Supreme Court of Florida _____________
No. SC2023-0531 _____________
DARRYL B. BARWICK, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
April 28, 2023
PER CURIAM.
Darryl B. Barwick, a prisoner under sentence of death for
whom a warrant has been signed and an execution set for May 3,
2023, appeals the circuit court’s orders summarily denying his
second successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851; denying his motion
for a stay of execution; and sustaining objections to his public
records requests, which were made under rule 3.852. We have
jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND
On March 31, 1986, after observing the victim sunbathing at
her Panama City apartment complex, Barwick returned to his home
to retrieve a knife and walked back to the apartment complex. He
followed the victim into her apartment, stabbed her thirty-seven
times, wrapped her in a comforter, and left her body in the
bathroom for her sister to find when she returned to their shared
apartment that evening. Bloody fingerprints were found on the
victim’s purse and wallet, and her bathing suit had been displaced.
Semen was found on the comforter wrapped around her body, and
it was determined that Barwick was included within the two percent
of the population who could have left the stain. Barwick was
arrested and confessed to law enforcement and multiple family
members. Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685, 688-89 (Fla. 1995).
Barwick was indicted on charges of first-degree murder, armed
burglary, attempted sexual battery, and armed robbery. He was
initially found guilty as charged and subsequently sentenced to
death for the murder in 1987, but the convictions and sentences
-2- were vacated due to a Neil violation during jury selection.1 Id. at
689. At his retrial in 1992, the jury again found Barwick guilty as
charged and unanimously recommended a sentence of death. The
trial court found that the following aggravators had been
established beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) previous convictions for
the violent felonies of sexual battery with force likely to cause death
or great bodily harm and burglary of a dwelling with an assault; (2)
the murder was committed during an attempted sexual battery; (3)
the murder was committed to avoid arrest; (4) the murder was
committed for pecuniary gain; (5) the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (6) the murder was committed in a
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of
moral justification. The trial court found that each potential
mitigator proposed by Barwick was either not established by the
1. Barwick had objected to the State’s use of peremptory challenges to excuse three black jurors, and the trial court incorrectly believed that Barwick had no standing to make an objection under State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984)—which prohibits the use of peremptory challenges on prospective jurors based solely on their race—due to the fact that both he and the victim were white. See Barwick v. State, 547 So. 2d 612, 612 (Fla. 1989).
-3- evidence or was not a significant mitigating circumstance. The trial
court followed the jury’s recommendation of a sentence of death for
the murder and also sentenced Barwick to life for armed burglary
with a battery, thirty years for attempted sexual battery, and life for
armed robbery. Id. at 689-90.
On appeal after retrial, this Court concluded that although the
trial court erred in applying the cold, calculated, and premeditated
aggravator, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and
Barwick’s convictions and sentences were affirmed. Id. at 696-97.
The convictions and sentences became final when the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1996. Barwick v. Florida, 516
U.S. 1097 (1996).
In the decades since, Barwick has unsuccessfully challenged
his convictions and sentences in state and federal court. See
Barwick v. State, 88 So. 3d 85 (Fla. 2011) (affirming the denial of
Barwick’s initial motion for postconviction relief and denying his
state habeas petition); Barwick v. Crews, 5:12cv00159-RH, 2014
WL 1057088 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2014) (denying Barwick’s federal
habeas petition); Barwick v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corr., 794 F.3d 1239
(11th Cir. 2015) (affirming the denial of Barwick’s federal habeas
-4- petition); Barwick v. State, 237 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 2018) (affirming the
denial of Barwick’s first successive motion for postconviction relief).
