.33, 411.
4 Appellant disputed that he had been fired. 3 Appellant and his fiancée. After the officers investigated both calls, they realized that the
burglary victim’s description of the suspect matched Appellant.
Following an investigation, a warrant issued for Appellant for burglary of a
habitation.5 On June 16, 2022, he was stopped for a traffic offense and a gun was found
in the car he was driving which was registered in his fiancée’s name. When the officer
ran Appellant’s name, he discovered the outstanding arrest warrant for the burglary and
arrested Appellant. Appellant was also charged with unlawfully carrying a weapon.6
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an order revoking community supervision, the sole question
before the court is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Hacker v. State, 389
S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant violated a condition of community
supervision as alleged in the motion to revoke. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993). In a revocation context, “a preponderance of the evidence” means
“that greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that
the defendant has violated a condition of his [community supervision].” Hacker, 389
S.W.3d at 865 (citing Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764). The trial court abuses its discretion in
revoking community supervision if, as to every ground alleged, the State fails to meet its
burden of proof. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Proof
5 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a).
6 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a)(1) (criminalizing possession of a firearm by a felon following
conviction and before the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement or supervision). 4 of a single violation is sufficient to support revocation. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20,
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-22-00291-CR No. 07-22-00292-CR
DARWIN GEROD GRANT JR., APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 1610010D & 1700424D, Honorable Elizabeth Beach, Presiding
April 20, 2023 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Pending before this Court is a motion to withdraw supported by a brief filed
pursuant to Anders v. California.1 Pursuant to a plea agreement, in November 2021,
Appellant, Darwin Gerod Grant, Jr., was placed on deferred adjudication community
supervision for five years for possession of a controlled substance of four grams or more
but less than 200 in cause number 1610010D and for evading arrest or detention with a
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). vehicle in cause number 1700424D. In June 2022, the State moved to adjudicate guilt in
both causes alleging that Appellant had committed two new offenses, tested positive for
controlled substances, and failed to complete a drug assessment and screening, all
violations of his community supervision. At a contested hearing on the State’s motion,
Appellant entered pleas of “not true” to all four of the allegations. After presentation of
the testimony and evidence, the trial court found all the allegations to be true and found
Appellant guilty of the original offenses. The offenses were enhanced by prior felony
convictions.2 Punishment under the habitual offender statute was assessed as follows:
cause number 1610010D possession of methamphetamine, thirty years confinement four grams or more but less than 200 grams; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(d) cause number 1700424D evading arrest or detention with a thirty years confinement vehicle; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(b)(2)(A)
The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Based on the Anders brief, we affirm
both judgments and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has conducted a
conscientious examination of the records, and in his opinion, they reflect no potentially
plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s convictions. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Counsel candidly discusses why, under the controlling
authorities, the records support that conclusion. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813
2Under section 12.42 of the Penal Code, a habitual offender is punished at a higher level, but the degree of the offense remains the same. See Oliva v. State, 548 S.W.3d 518, 526–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Here, Appellant was sentenced under section 12.42 (d) which elevated the punishment range to a minimum of twenty-five years but not more than ninety-nine, or for life. 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel has demonstrated that he has complied with the
requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief to
Appellant, (2) notifying him of the right to file a pro se response if he desired to do so, and
(3) informing him of the right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408.3 By letter, this Court granted Appellant an opportunity to
exercise his right to file a response to counsel’s brief, should he be so inclined. Id. at 409
n.23. Appellant did file a response. The State did not favor us with a brief.
BACKGROUND
Appellant has an extensive criminal background and has a history of substance
abuse. During the relevant time period, Appellant was living with his fiancée at an
apartment complex where he had been employed as a maintenance person. He had
been fired on April 27, 2022.4
During the early morning hours of April 28, 2022, police officers were dispatched
to two separate calls at the apartment complex where Appellant lived. The first call
involved a home invasion, and the subsequent call was for a domestic dispute involving
3 Notwithstanding that Appellant was informed of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review upon execution of the Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal, counsel must comply with Rule 48.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure which provides that counsel shall within five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the opinion and judgment together with notification of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Id. at 408 n.22, 411. The duty to send the client a copy of this Court’s decision is an informational one, not a representational one. It is ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after the court of appeals has granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. Id. at 411 n.33, 411.
4 Appellant disputed that he had been fired. 3 Appellant and his fiancée. After the officers investigated both calls, they realized that the
burglary victim’s description of the suspect matched Appellant.
Following an investigation, a warrant issued for Appellant for burglary of a
habitation.5 On June 16, 2022, he was stopped for a traffic offense and a gun was found
in the car he was driving which was registered in his fiancée’s name. When the officer
ran Appellant’s name, he discovered the outstanding arrest warrant for the burglary and
arrested Appellant. Appellant was also charged with unlawfully carrying a weapon.6
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an order revoking community supervision, the sole question
before the court is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Hacker v. State, 389
S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant violated a condition of community
supervision as alleged in the motion to revoke. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993). In a revocation context, “a preponderance of the evidence” means
“that greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that
the defendant has violated a condition of his [community supervision].” Hacker, 389
S.W.3d at 865 (citing Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764). The trial court abuses its discretion in
revoking community supervision if, as to every ground alleged, the State fails to meet its
burden of proof. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Proof
5 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a).
6 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a)(1) (criminalizing possession of a firearm by a felon following
conviction and before the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement or supervision). 4 of a single violation is sufficient to support revocation. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20,
26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
ANALYSIS
By the Anders brief, counsel presents potential issues but after a thorough analysis
of each, disregards them as frivolous. We agree with counsel’s evaluation.
Additionally, because evidence of a single violation is all that is required, the trial
court’s judgment is supported by sufficient evidence. Although defense counsel argued
at the revocation hearing that the State failed to meet its burden of proof on the newly
alleged offenses, there is ample evidence that Appellant tested positive for THC and for
methamphetamine. He and his fiancée both testified that he had tested positive for
controlled substances although Appellant excused his violation as self-medication after
losing a loved one. Appellant also admitted not completing his drug assessment and
screening and offered excuses for his failure to do so.
When we have an Anders brief by counsel and a pro se response by an appellant,
we have two choices. We may determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an
opinion explaining that we have reviewed the record and find no reversible error; Bledsoe
v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at
744), or we may determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand the cause
to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief issues. Bledsoe, 178
S.W.3d at 826–27 (citing Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
We have independently examined the entire record to determine whether there are
any non-frivolous issues which might support the appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 5 75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409;
Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511. We have found no such issues. See Gainous v. State, 436
S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). After reviewing the record, counsel’s brief, and
the pro se response, we agree with counsel that there is no plausible basis for reversal.
See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826–27.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgments are affirmed and counsel’s motion to withdraw is
granted.
Alex L. Yarbrough Justice
Do not publish.