RENDERED: AUGUST 28, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1110-MR
DARRYL SHIELDS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE SARAH E. CLAY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-CI-004044
MT. LEBANON KENTUCKY, LLC AND HAYES GIBSON PROPERTY SERVICES, LLC APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CALDWELL, L. JONES, AND KAREM, JUDGES. CALDWELL, JUDGE: Darryl Shields (“Shields”) appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court’s dismissal of his claims against his landlord, Mt. Lebanon Kentucky, LLC, and his landlord’s property manager, Hayes Gibson Property Services, LLC (collectively, “Mt. Lebanon”). Shields brought his claims under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (“URLTA”), which is codified at
KRS1 383.505 to 383.715. The circuit court concluded that district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under URLTA. We reverse and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The only issue Shields raises is whether the circuit court properly dismissed his complaint on jurisdictional grounds.
Shields has resided at an apartment owned by Mt. Lebanon since 2023. Shields receives housing assistance from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). Specifically, Shields pays $185 per month in rent to Mt. Lebanon and HUD pays the remainder, $562 monthly.
Beginning in April 2024, Shields began organizing a tenants’ union.
Within the next year or so, Mt. Lebanon sent Shields four written notices of deficiencies. Three notices alleged Shields owed additional rent and the fourth alleged Shields had not kept his utility services current. The rent-based notices stated that Mt. Lebanon “shall immediately take legal action to evict” Shields if he did not rectify the deficiencies. See, e.g., Trial Court Record (“R.”) at 40. The utility-based notice stated that Shields’ failure to correct the utility issue “may force” Mt. Lebanon “to take further action and terminate your [Shields’] lease and file [for his] eviction.” R. at 41.
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Shields alleges he did not owe additional rent, and the three rent-based notices were issued in retaliation for his union activities. See KRS 383.705.2 However, Shields admitted in his complaint that he contacted the utility company “to switch the utility services for the unit where he resides into his name” soon after he received the utility-based notice. R. at 6.
In May 2025, Shields filed the two-count complaint at issue. Count one alleges improper retaliation by Mt. Lebanon. Count two nonspecifically alleges Mt. Lebanon “willfully diminished services” to Shields. R. at 8. In addition to damages, Shields also requested injunctive relief.
Shields also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. The circuit court quickly issued an order denying the motion for restraining order.3 In
2 KRS 383.705 provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as provided in this section, a landlord may not retaliate by increasing rent or decreasing services or by bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession after:
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(c) The tenant has organized or become a member of a tenant’s union or similar organization.
(2) If the landlord acts in violation of subsection (1) of this section, the tenant is entitled to the remedies provided in KRS 383.655 and has a defense in any retaliatory action against him for possession. In an action by or against the tenant, evidence of a complaint within one (1) year before the alleged act of retaliation creates a presumption that the landlord's conduct was in retaliation . . . .
3 Shields does not contest the denial of his motion for a restraining order. We express no opinion on that decision beyond noting that Shields’ requests in his complaint for a temporary and a permanent injunction have not been resolved.
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that order, the court also stated it believed “circuit courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over . . . actions asserting violations of the URLTA, except when they are acting in their appellate capacity.” R. at 80. The court ordered Shields to show cause why his complaint should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.4 Unpersuaded by Shields’ response, the circuit court dismissed Shields’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Shields then filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue before us is whether the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Shields’ complaint. We have examined the parties’ briefs but have concluded that any arguments raised therein which we do not discuss in this Opinion are irrelevant or are otherwise unnecessary for us to resolve the narrow jurisdictional issue before us.
Determining whether the Jefferson Circuit Court has jurisdiction over Shields’ complaint largely rests on statutory interpretation. We review issues of statutory interpretation and jurisdiction de novo. Davis v. Davis, 563 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Ky. App. 2018).
