Darryl Davis v. New Jersey Department of Corrections

CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedMay 8, 2026
DocketA-1831-24
StatusUnpublished

This text of Darryl Davis v. New Jersey Department of Corrections (Darryl Davis v. New Jersey Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Darryl Davis v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, (N.J. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1831-24

DARRYL DAVIS,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent. ___________________________

Submitted April 21, 2026 – Decided May 8, 2026

Before Judges Gilson and Vinci.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.

Darryl Davis, self-represented appellant.

Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Elizabeth Micheletti, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Appellant Darryl Davis, self-represented, appeals from a November 18,

2024 final decision of the Department of Corrections (Department) finding his

grievance alleging he was unable to make certain toll-free telephone calls from

the Department's Special Treatment Unit (STU) where he resides was

appropriately investigated and closed. We affirm.

Davis is civilly committed to the STU under the Sexually Violent Predator

Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. On October 17, 2024, Davis submitted an

inquiry to the Department "about the abundance of payphones being blocked by

[the third-party telephone service provider] Verizon." Specifically, he alleged

that he was no longer able to contact Ring Central to make pre-paid telephone

calls using the toll-free number he had used for many years. He alleged "Ring

Central . . . confirmed through[] [a] test that the[y] conducted that the [block]

was in fact V[erizon]." He asked the Department to "look into this problem."

On October 21, the Department asked Davis to "provide the phone

numbers and location o[f] the phone and the exact issue." On October 25, Davis

filed a grievance stating "[t]here is [n]othing wrong with the phones

physically . . . that [he] was complaining about" and his "complaint was about

the access to the toll-free telephone numbers." He repeated his allegation that

A-1831-24 2 "V[erizon] has them blocked" and asked the Department "to intercede[] and ask

them to remove it."

In response to his grievance, the Department investigated and on October

28, advised Davis that he was "able to make toll[-]free calls from [his] unit" and

he "should check the numbers [he was] trying to call." The Department then

closed the grievance.

On October 30, Davis appealed the decision to close his grievance. He

asserted "with a great degree of certainty that it [was] Verizon that . . . blocked"

the number because he had "been in contact with Ring Central and if they say

that it[ is] V[erizon] that has the [b]locks on, [it] most likely is." On November

18, the Department determined its response to the grievance was "appropriate"

and the case was "closed." This appeal followed.

On appeal, Davis contends the Department "erred when it denied [his]

administrative remedy." He argues "a due process claim is created by the failure

of [the Department] to provide a reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity

to be heard, as to the blocking of [his] toll-free telephone numbers." In his reply

brief, Davis also argues the Department's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and

unreasonable.

A-1831-24 3 We are unpersuaded by Davis's claim that the Department violated his

right to due process. The law is well-established that prisoners have limited due

process rights. Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 529-30 (1975); Blanchard v. N.J.

Dep't of Corr., 461 N.J. Super. 231, 239-40 (App. Div. 2019). The Legislature

has granted the Department broad authority to exercise discretion in matters

related to the administration of correctional facilities. Russo v. N.J. Dep’t of

Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576, 584 (App. Div. 1999).

A "supervised offender must be provided reasonable notice and a

meaningful opportunity to be heard." Jamgochian v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 196

N.J. 222, 250 (2008). In that regard, the Department has an administrative

remedy system for STU residents to submit written requests or grievances to

"formally communicate with correctional facility staff to request information

from, and present issues, concerns, and/or complaints to the correctional facility

staff." N.J.A.C. 10A:1-4.1(a)(1). The remedy system consists of: (1) an

"[i]nmate [i]nquiry [f]orm"; (2) an "[i]nmate [g]rievance [f]orm"; and (3) an

"[a]dministrative [a]ppeal." Ibid.

In Mourning v. Correctional Medical Services, (CMS) of St. Louis, Mo.,

we found an inmate's due process rights were protected by providing the

"opportunity institutionally to grieve the issues raised." 300 N.J. Super. 213,

A-1831-24 4 233 (App. Div. 1997). In this case, Davis was afforded a meaningful opportunity

to file a grievance, in accordance with N.J.A.C. 10A:1-4.1(a)(1), and his

grievance was promptly investigated and addressed by the Department. He was

then given the opportunity to administratively appeal the Department's initial

decision to close his case. His dissatisfaction with the resolution of his

grievance and appeal does not constitute a violation of his due process rights.

We are also satisfied the Department's final decision was not arbitrary,

capricious, or unreasonable. "Our role in reviewing the decision of an

administrative agency is limited." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J.

Super. 186, 190 (App. Div. 2010). "We defer to an agency decision and do not

reverse unless it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable[,] or not supported by

substantial credible evidence in the record." Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 412

N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Bailey v. Bd. of Rev., 339 N.J.

Super. 29, 33 (App. Div. 2001)).

In this case, the record establishes the Department timely investigated and

responded to Davis's appeal. The Department determined the telephones in the

STU were working properly and informed Davis of the results of its

investigation. There is no basis for us to disturb the Department's determination

A-1831-24 5 that the response to his grievance was appropriate, and his case was properly

closed.

Affirmed.

A-1831-24 6

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Related

Jamgochian v. New Jersey State Parole Board
952 A.2d 1060 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2008)
Russo v. NJ Dept. of Corrections
737 A.2d 183 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1999)
Figueroa v. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
997 A.2d 1088 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2010)
Avant v. Clifford
341 A.2d 629 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1975)
Jenkins v. DOC
989 A.2d 854 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2010)
Bailey v. Bd. of Review
770 A.2d 1216 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2001)
Mourning v. Correctional Medical Services
692 A.2d 529 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1997)

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