Darrin R. Teague v. Southside Bank

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 14, 2006
• Docket: 12-05-00037-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

MARY'S OPINION HEADING

                                                                                                       NO. 12-05-00037-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

DARRIN R. TEAGUE,         §                      APPEAL FROM THE 114TH

APPELLANT

V.        §                      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

SOUTHSIDE BANK,

APPELLEE   §                      SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Darrin R. Teague, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (“TDCJ”), proceeding pro se, appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and awarding sanctions in favor of Southside Bank.  Teague raises four issues on appeal.  We affirm.

Background

            In August 2002, Teague sued Southside alleging that Southside had acted negligently and breached its fiduciary duty with regard to an account that belonged to his deceased mother, Frances Perryman.  Specifically, Teague alleged that he had given Perryman his power of attorney and that she had placed a settlement check for $12,135.85 in an account at Southside listing Teague as the sole beneficiary.  Teague further alleged that thereafter, Perryman withdrew the settlement money and placed it in another account at Southside, but failed to designate Teague as the beneficiary.  When Perryman died, her burial expenses were paid out of the second account.  Thereafter, the independent administrator of Perryman’s estate and Teague executed a compromise and settlement agreement with Southside that gave the funds remaining in the second account to Teague.  In return, Teague agreed to forfeit any claims he might have against Southside relating to Perryman’s accounts at the bank.  Southside moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted Southside’s motion.

            Teague filed another lawsuit in June 2004.  In his 2004 suit, Teague asserted the same underlying facts as in the suit he filed in 2002.  Teague alleged that Southside was liable to him for fraud because Southside forced him to sign the compromise and settlement agreement under coercion and duress with knowledge that it was Teague’s money in the account.  Southside answered and filed a cross claim for sanctions.¹  Southside moved for summary judgment on its pleadings and requested sanctions contending that Teague’s claim was barred by res judicata.  The trial court granted Southside’s motion for summary judgment and ordered Teague to pay one thousand dollars to Southside in attorney’s fees.  This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

            In reviewing a traditional motion for summary judgment, this court must apply the standards established in Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985), which are as follows:

                1.             The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law;

                2.             In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true;

                3.             Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in its favor.

See id.; May v. Nacogdoches Mem’l Hosp., 61 S.W.3d 623, 628 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2001, no pet.).  For a party to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, he must conclusively establish the absence of any genuine question of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).  A movant must either negate at least one essential element of the nonmovant's cause of action or prove all essential elements of an affirmative defense.  See Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995); see also MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986).  Since the burden of proof is on the movant, and all doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of material fact are resolved against the movant, we must view the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.  See Great Am.  Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1965).  We are not required to ascertain the credibility of affiants or to determine the weight of evidence in the affidavits, depositions, exhibits, and other summary judgment proof.   See Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1952).  The only question is whether an issue of material fact is presented.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).

            Once the movant has established a right to summary judgment, the nonmovant has the burden to respond to the motion for summary judgment and present to the trial court any issues that would preclude summary judgment.  See, e.g., City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678-79 (Tex. 1979).  All theories in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be presented in writing to the trial court.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).

Res Judicata

            In his first, second, and fourth issues, Teague argues that the trial court erred in granting Southside’s motion for summary judgment.²  Res judicata is an affirmative defense.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 94.  The doctrine of res judicata addresses the conclusive effects of judgments.  Puga v. Donna Fruit Co., 634 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. 1982).  Under the doctrine, a party may not dispute a right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a prior suit as a ground of recovery or defense in a later suit between the same parties.  See Tex. Water Rights Comm’n v. Crow Iron Works, 582 S.W.2d 768, 771–72 (Tex. 1979).  Res judicata also bars a party from litigating matters in a later lawsuit that it could have raised, but did not raise in a previous lawsuit.  Abbott Labs. v. Gravis, 470 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. 1971).  Thus, Southside was required to demonstrate that  (1) there was a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the identity of parties or those in privity with them was the same as the case at hand; and (3) the instant case is based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first action.  See Robinson v. Garcia, 5 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied).  

            Here, the record reflects that trial court had jurisdiction to render judgment in the Teague’s 2002 lawsuit.  Additionally, the record reflects that the parties involved in the instant litigation are the same parties as were involved in Teague’s 2002 lawsuit.

              Texas has adopted the “transactional” approach to res judicata.  See Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1992); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982).  Determining whether a series of transactions arises from related subject matter requires an examination of the factual background of the claim or claims in the prior litigation.  Id. at 630.  In determining whether claims arise out of the same subject matter and thereby constitute a single “transaction,” the court considers (1) the two claims’ relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation, (2) whether the claims form a convenient trial unit, and (3) whether their treatment as a trial unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.  See id. at 631.

            Teague argues that Southside acted fraudulently in securing the release from him.  The record reflects that the compromise and settlement agreement was signed prior to the first lawsuit filed by Teague.  Thus, any complaint that Teague had about Southside’s management of the account or the execution of the release was fully known to Teague prior to the filing of the first lawsuit.  Both lawsuits concerned the same subject matter—the management of Perryman’s bank accounts by Southside.  Thus, we conclude that the claim asserted in the first lawsuit and the fraud claim asserted in this suit are related in time, space, origin, and motivation.

            Moreover, the claims also form a convenient trial unit inasmuch as separate lawsuits would require significant duplication of effort of the court and the parties involved.  See id.  Furthermore, it follows that the treatment of the two matters as a trial unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage considering that Teague’s allegations in both suits involve underlying factual circumstances before the parties at the time the settlement agreement was executed.  Therefore, we conclude that the claims asserted for negligence in the first case and the fraud claim in the case at hand constitute a single transaction.  We hold the trial court did not err in granting Southside’s motion for summary judgment on its affirmative defense of res judicata.  Teagues first, second, and fourth issues are overruled.

Sanctions

            In his third issue, Teague argues that Southside is not entitled to sanctions pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 because it did not request such sanctions in its motion for summary judgment.   A motion for summary judgment shall state the specific grounds therefor.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).  Rule 13 authorizes the court to sanction a party pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.2(b).  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13.  Rule 215.2(b) authorizes sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.2(b)(8).   

            Our review of Southside’s summary judgment motion indicates that Southside requested sanctions in paragraphs four and five of its motion.  Thus, Rule 166a(c) is satisfied.  Teague has not made a substantive challenge to the trial court’s grant of sanctions in Southside’s favor.  Accordingly, we hold that Southside properly presented the issue of sanctions to the trial court in its motion for summary judgment.  Teague’s third issue is overruled.

Disposition

            Having overruled Teague’s issues one, two, three, and four, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                                    DIANE DEVASTO   

                                                                                                                 Justice

Opinion delivered June 14, 2006.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and DeVasto, J.

(PUBLISH)

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     ¹ Southside attached a copy of the petition from Teague’s 2002 lawsuit as an exhibit to its answer.

     ² Teague’s issues are construed liberally in the interest of justice.