Darwin Bois v. State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: February 26, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-1592
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed February 26, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-1592 Lower Tribunal Nos. F08-3129A, F08-5735A ________________

Darwin Bois, Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Laura Shearon Cruz, Judge.

Darwin Bois, in proper person.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LINDSEY, MILLER, and GOODEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Martell v. State, 676 So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA

1996) (“‘Rule 3.800(a) is intended to provide relief for a narrow category of

cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized

by law. It is concerned primarily with whether the terms and conditions of

the punishment for a particular offense are permissible as a matter of law. It

is not a vehicle designed to re-examine whether the procedure employed to

impose the punishment comported with statutory law and due process.’

Accordingly, we hold that Rule 3.800(a) is not the proper means to challenge

a court’s failure to order a presentence investigation.”) (quoting Judge v.

State, 596 So. 2d 73, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)) (emphasis omitted); Hill v.

State, 56 So. 3d 905, 905 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (rejecting the argument under

rule 3.800(a) that “the trial court erred in relying on the pre-sentence

investigation report to support the habitual felony offender enhancement”

because it related to the “procedure used to enhance” the sentence, not to

the illegality of it); Whiteley v. State, 192 So. 3d 579, 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)

(“Appellant’s allegations in his motion to correct an illegal sentence were

insufficient to establish that his sentence is illegal. Assuming the sentencing

court erred in considering an outdated PSI as alleged by appellant, this was

an error in sentencing procedure that should have been raised on direct

appeal.”); Shaw v. State, 780 So. 2d 188, 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“[T]o the

2 extent that Shaw’s supporting memorandum suggests that the trial court also

failed to file written findings for a departure sentence, this is not properly

raised in a rule 3.800(a) motion and we affirm as to this claim.”); Carter v.

State, 127 So. 3d 572, 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“Even if a presentence

investigation was required in this case, . . . the trial court’s failure to consider

a presentence investigation does not result in an ‘illegal sentence’ under

Rule 3.800(a).”); Rutherford v. State, 93 So. 3d 1132, 1132–33 (Fla. 1st DCA

2012) (explaining that “alleged flaws in the procedure used to impose [the

defendant’s] sentence and specifically . . . the court’s failure to consider

certain mitigating factors . . . is not a proper basis for a rule 3.800(a)

motion”); Collier v. State, 148 So. 3d 797, 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“In his

postconviction motion, he alleged his life sentence is illegal because the trial

court improperly took into account his lack of remorse and candor when

imposing the sentence. . . . However, such a claim asserts error in the

sentencing process, as opposed to the legality of the sentence itself, and

thus, cannot be raised in a rule 3.800(a) motion.”) (citation omitted); Linder

v. State, 54 So. 3d 1031, 1033 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“Appellant’s claim that

the evidence did not support penetration cannot be brought in a motion to

correct an illegal sentence.”).