As our Supreme Court has succinctly explained:
4 The court’s denial on the merits of Shields’ motion for a temporary restraining order is at odds with its conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction since “[t]he determination by any court that it lacks authority to decide the controversy constitutes an express declaration that it is without power to decide any other issue.” Commonwealth ex rel. Cowan v. Telcom Directories, Inc., 806 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Ky. 1991).
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In Kentucky, circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, which means that circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not vested in some other court. Jurisdiction, when used here, refers to subject-matter jurisdiction: the authority not simply to hear this case[,] but this kind of case. Narrowing these broad concepts, constitutional provisions and statutes [may] assign[ ] to the courts specific types of claims and causes of action[.] A court acts outside its jurisdiction, accordingly, only where [it] has not been given, by constitutional provision or statute, the power to do anything at all.
Davis v. Wingate, 437 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted). And, though the circuit court here seemed to view jurisdiction as a binary, “all or nothing at all” matter, our Supreme Court has noted that “there are times when more than one court may have subject matter jurisdiction[.]” Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 738 (Ky. 2007).
“In Kentucky, circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, which means that circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not vested in some other court.” Wingate, 437 S.W.3d at 725 (italics in Wingate) (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted). Therefore, we must determine whether the Jefferson Circuit Court had jurisdiction over Shields’ URLTA claims by ascertaining whether the General Assembly vested district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.
KRS 24A.010(1) provides that a district court “is a court of limited jurisdiction; it has original jurisdiction in all matters specified in KRS 24A.110 to
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24A.130.” KRS 24A.120(1) provides in relevant part that a district court has “exclusive jurisdiction” over “[c]ivil cases in which the amount in controversy does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), exclusive of interest and costs, except matters affecting title to real estate and matters of equity . . . .”
The General Assembly’s express statement that district courts lack jurisdiction over “matters of equity” is in direct conflict with the circuit court’s conclusion that district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over URLTA claims. Shields requested injunctive relief (temporary and permanent). Various statutes within URLTA explicitly allow a tenant (e.g., KRS 383.625(2)) or landlord (e.g., KRS 383.660(3)) to obtain injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is a matter of equity. See, e.g., Bartman v. Shobe, 353 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Ky. 1962) (discussing injunctive relief as being equitable in nature); 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 306 (April 2026 Update) (“An injunction is an equitable remedy.”).
We have held that a party was “[o]bviously . . . correct in his assertion that district courts are prohibited from entertaining ‘matters of equity.’” Kelley v. Nationwide Auto Restoration, LLC, 246 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Ky. App. 2007). In addition, the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) generally only allow circuit courts to grant injunctions. See CR 65.01 (“A party may obtain injunctive relief in the circuit court by (a) restraining order, (b) temporary injunction, or (c)
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permanent injunction in a final judgment.”) (emphasis added).5 The General Assembly’s statement that a district court “may” exercise jurisdiction over URLTA claims does not expressly override its statement in KRS 24A.120(1) that a district court lacks the jurisdiction to resolve matters of equity. The language providing that a district court “may” exercise jurisdiction over URLTA claims also does not explicitly override the plain language of CR 65.01 providing that “[i]njunctive relief shall not be granted in any action in the district court except as specifically authorized by statute.” URLTA does not unambiguously and “specifically” allow a district court to grant injunctive relief. A request for injunctive relief in an URLTA complaint invokes the circuit court’s jurisdiction.
The circuit court relied on the principle that “[w]here the statute both declares the unlawful act and specifies the civil remedies available to the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party is limited to the remedy provided by the statute.” Hill v. Kentucky Lottery Corp., 327 S.W.3d 412, 421 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). That principle is sound. And the specific URLTA statutes cited as avenues for relief by Shields in his complaint do not expressly provide for
5 The extremely narrow exception in CR 65.03(2) allowing a district judge to issue a restraining order “if no judge of that circuit court is present in the county” is clearly inapplicable here. Moreover, Shields’ complaint also requested a temporary and a permanent injunction, and such requests do not fall within the narrow, rare exception in CR 65.03(2) allowing a district court to issue a restraining order.
