Darryl Farris v. Stuart Ryan

Ninth Circuit

Darryl Farris v. Stuart Ryan

396 F. App'x 358

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedSeptember 21, 2010

Docket09-15835

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 396 F. App'x 358 (Darryl Farris v. Stuart Ryan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Darryl Farris v. Stuart Ryan, 396 F. App'x 358 (9th Cir. 2010).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Appellant Darryl Wayne Farris (Farris) challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Far-ris contends that the exclusion of evidence of prostitution pursuant to California’s Rape Shield Law violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause.

Because Farris’s habeas petition was filed after 1996, his claim is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567 (9th Cir.2010). Under the AEDPA, Farris’s petition can only be granted if the state court’s “adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. (citations and alteration omitted).

The California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court, pursuant to California’s Rape Shield Law, properly excluded a victim’s prior conviction for prostitution and her “price list”. This conclusion was not contrary to Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152-53, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991), in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant does not have an unconditional constitutional right to introduce evidence of a prior sexual relationship with the victim, and the legitimate interests served by state rape shield statutes could justify excluding such evidence.

Consistent with Lucas, the trial court balanced the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial nature. See id. at 153, 111 S.Ct. 1743 (remanding for consideration of whether the defendant’s right to confrontation was violated “on the facts”). Indeed, Farris was allowed to ask all three victims whether they were engaged in prostitution on the nights in question. He also identified one location as a “stroll area” for prostitutes.

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MEMORANDUM *

Appellant Darryl Wayne Farris (Farris) challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Far-ris contends that the exclusion of evidence of prostitution pursuant to California’s Rape Shield Law violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause.

Because Farris’s habeas petition was filed after 1996, his claim is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567 (9th Cir.2010). Under the AEDPA, Farris’s petition can only be granted if the state court’s “adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. (citations and alteration omitted).

The California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court, pursuant to California’s Rape Shield Law, properly excluded a victim’s prior conviction for prostitution and her “price list”. This conclusion was not contrary to Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152-53, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991), in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant does not have an unconditional constitutional right to introduce evidence of a prior sexual relationship with the victim, and the legitimate interests served by state rape shield statutes could justify excluding such evidence.

Consistent with Lucas, the trial court balanced the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial nature. See id. at 153, 111 S.Ct. 1743 (remanding for consideration of whether the defendant’s right to confrontation was violated “on the facts”). Indeed, Farris was allowed to ask all three victims whether they were engaged in prostitution on the nights in question. He also identified one location as a “stroll area” for prostitutes.

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

396 F. App'x 358, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/darryl-farris-v-stuart-ryan-ca9-2010.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack