RENDERED: MAY 8, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0469-MR
DARREN C. WILSON APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARRISON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JAY B. DELANEY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 20-CI-00055
CYNTHIANA-HARRISON COUNTY- BERRY JOINT PLANNING COMMISSION APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, EASTON, AND L. JONES, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant Darren Wilson appeals the Harrison Circuit Court’s
order granting summary judgment to Appellee, Cynthiana-Harrison County-Berry
Joint Planning Commission. He argues on appeal the trial court erroneously
determined his use of property did not constitute a nonconforming use under KRS1
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 100.253(3). Because Wilson and his property were subjected to adverse orders and
other adverse actions over the span of many years, he cannot satisfy the
nonconforming use criteria. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant Darren Wilson purchased a parcel situated in Harrison
County, Kentucky in May 2002. At the time of purchase, and at all times during
his ownership, the property has been zoned for agricultural use (A-1). Despite the
zoning designation, Wilson used the property as a junkyard since at least June
2002. The nature of his junkyard is such that he stores vehicles in need of repair
and moves the vehicles in and out as the repairs are completed.
Wilson was asked to come to the Harrison County Fiscal Court on
April 22, 2003, to address the junkyard’s violation of zoning ordinances. Prior to
this meeting, Wilson was contacted multiple times about the violation yet made no
improvements and continued to use the property as a junkyard. The fiscal court
authorized the county attorney to summons Wilson to District Court on charges of
violating Harrison County Ordinance No. 155 Series 2000 (nuisance).
On January 13, 2004, Wilson was again before the fiscal court. Judge
Peak asked Wilson to clean up the property and keep it clean.
Little enforcement happened between 2004 and 2013 when Wilson
was charged criminally for operating a business in the A-1 district of Harrison
-2- County without proper permits. He was found guilty of violating Harrison County
Ordinance Series No. 283, Series 2014.
Again in 2018, the Commission filed a complaint against Wilson. A
jury found Wilson guilty of 245 violations of Harrison County Ordinance Series
No. 283, Series 2014.
Wilson filed the underlying declaration of rights action against the
Commission on March 4, 2020. He alleges he continuously used his property as a
junkyard as defined in the Harrison County Zoning Ordinance for ten (10) years
without any adverse order or other adverse action by an administrative official for
Harrison County and, on that basis, sought a declaration that his junkyard was a
permissible nonconforming use pursuant to KRS 100.253(3). The Harrison Circuit
Court granted summary judgment for the Commission, finding Wilson’s junkyard
did not meet the nonconforming use exception.
ANALYSIS
“The proper standard of review on appeal when a trial judge has
granted a motion for summary judgment is whether the record, when examined in
its entirety, shows there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Hammons v. Hammons, 327
S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010) (quoting CR2 56.03).
2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-3- We initially note Wilson has moved this Court to strike the
Commission’s brief pursuant to RAP3 31(H) (“A brief may be stricken for failure
to substantially comply with the requirements of these rules.”). However, we find
no merit to this argument and will proceed with our review.
KRS 100.253(3) provides as follows:
Any use which has existed illegally and does not conform to the provisions of the zoning regulations, and has been in continuous existence for a period of ten (10) years, and which has not been the subject of any adverse order or other adverse action by the administrative official during said period, shall be deemed a nonconforming use. Thereafter, such use shall be governed by the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.
KRS 100.253(3) (emphasis added). By this statute, Wilson may qualify his
junkyard as a permissible nonconforming use if he can show the property (1) was
in continuous existence for ten years, and (2) was not the subject of any adverse
order or other adverse action by the administrative official during the period.
It is undisputed that the property is zoned for agricultural use (A-1)
only, within which a junkyard is not permitted, and the property has been used as a
junkyard since at least June 2002 when the Commission noticed Wilson’s violative
use of the property. (Record (R.) at 127).
3 Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.
-4- Authorized administrative officials4 took action against Appellant and
his property in 2003, 2004, 2013, and 2018; this is a power conferred upon the
officials through the 2003 Zoning Ordinance of Cynthiana-Harrison County-Berry,
Kentucky, Article III, Section 300. The ordinance provides as follows:
An administrative official designated by the appropriate legislative bodies shall administer and enforce this ordinance. He may be provided with the assistance of such other persons as the legislative bodies may direct.