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the issuance of injunctive relief. But that general principle does not deprive circuit courts of jurisdiction over all URLTA claims.
The circuit court did not meaningfully address the fact that URLTA specifically envisions a tenant and a landlord being able to obtain injunctive relief, at least for certain URLTA violations. Arguably, the lack of a specific mention of injunctive relief in the statutes Shields relies upon in his complaint means he is not entitled to such relief.6 However, that does not mean that circuit courts are always deprived of jurisdiction over URLTA claims.
The fact that URLTA explicitly envisions the issuance of injunctive relief (at least under some circumstances) greatly undercuts the trial court’s conclusion that URLTA claims must always be decided in district courts since district courts generally cannot grant injunctions. In short, Shields’ requests for injunctive relief may prove to be without merit, but the circuit court erred by holding that circuit courts always lack jurisdiction over URLTA claims. Indeed, though involving distinguishable facts and issues from the case at hand, there are published opinions resolving on non-lack-of subject-matter-jurisdiction grounds URLTA claims which had been brought in circuit courts. See, e.g., Waugh v.
6 “As an appellate court, we review judgments; we do not make them.” Klein v. Flanery, 439 S.W.3d 107, 122 (Ky. 2014). The circuit court has not addressed the merits of Shields’ requests for a temporary and permanent injunction, and so we express no firm opinion on the merits of those requests.
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Parker, 584 S.W.3d 748 (Ky. 2019); Miller v. Cundiff, 245 S.W.3d 786 (Ky. App. 2007).
Our conclusion that circuit courts do not lack subject matter jurisdiction over all URLTA claims is not changed by an analysis of KRS 24A.020 and KRS 383.540. KRS 24A.020 provides that “[w]hen jurisdiction over any matter is granted to District Court by statute, such jurisdiction shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the statute specifically states that the jurisdiction shall be concurrent.” KRS 383.540(1) provides in relevant part that “[t]he District Courts of this state may exercise jurisdiction over any landlord or tenant with respect to any conduct in this state governed by KRS 383.505 to 383.715 or with respect to any claim arising from a transaction subject to KRS 383.505 to 383.715.”
Of course, the word may in a statute is permissive, not mandatory.
See KRS 446.010(26). The General Assembly has used mandatory language to vest jurisdiction exclusively in district courts in numerous other contexts. See, e.g., KRS 387.020(1); KRS 387.520(1); KRS 386B.7-100. But the General Assembly consciously chose to not use similarly explicit language vesting sole jurisdiction over URLTA claims in district courts. Instead, by its use of permissive jurisdictional language while simultaneously explicitly providing that courts may sometimes grant injunctions for URLTA violations, the General Assembly has vested district courts with concurrent jurisdiction over URLTA claims not
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involving requests for injunctive relief. As our Supreme Court recognized, sometimes two courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d at 738.
The takeaway is that the trial court’s sweeping conclusion that circuit courts never have jurisdiction over URLTA claims is erroneous. Indeed, Mt. Lebanon concedes as much in its brief. Instead, Mt. Lebanon makes a more limited argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over Shields’ specific claims because his alleged damages were under $5,000. We disagree that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over Shields’ specific complaint due to an insufficient amount in controversy.
KRS 24A.120(1) provides that, with exceptions for “matters affecting title to real estate and matters of equity[,]” a district court has exclusive jurisdiction over civil claims when “the amount in controversy does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) . . . .” KRS 383.705(2) entitles a tenant to the remedies found in KRS 383.655 if a landlord engages in illegal retaliatory conduct; KRS 383.655 allows a tenant to “recover an amount not more than three (3) months periodic rent and a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Rent is defined within URLTA as “all payments except a security deposit as defined in this section to be made to the landlord under the rental agreement.” KRS 383.545(10). There is no statutory exclusion from the definition of rent for payments made by someone besides the tenant (e.g., HUD).
