IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2024-CP-00580-COA
DARRELL RAY MORRIS A/K/A DARRELL APPELLANT MORRIS
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/06/2023 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. KATHY KING JACKSON COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DARRELL RAY MORRIS (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: SCOTT STUART NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/31/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ.
EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In January 2023, Darrell Ray Morris pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Jackson
County, Mississippi, to aggravated stalking, possession of a weapon by a felon, attempted
kidnapping, and domestic violence. He was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of five, ten,
thirty, and twenty years in custody, respectively. Morris timely filed a motion for post-
conviction collateral relief (PCR), which was summarily denied by the circuit court.
Although Morris’ notice of appeal was untimely, this Court suspended our Rules of
Appellate Procedure and allowed his appeal to proceed. See M.R.A.P. 2(c). Finding no error,
we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶2. In Hardison v. State, 317 So. 3d 978, 982 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021), this Court held:
“This Court employs the clearly-erroneous standard of review when reviewing a trial court’s summary dismissal of a PCR motion.” Smith v. State, 291 So. 3d 1, 5 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Lofton v. State, 233 So. 3d 907, 908 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). We will affirm a court’s “summary dismissal of a defendant’s PCR motion ‘if he fails to demonstrate a claim procedurally alive substantially showing the denial of a state or federal right.’” Id. (quoting Moore v. State, 248 So. 3d 845, 848 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Id. (citing Lofton, 233 So. 3d at 908 (¶9)).
After the circuit court summarily denied his PCR motion, Morris appealed.
ANALYSIS
¶3. In his brief on appeal, Morris contends that (1) he was denied his due process right
to a preliminary hearing; (2) the grand jury was improperly influenced; (3) his convictions
violated the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution; (4) the indictment for
attempted kidnapping was insufficient because it failed to allege an overt act; (5) the
indictment for aggravated stalking failed to allege a course of conduct; (6) his sentence for
domestic violence was improper; (7) the trial court illegally ordered restitution; (8) his guilty
plea was involuntary; and (9) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We will address
these issues separately below.
I. Right to a Preliminary Hearing
¶4. Morris attached copies of four warrants issued for his arrest to his PCR motion: a
warrant charging Morris with aggravated domestic violence issued on September 9, 2020;
a warrant charging Morris with armed robbery issued on September 14, 2020; a warrant
charging Morris with aggravated stalking issued on September 21, 2020; and a warrant
2 charging Morris with attempted kidnapping issued on March 8, 2021. He also attached a
copy of a five-count indictment that shows the Jackson County grand jury was recalled into
session on February 25, 2021, and returned an indictment charging Morris with the four
crimes set out above, plus a count of possession of firearm or weapon by a felon. This
indictment was filed on March 15, 2021. There is no record evidence as to when these
warrants or the indictment was served upon Morris.
¶5. In his PCR filing, Morris stated that he was first arrested on a charge of aggravated
domestic violence in Jackson County on September 9, 2020. However, it appears that Morris
was taken into federal custody for a revocation proceeding on a prior federal conviction.
Morris attached a copy of an order from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi, entered on December 8, 2020, wherein Morris admitted that he was
guilty of violating a mandatory condition of his probation and was sentenced to serve a term
of twenty-four months in custody, consecutively to state court sentences. In a “Motion for
Bail Bond,” which Morris filed in the Jackson County Circuit Court on March 22, 2021, he
states that he was taken into federal custody on October 9, 2020, and was housed in Stone
County. He states that he was returned to Jackson County for a preliminary hearing on his
state charges, which was set for February 8, 2021. He admits that the hearing was continued
due to COVID-19 and was reset for March 8, 2021. He contends that when he appeared for
a preliminary hearing on March 8, he was told by the Jackson County Court judge that there
would be no preliminary hearing because his case had been presented to the grand jury. There
is no evidence in the record to support Morris’ statements concerning when or if a
3 preliminary hearing was set, when or why it was continued, or what Morris was told by the
county judge. What is clear from the documents attached to Morris’ PCR motion is that
Morris was in federal custody, outside Jackson County, for most to the time between his
arrest and his indictment
¶6. Concerning any right to a preliminary hearing, Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure
Rule 6.1(a)(1) provides:
(a) Right to a Preliminary Hearing.
(1) Generally. A defendant who has been charged with a felony is entitled to a preliminary hearing upon request. But a defendant who has been indicted by a grand jury is not entitled to a preliminary hearing.
There is nothing in the appellate record to show that Morris ever made a request or demand
for a preliminary hearing as required by Rule 6.1. When Morris was indicted, he was no
longer entitled to a preliminary hearing. The comment to Rule 6.1 explains:
Rule 6.1(a) grants an accused charged with a felony (and not under indictment) the right to a preliminary hearing upon request. See Mayfield v. State, 612 So. 2d 1120, 1129 (Miss. 1992) (the principal purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether probable cause exists). The provision that a defendant who has been indicted by a grand jury is not entitled to a preliminary hearing is consistent with former Rule 6.05 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court.
Further, in Bell v. State, 310 So. 3d 837, 842 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021), we confirmed:
This Court previously held in Hogan that “[o]nce the indictment occurs, even had a preliminary hearing not been provided, that question becomes moot.” Hogan v. State, 730 So. 2d 100, 101 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to explore whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed an offense. Id. The indictment by a grand jury removes the purpose of the hearing, and none need thereafter be conducted. Id.
4 Finally, even if Morris had been denied his right to a preliminary hearing, his entry of a valid
guilty plea effectively waived this claim. See Jiles v. State, 398 So. 3d 928, 933 (¶15) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2024). This issue is without merit.
II. Improper Influence Before the Grand Jury
¶7. Morris contends that he was personally brought before the grand jury on March 8,
2021, by an investigator and charged with attempted kidnapping. But no evidence in the
record shows that the grand jury met on March 8. In any event, Morris’ claim that the grand
jury was improperly influenced was waived by his entry of a valid guilty plea.1
¶8. Morris correctly notes that the trial court’s order denying him post-conviction relief
does not specifically address this claim. In Morgan v. State, 995 So. 2d 787, 791 (¶12) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2008), this Court stated:
The statute relating to post-conviction relief includes the following provision: “If it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief, the judge may make an order for its dismissal and cause the prisoner to be notified.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2007). “Furthermore, where the trial court summarily dismisses the post-conviction relief claim, it does not have an obligation to render factual findings and ‘this Court will assume that the issue was decided consistent with the judgment and . . . will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous.’” Culbert v. State, 800 So. 2d 546, 550 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Par Indus., Inc. v. Target Container Co., 708 So. 2d 44, 47 (¶4) (Miss. 1998)).
1 See Cochran v. State, 969 So. 2d 119, 123 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), where the court stated:
A valid guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects to an indictment. Kincaid v. State, 711 So. 2d 873, 877 (¶19) (Miss.1998). It does not waive the failure to charge a criminal offense or subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at (¶20).
5 (Emphasis added). In the order denying relief, after addressing several issues raised by
Morris in his PCR motion, the trial court stated that the court found “all of Morris’s claims
to be without merit.” We find this issue to be without merit.
III. Double Jeopardy
¶9. In his PCR motion, Morris argued that all five counts of the indictment arose from a
single incident. Therefore, he contends that he was subjected to double jeopardy in violation
of the United States Constitution. On appeal, Morris limits his argument to the charges of
aggravated stalking and domestic violence. Therefore, he has waived any argument as to the
other three counts. See Summers v. Gros, 319 So. 3d 479, 485 (¶21) (Miss. 2021) (“Points
not argued in the brief on appeal are abandoned and waived.”).
¶10. The State contends that Morris’ guilty plea waived this claim as well. In support of
its argument, the State cites Ball v. State, 398 So. 3d 296, 299 (¶¶16-18) (Miss. Ct. App.
2024), where the Court stated:
Conversely, “a guilty plea does waive a double-jeopardy claim that cannot be proven without contradicting the indictments under which a prisoner pled guilty.” [Knight v. State, 192 So. 3d 360, 365 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016)]. We applied a U.S. Supreme Court decision that “prisoners who plead guilty to ‘indictments that on their face described separate crimes’ essentially waive the right to contradict ‘the admissions inherent in their guilty pleas.’” Id. at (¶14) (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 576 (1989)). ....
We subsequently applied these rules from Broce and Knight in a PCR case where a petitioner claimed he was punished three times for the same act of larceny. “‘Just as a defendant who pleads guilty to a single count admits guilt to the specified offense, so too does a defendant who pleads guilty to two counts with facial allegations [of] distinct offenses concede that he has committed two separate crimes.’ ” Hooghe v. State, 244 So. 3d 81, 86 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 570).
6 (Emphasis added). A review of the indictment and the guilty plea transcript reveals that
Morris pled guilty to two counts that, on their face, described two distinct offenses,
aggravated stalking and domestic violence. Based on Ball, the entry of Morris’ guilty pleas
waived his double jeopardy argument.
¶11. In any event, Morris was charged with violating two different statutes, and each
required proof of a fact that the other did not. For the fourth-offense domestic violence
charge in Count V, the State was required to prove a specific relationship between the victim
and the defendant and had to prove three prior domestic-violence convictions. Those are not
elements the State was required to prove for aggravated stalking as charged in Count II. For
aggravated stalking, the State was required to prove a course of conduct, which is not a
required element of proof for domestic violence. In Galvan v. State, 385 So. 3d 471, 481
(¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023), this Court stated:
Under Blockburger, “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” [Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)].
The waiver notwithstanding, Morris’ claim is without merit because aggravated stalking and
fourth-offense domestic violence charges each required proof of a fact that the other did not.
IV. Attempted Kidnapping Charged in the Indictment
¶12. On appeal, Morris contends that while Count V charged him with attempted
kidnapping, it failed to allege that he committed an overt act. However, our review of the
indictment shows that an overt act was charged. A portion of Count V states that Morris:
7 did an overt act toward the commission thereof, to-wit: by attempting to take Rhonda Breaux from her residence into the woods near her residence at gunpoint; but he failed therein, in that Rhonda Breaux’s neighbors arrived during the attempted kidnapping causing Darrell Ray Morris to abandon the kidnapping attempt . . . .
Based upon the clear language of the indictment, Morris’ claim is without merit.
V. Aggravated Domestic Stalking Charged in the Indictment
¶13. Morris argues on appeal that Count II of the indictment, which charged him with
aggravated stalking, was insufficient because the indictment describes a “single act with no
pattern or period of time existing in between.” Therefore, he argues, the indictment did not
allege a “course of conduct.” However, Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-107(8)(a)
(Rev. 2020) defines “course of conduct,” as used in the aggravated stalking statute, in part,
as follows:
(a) “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of two (2) or more acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose and that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her own safety, to fear for the safety of another person, or to fear damage or destruction of his or her property.
(Emphasis added). Count II of the indictment charged that Morris engaged in a course of
conduct by tracking the victim’s whereabouts using an electronic tracking device and then
by placing the victim in fear of death or great bodily harm by pointing a firearm at her. We
find that the language of the indictment in Count II properly charges aggravated stalking as
defined by the statute. This claim is without merit.
VI. Domestic Violence Sentence
¶14. Morris contends that his sentence was improperly imposed because there was no
8 hearing conducted and no proof presented that he had prior domestic violence convictions.
The State responds by first arguing, again, that this issue was waived by Morris’ entry of a
valid guilty plea. The State also points to the admissions Morris made during the course of
his entry of pleas of guilty. Count V of the indictment was labeled “Domestic Violence-4th
Offense.” During the hearing on Morris’ petition to enter his guilty pleas, the State advised
the court that Morris was
convicted in the Circuit Court of Jackson County of misdemeanor domestic violence on August 29th of 2010; he was convicted in the Justice Court of Jackson County for the crime of misdemeanor domestic violence on April 5, 2012; and he was convicted of the crime of misdemeanor domestic violence in the Justice Court of Jackson County on September 29th of 1999.
Under oath, Morris admitted that he understood the charge and admitted that he was guilty
of “Domestic Violence-4th Offense” as charged in Count V. We find that Morris’ admissions
were sufficient proof of his prior domestic convictions without the necessity of the State
putting on additional proof. See Parker v. State, 351 So. 3d 971, 976 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App.
2022). This issue is without merit.
VII. Order of Restitution
¶15. Morris admits that restitution was not ordered by the court when imposing his
sentence from the bench but points out that the State was given ten days to determine the
restitution amount. Morris further admits in his brief that no written order required him to pay
restitution, but he argues “the order contemplating restitution constitutes an illegal imposition
of sentence.” There is no order of restitution in this case. This claim is without merit.
VIII. Voluntariness of the Guilty Plea
9 ¶16. On appeal, Morris contends that his pleas of guilty were involuntarily given.2 He first
alleges that he was misadvised concerning his eligibility for “early release.”3 He contends
that he was told that he would be eligible for release after serving fifteen years, but because
of the federal detainer that was in place at the time of his guilty pleas, he is not eligible for
“early release.” Morris maintained in his petition for relief that had he known he was not
eligible for “early release,” he would not have pled guilty and would have gone to trial. It is
important to note, however, that Morris was indicted in each of the five counts of the
indictment as a violent habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-
19-83 (Rev. 2020). Therefore, if he had been convicted at trial of any one of the five counts
of the indictment, he would have been facing a possible sentence of life in prison without
parole eligibility.
¶17. The State counters by arguing that Morris did not produce a copy of any federal
detainer and did not explain how any federal detainer would make him ineligible for “early
release.” In any event, the State correctly notes that since all of his Jackson County sentences
were ordered to run concurrently, pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated sections 47-7-
3(h)(i)(2) and 47-7-3.2(1)(b) (Rev. 2023), Morris will be parole-eligible after serving fifteen
years. To the extent that Morris is referring to earned release supervision (ERS), the policies
that he argues on appeal still do not explain why he is automatically ineligible for those
2 While Morris raised several other issues concerning the voluntariness of his guilty plea in his PCR Motion, he argues only two on appeal. Accordingly, as noted above, he has waived all other issues concerning the voluntariness of his guilty pleas. 3 Morris does not explain whether he is referring to parole eligibility or another form of statutory “early release.”