(R. at 165). Section 360 provides “[n]othing herein contained shall prevent the
City [or] county from taking such other lawful action as is necessary to prevent or
remedy any violation.” (R. at 167). By referring Wilson to fiscal court, the
administrative official was acting in accordance with the Ordinance.
The question we must answer is whether the 2003, 2004, 2013, or
2018 efforts to remedy Wilson’s nonconforming use of the property constitute
“adverse order[s] or other adverse action[s]” as stated in KRS 100.253(3). The
state planning and zoning statutes do not provide a definition for “adverse order”
nor “adverse action.” See KRS 100.111 et seq.
Wilson reads the statute myopically, focusing on the word “action”
only and urging a narrow interpretation requiring “evidence of an adverse
proceeding in any court of this state” based on the definition of “action” as
4 The Commission identified two individuals as administrative officials: Phillip Sims served from 1988 to 2003 and Linden Smith served from 2003 to 2010.
-5- meaning “all proceeding [sic] in any court of this state.” (Appellant Br. at 5)
(quoting KRS 446.010(1)). This definition is correct as far as it goes.
However, the legislature began its general definitions statute with a
qualifier limiting use of its definitions or not applying them at all if “the context
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RENDERED: MAY 8, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0469-MR
DARREN C. WILSON APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARRISON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JAY B. DELANEY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 20-CI-00055
CYNTHIANA-HARRISON COUNTY- BERRY JOINT PLANNING COMMISSION APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, EASTON, AND L. JONES, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant Darren Wilson appeals the Harrison Circuit Court’s
order granting summary judgment to Appellee, Cynthiana-Harrison County-Berry
Joint Planning Commission. He argues on appeal the trial court erroneously
determined his use of property did not constitute a nonconforming use under KRS1
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 100.253(3). Because Wilson and his property were subjected to adverse orders and
other adverse actions over the span of many years, he cannot satisfy the
nonconforming use criteria. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant Darren Wilson purchased a parcel situated in Harrison
County, Kentucky in May 2002. At the time of purchase, and at all times during
his ownership, the property has been zoned for agricultural use (A-1). Despite the
zoning designation, Wilson used the property as a junkyard since at least June
2002. The nature of his junkyard is such that he stores vehicles in need of repair
and moves the vehicles in and out as the repairs are completed.
Wilson was asked to come to the Harrison County Fiscal Court on
April 22, 2003, to address the junkyard’s violation of zoning ordinances. Prior to
this meeting, Wilson was contacted multiple times about the violation yet made no
improvements and continued to use the property as a junkyard. The fiscal court
authorized the county attorney to summons Wilson to District Court on charges of
violating Harrison County Ordinance No. 155 Series 2000 (nuisance).
On January 13, 2004, Wilson was again before the fiscal court. Judge
Peak asked Wilson to clean up the property and keep it clean.
Little enforcement happened between 2004 and 2013 when Wilson
was charged criminally for operating a business in the A-1 district of Harrison
-2- County without proper permits. He was found guilty of violating Harrison County
Ordinance Series No. 283, Series 2014.
Again in 2018, the Commission filed a complaint against Wilson. A
jury found Wilson guilty of 245 violations of Harrison County Ordinance Series
No. 283, Series 2014.
Wilson filed the underlying declaration of rights action against the
Commission on March 4, 2020. He alleges he continuously used his property as a
junkyard as defined in the Harrison County Zoning Ordinance for ten (10) years
without any adverse order or other adverse action by an administrative official for
Harrison County and, on that basis, sought a declaration that his junkyard was a
permissible nonconforming use pursuant to KRS 100.253(3). The Harrison Circuit
Court granted summary judgment for the Commission, finding Wilson’s junkyard
did not meet the nonconforming use exception.
ANALYSIS
“The proper standard of review on appeal when a trial judge has
granted a motion for summary judgment is whether the record, when examined in
its entirety, shows there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Hammons v. Hammons, 327
S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010) (quoting CR2 56.03).
2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-3- We initially note Wilson has moved this Court to strike the
Commission’s brief pursuant to RAP3 31(H) (“A brief may be stricken for failure
to substantially comply with the requirements of these rules.”). However, we find
no merit to this argument and will proceed with our review.
KRS 100.253(3) provides as follows:
Any use which has existed illegally and does not conform to the provisions of the zoning regulations, and has been in continuous existence for a period of ten (10) years, and which has not been the subject of any adverse order or other adverse action by the administrative official during said period, shall be deemed a nonconforming use. Thereafter, such use shall be governed by the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.
KRS 100.253(3) (emphasis added). By this statute, Wilson may qualify his
junkyard as a permissible nonconforming use if he can show the property (1) was
in continuous existence for ten years, and (2) was not the subject of any adverse
order or other adverse action by the administrative official during the period.
It is undisputed that the property is zoned for agricultural use (A-1)
only, within which a junkyard is not permitted, and the property has been used as a
junkyard since at least June 2002 when the Commission noticed Wilson’s violative
use of the property. (Record (R.) at 127).
3 Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.
-4- Authorized administrative officials4 took action against Appellant and
his property in 2003, 2004, 2013, and 2018; this is a power conferred upon the
officials through the 2003 Zoning Ordinance of Cynthiana-Harrison County-Berry,
Kentucky, Article III, Section 300. The ordinance provides as follows:
An administrative official designated by the appropriate legislative bodies shall administer and enforce this ordinance. He may be provided with the assistance of such other persons as the legislative bodies may direct.
(R. at 165). Section 360 provides “[n]othing herein contained shall prevent the
City [or] county from taking such other lawful action as is necessary to prevent or
remedy any violation.” (R. at 167). By referring Wilson to fiscal court, the
administrative official was acting in accordance with the Ordinance.
The question we must answer is whether the 2003, 2004, 2013, or
2018 efforts to remedy Wilson’s nonconforming use of the property constitute
“adverse order[s] or other adverse action[s]” as stated in KRS 100.253(3). The
state planning and zoning statutes do not provide a definition for “adverse order”
nor “adverse action.” See KRS 100.111 et seq.
Wilson reads the statute myopically, focusing on the word “action”
only and urging a narrow interpretation requiring “evidence of an adverse
proceeding in any court of this state” based on the definition of “action” as
4 The Commission identified two individuals as administrative officials: Phillip Sims served from 1988 to 2003 and Linden Smith served from 2003 to 2010.
-5- meaning “all proceeding [sic] in any court of this state.” (Appellant Br. at 5)
(quoting KRS 446.010(1)). This definition is correct as far as it goes.
However, the legislature began its general definitions statute with a
qualifier limiting use of its definitions or not applying them at all if “the context
requires otherwise.” KRS 446.010 (“unless the context requires otherwise”). We
are not seeking the definition of a word, but of a term—“any adverse order or other
adverse action”—in the context of administrative oversight of land use at the local
level. See, e.g., Adverse Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (“A
decision or event that unfavorably affects a person, entity, or association.”).
The statutory scheme prohibiting nonconforming land use is remedial
because its intent is to conform land use to a comprehensive plan and correcting
nonconforming uses. KRS 100.183. Together with the Ordinance, the statutory
scheme authorizes local administrative officials to carry out that intention.
“[S]tatutes which are remedial in nature should be liberally construed in favor of
their remedial purpose.” Workforce Dev. Cab. v. Gaines, 276 S.W.3d 789, 792
(Ky. 2008). The Commission urges this liberal construction.
The Commission argues that a plain reading of the statute lends itself
to an interpretation which recognizes that events of a negative consequence to a
landowner—i.e., “adverse orders or other adverse actions”—are not limited to
formal court proceedings. We agree. We perceive the nonconforming use
-6- exception to require proof of quiet enjoyment of a nonconforming or illegal use of
property for a period of ten years uninterrupted by administrative officials’ efforts
to correct such use. Wilson cannot satisfy that requirement.
Because Wilson cannot satisfy the KRS 100.253(3) requirement that
his use of the property has not been the subject of any adverse order or other
adverse action for a period of ten (10) years, his property is not exempt from
enforcement by the Commission under the nonconforming use exception.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Harrison Circuit Court’s March 1, 2021
order granting summary judgment in favor of the Cynthiana-Harrison County-
Berry Joint Planning Commission.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Patrick H. Watson Brian R. Canupp Paris, Kentucky Cynthiana, Kentucky
-7-