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Instead, the definition of rent broadly includes “all payments” made to a landlord. We may not judicially graft language onto the statutory definition of rent to make it read “all payments made directly by a tenant” to a landlord.7 “We are not permitted to add words to a statute, and a legislature making no exceptions to the positive terms of a statute is presumed to have intended to make none.” Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metropolitan Government v. Moore, 701 S.W.3d 335, 345 (Ky. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Thus, we reject Mt. Lebanon’s argument that Shields may recover only treble the portion of his rent which he personally paid monthly. Accepting Mt. Lebanon’s argument would mean that a destitute tenant whose entire rent, or nearly so, is paid by HUD would be unable to recover any meaningful damages based on a landlord’s misconduct. For URLTA purposes, Shields’ rent includes both the monthly payments he makes, and the monthly payments HUD makes on his behalf.
Therefore, Shields may recover $2,241 for each instance of retaliation upon which he prevails ($747 monthly rent X 3 = $2,241). Shields alleges four instances of retaliation, so he could potentially receive $8,964 ($2,241 X 4 = $8,964), as well as any potentially appropriate attorney fees. “[F]or jurisdictional
7 Because rent is broadly, plainly defined by a Kentucky statute, we decline to address the extraterritorial authority cited by Mt. Lebanon involving whether rent includes payments made by another entity on a tenant’s behalf.
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purposes, the amount in controversy is determined based on the allegations in the complaint, not what a party is entitled to.” Hernandez v. Cnty. Investments, LLC, 696 S.W.3d 832, 836 (Ky. App. 2024). As per Shields’ complaint, for jurisdictional purposes, the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000, and so the district court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over Shields’ claims.
We also reject Mt. Lebanon’s argument that Shields may only recover a maximum of $2,241 (three times his monthly rent) even if he prevails on multiple retaliation claims. Mt. Lebanon points to no statutory language or precedent which explicitly allows an URLTA tenant to only recover one lump sum representing three times the tenant’s monthly rent even if the tenant prevails on multiple claims against a landlord. We refuse to provide a perverse incentive to landlords to commit second or subsequent acts of misconduct with financial impunity. See, e.g., Brown v. Funk, 697 S.W.3d 739, 748 (Ky. App. 2024) (noting the ancient principle of Kentucky law that “for every injury, there should be a compensation . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We respectfully decline to address Mt. Lebanon’s argument that Shields lacks standing. Mt. Lebanon did not present that argument to the circuit court. Kentucky precedent plainly holds that an appellee may raise alternate grounds for affirming a trial court “provided only that the alternative ground was brought to the trial court’s attention and is otherwise supported by the
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record.” Klein, 439 S.W.3d at 122 (emphasis added). Cases with a similar statement of the law include, for example, Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d 616, 619 (Ky. 1982); Carrico v. City of Owensboro, 511 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Ky. 1974); and Commonwealth, Corrections Cabinet v. Vester, 956 S.W.2d 204, 205-06 (Ky. 1997). We decline to be the initial decisionmaker regarding Mt. Lebanon’s argument that Shields lacks standing, especially given the extremely limited record adduced thus far in the circuit court. Klein, 439 S.W.3d at 122. On remand, Mt. Lebanon may raise whatever defenses it deems proper, including an assertion that Shields lacks standing.
In conclusion, the circuit court erred by broadly holding that district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all URLTA claims. Shields’ complaint also facially satisfied the amount in controversy requirement necessary for a claim to be heard in circuit court. We decline to address any hypothetical scenarios created by the permissive jurisdictional language in URLTA involving potential factual scenarios under which URLTA claims may only be heard by district courts or any potential factual scenarios under which both district and circuit courts may have jurisdiction. Instead, we limit our holding to the facts at hand, and those facts, and the applicable law, show that the circuit court had jurisdiction over Shields’ complaint. We express no opinion on the merits of any of Shields’ claims or any potential defenses thereto.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed, and this case is remanded with instructions to reinstate Shields’ complaint.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Andrew Chandler Jaron P. Blandford Melissa Weinstein Emily D. Penn Louisville, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky