Darryl J. LaRock v. John and Jane Does

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 15, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00444
StatusUnknown

This text of Darryl J. LaRock v. John and Jane Does (Darryl J. LaRock v. John and Jane Does) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Darryl J. LaRock v. John and Jane Does, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ DARRYL J. LAROCK,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 25-cv-444-pp

JOHN AND JANE DOES,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Darryl J. LaRock, who is incarcerated at Oshkosh Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On May 12, 2025, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $2.01. Dkt. No. 8. The court received that fee on May 27, 2025. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee over time in the

manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that on September 3, 2024,1 while at the Brown County Jail, defendants Jane and John Doe doctors mistreated him when he had just had a stroke in January 2024. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. The plaintiff states that because of the stroke, he could not hold his bowel movements, wore a diaper and could not clean himself. Id. at 2-3. He allegedly asked for help, but

defendants Jane and John Doe officers did not help him, and he had to wear a dirty diaper until the nurses cleaned him on September 6, 2024. Id.

1 The plaintiff initially says “September 3, 2023,” but based the rest of the complaint, it appears that “2023” is a typographical error and that he means September 3, 2024. The plaintiff alleges that after the nurses cleaned him on September 6, 2024, the Jane and John Doe defendants placed him in a room with a rubber mat for a bed for five days. Id. After that, he allegedly was moved to another unit for ten days where he had to sleep on a concrete slab. Id. The plaintiff

states that after ten days, he contracted pneumonia and was transferred to Dodge Correctional Institution. Id. The plaintiff claims that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Id. He also says that the defendants made him pay for medication for which his “reservation” already had paid. Id. For relief, the plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for leaving feces on him for two days and for not providing him with his medication. Id. at 4. C. Analysis

It is not clear if the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or if he had been convicted of a crime when he was confined at the Brown County Jail. If he was a pretrial detainee, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to his claims; if he already had been convicted, the Eighth Amendment applies. See Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350-51 (7th Cir. 2018). Under either standard, the plaintiff’s allegations that the John and Jane Doe defendants refused to help him change his soiled diaper for over two days implicate his constitutional

rights. See Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
James T. Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Department
95 F.3d 548 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Marcos Gray v. Marcus Hardy
826 F.3d 1000 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Alfredo Miranda v. County of Lake
900 F.3d 335 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Tapanga Hardeman v. David Wathen
933 F.3d 816 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Darryl J. LaRock v. John and Jane Does, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/darryl-j-larock-v-john-and-jane-does-wied-2025.