10 programs. His federal detainer is not due to pending charges, and his state sentences do not
include probation or post-release supervision.4 Morris failed to show that he was misadvised
by his attorney concerning either his parole eligibility or his eligibility for ERS.
¶18. Next, Morris contends that he was not advised of “his constitutional right to protection
against self incrimination.” On January 19, 2023, the day before Morris entered his pleas of
guilty, Morris filed a “Petition to Plead Guilty.”5 In his petition Morris states he was advised
of his right to testify or not to testify:
Do you understand that if you plead guilty, you are waiving your constitutional right against self-incrimination, the constitutional rights I have just asked you about, and all of your constitutional rights?
Morris responded, under oath, “YES,” to that question in the petition. During the hearing on
his petition, the transcript (which is a part of the appellate record) shows that Morris stated,
under oath, that he read and understood the petition. Later during the hearing, Morris
acknowledged that he understood his right to remain silent at trial. Finally, Morris advised
the court during the guilty plea hearing that he knew all the rights he was waiving by
4 Morris did not attach a copy of a detainer, and we gain the impression that he is referring to the federal revocation order that is contained in the record on appeal. The revocation was based upon Morris’ admission that he violated federal probation terms by committing an armed robbery in Jackson County, Mississippi. The armed robbery charge was still pending at the time of his federal probation hearing. The armed robbery charge was related to this event but was dismissed. Pursuant to this order, he was sentenced to serve twenty-four months in federal custody, consecutively to the sentence to be served for state court convictions. 5 This petition is not a part of the appellate record; however, we take judicial notice of the petition, which was filed on the Mississippi Electronic Courts (MEC) system in Jackson County Circuit Court Cause No. 21-10,045 KJ. This petition is readily available on MEC and cannot reasonably be disputed. See Jackson v. State, 394 So. 3d 420, 432 (¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024).
11 pleading guilty, and he still wanted to enter pleas of guilty to the charges.
¶19. Based upon our review of the entire record, we find that the circuit court did not err
by finding that Morris’ pleas of guilty were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made
and entered. This issue is without merit.
IX. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶20. In his PCR motion, Morris claimed that he had received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Morris’ burden proof on this claim is set forth in Jackson v. State, 122 So. 3d 1220,
1227 (¶¶32-33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013):
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Jackson must show that: (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) this deficiency prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The burden of proof rests with Jackson to show both prongs. McQuarter v. State, 574 So. 2d 685, 687 (Miss.1990). Under Strickland, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To overcome this presumption, Jackson must “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
As this case involves a guilty plea, Jackson must show that, but for counsel’s performance, he would have gone to trial, and the outcome would have been different. Mitchell v. State, 58 So. 3d 59, 62 (¶¶14-15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). Jackson has made no such showing.
¶21. Morris claimed his counsel’s performance was deficient for several reasons. First,
Morris contends that counsel failed to conduct an investigation into the charges. Second,
Morris claims that counsel refused to file certain motions on his behalf. Third, he contends
that his counsel never presented him with the State’s discovery materials. Fourth, Morris
argues that his counsel never reviewed the discovery with him. Fifth, while he was given a
12 plea offer, Morris contends that his attorney failed to go over the plea offer with him. Finally,
Morris contends that he was coerced by his attorney to plead guilty.
¶22. In Ramsey v. State, 424 So. 3d 330, 333-34 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025), this Court
stated:
“[T]rial courts may place great emphasis upon declarations made under oath by a petitioner for post-conviction relief in open court during the taking of guilty pleas and sentencing.” Townsend v. State, 344 So. 3d 858, 862 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022). “[S]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Id. Finally, it is well established “that a valid guilty plea operates as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional rights or defects which are incident to trial.” Swindoll v. State, 859 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. State, 577 So. 2d 390, 391 (Miss. 1991)). Included in these rights are “those secured by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as well as those comparable rights secured by Sections 14 and 26, Article 3, of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890.” Id.
In the trial court’s order denying Morris’ claim for relief, the trial court referenced the guilty
plea transcript wherein the petitioner testified, under oath, that his attorney had not made
“any kind of threats or promises to you about anything.” Morris also testified that he was
satisfied with the services of his attorney. The trial court found that Morris had not met his
burden.
¶23. As to Morris’ other claims of ineffectiveness, in Malone v. State, 379 So. 3d 388, 397
(¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024), this Court stated:
“[A] voluntary guilty plea waives claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except insofar as the alleged ineffectiveness relates to the voluntariness of the giving of the guilty plea.” Thomas v. State, 159 So. 3d 1212, 1215 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).
Based on the analysis above and our conclusion that Morris’ guilty pleas were knowingly,
13 intelligently, and voluntarily made, we find this issue to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶24. We find that the circuit court did not err by denying Morris’ motion for post-
conviction collateral relief.
¶25. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.