Governor Ron DeSantis signed Barwick’s death warrant on
April 3, 2023. Barwick then filed a second successive motion for
postconviction relief under rule 3.851, raising three claims: (1) the
scheduling of Barwick’s execution and warrant litigation violates his
right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and the corresponding provisions
of the Florida Constitution and deprives him of the effective
assistance of postconviction counsel; (2) newly discovered evidence
shows that the death penalty is a categorically unconstitutional
punishment for individuals who were under age twenty-one when
they committed their capital offenses; and (3) because of his severe
neuropsychological disorder, lifelong cognitive impairments, and
low mental age, executing Barwick would violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The
circuit court summarily denied all three claims, as well as Barwick’s
motion for a stay and certain requests for public records. This
appeal followed.
-5- II. ANALYSIS
A. Due Process, Effective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel, Stay of Execution, and Public Records
In his first issue on appeal, Barwick claims primarily that the
compressed warrant litigation schedule resulted in the denial of his
rights to due process and the effective assistance of postconviction
counsel. He addresses these claims as a single issue, asserting that
due process depends on the effective assistance of counsel, and that
the accelerated warrant schedule and other attendant
circumstances made it impossible for Barwick to be provided with
effective assistance of postconviction counsel.
The circuit court summarily denied this consolidated claim,
finding that Barwick was not denied due process because he did not
allege that he was ever denied notice or an opportunity to be heard
and that he was not denied effective assistance of postconviction
counsel because he has no right to effective assistance of
postconviction counsel. We agree that summary denial of this claim
was proper.
Barwick has made it abundantly clear in his pleadings filed in
both the circuit court and this Court that the post-warrant litigation
-6- in this case has been very arduous for his counsel due to certain
circumstances that happened to coincide with the beginning of the
warrant period, such as the occurrence of Holy Week, Passover, and
Ramadan; co-counsel being ill; and the presence of another inmate
on Death Watch. 2 Indeed, post-warrant litigation is arduous, even
without such circumstances. Yet none of the obstacles identified by
Barwick resulted in a denial of due process.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV. The Florida Constitution similarly provides
that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.” Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. “Due process requires
that a defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on
a matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 27 (Fla.
2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 982 (Fla. 1993)). But as
the circuit court recognized in summarily denying this claim,
2. “Death Watch” is a designated area of Florida State Prison where death row inmates under an active death warrant are housed.
-7- Barwick has not identified any matter on which he was denied
notice or an opportunity to be heard before it was decided. We have
previously denied a due process claim raised in the death warrant
context on this basis. See id. at 27-28 (rejecting due process claim
where capital defendant under a death warrant failed to state when
he was denied notice or an opportunity to be heard at any stage of
his postconviction proceedings). Because Barwick has failed to
state when he was denied notice or an opportunity to be heard, his
due process claim fails.
Barwick also alleges that the thirty-day warrant period and the
difficult attendant circumstances identified by Barwick made it
impossible for postconviction counsel to provide effective
assistance, thereby violating what he claims is his “statutory right
to effective postconviction counsel.” Under Florida law, individuals
sentenced to death are entitled to the appointment of capital
postconviction counsel for the purpose of pursuing any collateral
attacks on their convictions and sentences. See § 27.702(1), Fla.
Stat. (2022) (“The capital collateral regional counsel shall represent
each person convicted and sentenced to death in this state for the
sole purpose of instituting and prosecuting collateral actions
-8- challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed . . .
.”). Barwick argues that along with the entitlement to counsel,
section 27.711(12), Florida Statutes (2022), establishes a “statutory
right to effective postconviction counsel.”
Section 27.711(12) provides:
The court shall monitor the performance of assigned counsel to ensure that the capital defendant is receiving quality representation. The court shall also receive and evaluate allegations that are made regarding the performance of assigned counsel. The Justice Administrative Commission, the Department of Legal Affairs, or any interested person may advise the court of any circumstance that could affect the quality of representation, including, but not limited to, false or fraudulent billing, misconduct, failure to meet continuing legal education requirements, solicitation to receive compensation from the capital defendant, or failure to file appropriate motions in a timely manner.
§ 27.711(12), Fla. Stat. But Barwick ignores other provisions within
chapter 27 that make it clear that the “quality representation”
referenced in section 27.711(12) does not create a right to effective
assistance of postconviction counsel. Section 27.711(10) plainly
states that “[a]n action taken by an attorney who represents a
capital defendant in postconviction capital collateral proceedings
may not be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.” § 27.711(10), Fla. Stat. (2022). Section 27.7002(1) states
-9- that capital defendants may not “challenge in any form or manner
the adequacy of the collateral representation provided,” and section
27.7002(2) provides that the “sole method of assuring adequacy of
representation provided shall be in accordance with the provisions
of s[ection] 27.711(12),” i.e., court monitoring. §§ 27.7002(1), (2),
Fla. Stat. (2022). The fact that these provisions of chapter 27
expressly prohibit capital defendants from raising claims of
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel or otherwise
challenging the adequacy of their postconviction representation
forecloses any argument that section 27.711(12) creates a right to
effective postconviction counsel.
Despite the plain language of these statutes, Barwick argues
that this Court recognized the right to effective assistance of capital
postconviction counsel when it stated in Spalding v. Dugger, 526
So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 1988), that “under section 27.702, each
defendant under sentence of death is entitled, as a statutory right,
to effective legal representation by the capital collateral
representative in all collateral relief proceedings.” But in Asay, we
clarified that “Spalding only requires that a defendant be
represented by an attorney during postconviction proceedings.”
- 10 - 210 So. 3d at 28. And none of the cases cited by Barwick in
support of what he claims to be Spalding’s “holding” compel a
different conclusion.
We have also specifically held that “[u]nder Florida and federal
law, a defendant has no constitutional right to effective collateral
counsel.” Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1203 (Fla. 2005).
Further, the United States Supreme Court has “refused to extend a
due process requirement for effective collateral counsel to situations
where a state, like Florida, has opted to afford collateral counsel to
indigent inmates.” Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551
(1987)). Thus, a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction
counsel does not provide a valid basis for relief.
Within this first issue on appeal, Barwick also challenges the
circuit court’s denial of his motion for a stay of execution. We agree
with the circuit court that Barwick did not establish any substantial
grounds upon which relief might be granted if a stay had been
ordered. As a result, his motion was properly denied. See Dillbeck
v. State, 357 So. 3d 94, 103 (Fla.) (“ ‘[A] stay of execution on a
successive motion for postconviction relief is warranted only where
there are substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted.’
- 11 - ”) (quoting Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867, 873-74 (Fla. 2014)), cert.
denied, 143 S. Ct. 856 (2023).
Finally, to the extent that Barwick has also raised a claim that
the circuit court erred in denying his access to certain public
records under rule 3.852(h)(3), it is insufficiently pleaded because
he has not identified which updated records he was denied. Thus,
Barwick is not entitled to relief regarding his public records
requests. See Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1029 n.8 (Fla. 2009)
(“Vague and conclusory allegations on appeal are insufficient to
warrant relief.”).
After consideration of each of the arguments raised in this
issue, we find no error in the circuit court’s summary denial of
Claim 1 of Barwick’s second successive motion for postconviction
relief.
B. Newly Discovered Evidence/Extension of Roper
In his second issue on appeal, Barwick argues that the circuit
court erred in denying Claim 2 of his second successive
postconviction motion, in which he argued that he is categorically
exempt from execution because he was under the age of twenty-one
when he committed his capital offense. Barwick asserts that
- 12 - “[n]ewly discovered evidence of a definitive consensus regarding
adolescent brain development demonstrates that the death penalty
is a categorically unconstitutional punishment for individuals who
committed their offenses when they were between the ages of 18 to
21.” At its core, this is a claim that Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 578 (2005)—which held that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders
who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed”—
should be extended to individuals who were under the age of
twenty-one at the time their capital offenses were committed.
The “definitive consensus” to which Barwick refers is reflected
in an August 2022 “resolution” from the American Psychological
Association (APA). 3 In short, the resolution states that “based upon
the rationale of the Roper decision and currently available science,
APA concludes the same prohibitions that have been applied to
application of the penalty of death for persons who commit a
serious crime at ages 17 and younger should apply to persons ages
3. APA RESOLUTION on the Imposition of Death as a Penalty for Persons Aged 18 Through 20, Also Known As the Late Adolescent Class, American Psychological Association (August 2022), https://www.apa.org/about/policy/resolution-death-penalty.pdf.
- 13 - 18 through 20,” because “there is no neuroscientific bright line
regarding brain development that indicates the brains of 18- to 20-
year-olds differ in any substantive way from those of 17-year-olds.”
The circuit court summarily denied this claim as procedurally
barred, untimely, and without merit.
The circuit court was correct in concluding that this claim is
procedurally barred because it is a variation of claims that were
raised in prior proceedings. In Claim 22 of his initial postconviction
proceedings, Barwick argued that because he suffers from brain
damage and a mental and emotional age of less than eighteen
years, his execution would offend the evolving standards of decency,
serve no legitimate penological goal, and violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments under Roper. He argued that his
“neuropsychological impairments and his youth warrant
consideration” and that he “lacks the requisite ‘highly culpable
mental state’ ” for capital punishment. In denying relief, the
postconviction court recognized this claim as a Roper-extension
claim and declined to “extend the holding in Roper.”
Similarly, in Argument 1 of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, filed in this Court in 2008, Barwick argued that due to his
- 14 - brain damage, mental impairment, and mental and emotional age of
less than eighteen years, his execution would offend the evolving
standards of decency of a civilized society, serve no legitimate
penological goal, and violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments under Roper. He further argued that capital
punishment should not be imposed where a defendant, like himself,
lacks the requisite “highly culpable mental state.” See Barwick, 88
So. 3d at 106 (rejecting habeas claim that because Barwick’s
mental age is less than eighteen due to brain damage and mental
capacity, his execution is unconstitutional under Roper).
These initial postconviction and state habeas claims both
asserted that although Barwick was nineteen when he committed
the murder, Roper’s categorical ban on executing juveniles should
be extended to him because he had a “mental and emotional age of
less than eighteen years” at the time of the murder. The argument
at the core of the instant claim is similarly that the mental and
emotional age of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds cannot be
distinguished reliably from that of sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds,
and Roper should therefore extend to individuals who, like Barwick,
- 15 - were eighteen to twenty years old when they committed their capital
murders.
There is no doubt that Barwick is attempting to relitigate the
same issue—that Roper should extend to him—that he has raised in
two prior proceedings, now disguised as a claim of newly discovered
evidence. Barwick acknowledges in his second successive motion
that he previously “has raised the factual basis of [this] claim.”
Barwick is admittedly using “a different argument to relitigate the
same issue,” which is inappropriate. Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d
293, 295 (Fla. 1990). The circuit court was correct in denying this
claim as procedurally barred because versions of it were raised in
prior proceedings.
The circuit court also denied this claim as untimely because
the APA resolution does not constitute newly discovered evidence
such that it creates an exception to the one-year time limitation for
filing postconviction claims. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)
(requiring that “[a]ny motion to vacate judgment of conviction and
sentence of death shall be filed by the defendant within 1 year after
the judgment and sentence become final”); Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.851(d)(2)(A) (creating an exception to the one-year time limitation
- 16 - if “the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”).
The APA resolution appears to be the association’s official or
public stance that the death penalty should be banned in cases
where the offender was under twenty-one years of age at the time of
the capital offense. The resolution cites approximately fifty sources
in support of this position, including articles published in
psychology journals, law reviews, by universities, and by at least
one of each of the following: a “nonprofit think tank,” a “research
and advocacy center,” a federal agency, and a news outlet. It also
cites reports, books, online registries, and meta-analyses. Thus, it
is fair to say that the APA’s resolution is based on a compilation of
studies, research, data, and reports, published between 1992 and
2022 and relying on data from as early as 1977, and therefore does
not constitute newly discovered evidence under rule 3.851(d)(2)(A).
This Court has routinely held that resolutions, consensus
opinions, articles, research, and the like, do not constitute newly
discovered evidence. See, e.g., Foster v. State, 258 So. 3d 1248,
1253 (Fla. 2018) (rejecting as untimely an extension-of-Roper claim
- 17 - relying on scientific research and a 2018 American Bar Association
(ABA) resolution recommending individuals under twenty-two be
exempt from execution, because they do not qualify as newly
discovered evidence); Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981, 984-87 (Fla.
2018) (rejecting as untimely an extension-of-Roper claim that relied
on new scientific research, scientific consensus, international
consensus, and the 2018 ABA resolution, because they do not
qualify as newly discovered evidence); Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d
318, 325 (Fla. 2007) (holding that “new opinions” and “research
studies” are not newly discovered evidence); Rutherford v. State, 940
So. 2d 1112, 1117 (Fla. 2006) (holding that a 2006 ABA report was
not newly discovered evidence because it was “a compilation of
previously available information”). Because the August 2022 APA
resolution does not qualify as newly discovered evidence, this claim
was properly summarily denied as untimely.
This claim is also without merit because this Court lacks the
authority to extend Roper. The conformity clause of article I,
section 17 of the Florida Constitution provides that “[t]he
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be
- 18 - construed in conformity with decisions of the United States
Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.” This means that the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is both the floor and the
ceiling for protection from cruel and unusual punishment in
Florida, and this Court cannot interpret Florida’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment to provide protection that
the Supreme Court has decided is not afforded by the Eighth
Amendment.
Because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to limit the exemption from execution to those whose
chronological age was less than eighteen years at the time of their
crimes, this Court is bound by that interpretation and is precluded
from interpreting Florida’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment to exempt individuals eighteen or more years old from
execution on the basis of their age at the time of their crimes. This
Court simply does not have the authority to extend Roper to
Barwick based on his age of nineteen at the time of the murder.
Accordingly, Barwick is not entitled to relief.
- 19 - C. Extension of Atkins
Barwick’s final claim on appeal is that the circuit court erred
in denying Claim 3 of his second successive postconviction motion,
in which he argued that there is no meaningful distinction between
his reduced moral culpability on account of his “trifecta of
vulnerabilities”—severe neuropsychological disorder, immutable
cognitive impairments, and low mental age at the time of the
murder—and that of individuals with indistinguishable deficits due
to intellectual disability, and therefore his execution, like that of an
intellectually disabled person or a juvenile, would violate the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. In short, Barwick asserts that even
though he is not intellectually disabled, he is entitled to the same
protection under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of the intellectually
disabled. The circuit court also framed this as an “extension-of-
Atkins” claim and denied it as procedurally barred, untimely, and
without merit.
We agree that this claim is procedurally barred because it, or a
variation of it, has been raised in a prior proceeding. In Claim 5 of
his initial motion for postconviction relief, Barwick argued that
- 20 - because he is intellectually disabled, his execution would violate the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under Atkins. See Barwick,
88 So. 3d at 92 n.6 (identifying as Claim 5 of Barwick’s initial
postconviction proceedings that “Barwick is ineligible for the death
penalty pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and
section 921.1[3]7, Florida Statutes (2010), because he is
[intellectually disabled]”).
Similarly, as explained in Issue 2, Claim 22 in Barwick’s initial
postconviction proceedings was that because he suffers from
neuropsychological impairments, a mental and emotional age of
less than eighteen years, and lacks the requisite highly culpable
mental state his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. And in Argument 1 of his state habeas petition,
Barwick also argued that his execution would violate the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, due to his brain damage, mental
impairment, mental and emotional age of less than eighteen years,
and lack of the requisite highly culpable mental state.
At their core, all three of the aforementioned prior claims and
the instant claim on appeal have posited that Barwick should be
exempt from execution due to his mental deficiencies. Thus, the
- 21 - instant claim is a variation of claims that were raised in prior
proceedings, and as such, is procedurally barred.
Even if this claim had not been raised in a prior proceeding, it
is still procedurally barred because it could have been raised
previously. See Branch, 236 So. 3d at 986 (holding that an
extension-of-Roper claim was procedurally barred in an active
warrant case because it could have been raised previously);
Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 511 (Fla. 2012) (rejecting as
procedurally barred a claim, based on Roper and Atkins, that the
defendant was exempt from execution based on mental illness and
neuropsychological deficits because it could have been raised in
prior proceedings).
This claim was also properly denied as untimely. Barwick
asserts that the circuit court erred in denying this claim as
untimely, because, according to Barwick, procedural bars do not
apply to claims of categorical exemption from execution. Barwick is
wrong. Procedural bars do apply to exemption-from-execution
claims. See Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 100 (holding that this Court’s
precedent “flatly refutes Dillbeck’s contention that no time limits
apply to categorical exemption claims”).
- 22 - Finally, even if it were not procedurally barred or untimely,
this claim is without merit. As we have very recently reiterated,
“the categorical bar of Atkins that shields the intellectually disabled
from execution does not apply to individuals with other forms of
mental illness or brain damage.” Id.; see also Carroll v. State, 114
So. 3d 883, 887 (Fla. 2013) (rejecting as untimely, procedurally
barred, and meritless, claim that the protections of Atkins and
Roper should be extended to defendant who is less culpable as a
result of mental illness); Simmons, 105 So. 3d at 511 (holding claim
that persons with mental illness must be treated similarly to those
with intellectual disability due to reduced culpability to be without
merit); Lawrence v. State, 969 So. 2d 294, 300 n.9 (Fla. 2007)
(rejecting assertion that the Equal Protection Clause requires
extension of Atkins to the mentally ill due to their reduced
culpability).
This claim is also meritless because, like Barwick’s Roper-
extension claim, under the Eighth Amendment conformity clause in
article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution, this Court must
interpret Florida’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment in conformity with decisions of the Supreme Court,
- 23 - which has limited the categorical ban announced in Atkins so that
individuals with mental deficiencies other than intellectual
disability are outside the scope of that ban. Just as this Court
lacks the authority to extend Roper to individuals over the age of
seventeen, it also lacks the authority to extend Atkins to individuals
who, like Barwick, are not intellectually disabled as provided in
Atkins. Thus, Barwick’s “trifecta of vulnerabilities” does not exempt
him from execution.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the circuit court’s
order summarily denying the second successive postconviction
motion and its orders sustaining the objections to the public
records requests and denying a stay of execution.
No motion for rehearing will be entertained by this Court. The
mandate shall issue immediately.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and FRANCIS, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
- 24 - LABARGA, J., concurring in result.
As the majority observes, “post-warrant litigation is arduous,”
see majority op. at 7, and a death warrant by its very nature
requires expedited proceedings. However, these solemn proceedings
ultimately involve carrying out a sentence of death for the most
aggravated and least mitigated of murders and must still ensure
due process of law. I am extremely concerned by the recent pace of
death warrants and the speed with which the parties and involved
entities must carry out their respective duties.
Barwick has raised concerns about the accelerated timetable
and argues that “[t]he death warrant proceedings in [his] case
lacked any indicia of meaningfulness.” While I agree that Barwick’s
claims are not entitled to relief under this Court’s precedent, I
nonetheless caution that even in this final stage of capital
proceedings, a meaningful process must be ensured.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay County, Christopher N. Patterson, Judge Case No. 031986CF000940XXAXMX
Robert Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Karin L. Moore, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Drew A. Sena, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida,
- 25 - for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, and Steven Edward Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
- 26 -