In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-25-00058-CV
DARRELL RADFORD, LARRY KEITH RADFORD, CEDRIC LEON RADFORD, AND WILBURN SHENARD RADFORD AND THE ESTATE OF LONZELL RADFORD, Appellants
V.
TODD STANSBURY, ARDIE GOVAN, CROLEY FUNERAL HOME, INC. D/B/A CROLEY FUNERAL HOME-GILMER, GARY JACKSON, GARY JACKSON D/B/A TURNER BROTHERS MORTUARY, AND MURRAY FUNERAL HOMES LLC., BOREN-CONNER FUNERAL HOME, INC. D/B/A TYLER CREMATORY, Appellees
On Appeal from the 115th District Court Upshur County, Texas Trial Court No. 574-23
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lonzell Radford passed away at his residence on June 21, 2023, where he lived with
Ardie Govan. Govan reported Lonzell’s death to the Wood County Sheriff’s Office (WCSO),
which called Croley Funeral Home, Inc., to arrange for the removal of Lonzell’s body. Croley
Funeral Home transferred Lonzell’s body to Turner Brothers Mortuary, which released the body
to Tyler Crematory for cremation. When Lonzell’s adult sons, Darrell Radford, Larry Keith
Radford, Cedric Leon Radford, and Wilburn Shenard Radford,1 discovered on September 15,
2023, that their father had passed away and that his body had been cremated without their
knowledge, they, along with Lonzell’s estate (collectively the Radfords), sued Croley Funeral
Home, Inc. d/b/a Croley Funeral Home-Gilmer; Croley’s director, Todd Stansbury; Murray
Funeral Homes LLC.; and Boren-Conner Funeral Home, Inc. d/b/a Tyler Crematory (collectively
Appellees) for wrongful cremation, among other things.2
The Appellees filed traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment arguing,
in part, that they were statutorily immune from suit. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 711.002 (Supp.), § 716.203. The trial court granted the Appellees’ summary judgment motions
and dismissed the Radfords’ claims against them. The Radfords appeal. Because we find the
1 Wilburn passed away during the pendency of the proceedings, and Laqundria Radford was substituted as a party in his place. 2 The Radfords also sued Ardie Govan, Gary Jackson, and Gary Jackson d/b/a Turner Brothers Mortuary, but later nonsuited their claims against them. 2 trial court’s statutory immunity ruling proper and dispositive of this appeal, 3 we affirm the trial
court’s take-nothing summary judgment against the Radfords.
I. Standard of Review
“A party that moves for traditional summary judgment must demonstrate that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Energen
Res. Corp. v. Wallace, 642 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. 2022) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)). Our
review of a summary judgment “is de novo, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmovants by indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in their
favor.” City of Houston v. Rodriguez, 704 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex. 2024).
“Once the movant produces evidence entitling it to summary judgment, the burden shifts
to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.” Coniglio v.
Woods, 693 S.W.3d 44, 50 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, pet. denied) (quoting Polecat Hill,
LLC v. City of Longview, 648 S.W.3d 315, 330 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (citing
Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996))). “The evidence raises a genuine issue of
fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all the
summary judgment evidence.” Id. (quoting Delta Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. PPF Gin &
Warehouse, LLC, 632 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, pet. denied)).
II. Appellees Are Statutorily Immune from Suit as a Matter of Law
The summary judgment evidence established that, after the WCSO asked Croley Funeral
Home, Inc., and Stansbury (collectively Croley) to remove Lonzell’s body from his home,
3 As a result of our finding on statutory immunity, we need not address the Radfords’ point of error arguing that the trial court should have denied the no-evidence motions for summary judgment. 3 Croley accepted the body for refrigerated storage. The WCSO represented that Govan was
Lonzell’s “fiancé[e] and contact person.” According to Croley, Govan “presented herself as the
fiancé[e]” and told Croley that Lonzell had four adult sons for whom she had no contact
information. On discovering that, Croley explained that it would not do anything without
Lonzell’s children’s permission and that they were responsible for Croley’s arrangements.
The law is clear that a cremation cannot occur without a “cremation authorization form
signed by an authorizing agent.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 716.051(1). Even so, it
is undisputed that, on July 12, 2023, Govan signed an authorization for cremation and disposition
by Turner Brothers Mortuary and described her relationship to Lonzell as
“FRIEND/EXECUTOR.” See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 716.052. By signing the
form, Govan “certif[ied], warrant[ed], and represent[ed]” that she had “the full legal right to
authorize the cremation, processing[,] and disposition” of Lonzell’s body and remains. Govan
also agreed to the following provision:
If another person has an equal priority right to authorize cremation, the authorizing agent has made all reasonable efforts but failed to contact that person and believes the person would not object to the cremation and agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the funeral establishment and the crematory establishment for any liability arising from performing the cremation without the person’s authorization.
As a result, the State of Texas issued a Burial-Transit Permit authorizing the transfer of Lonzell’s
body to Tyler Crematory. On July 14, Gary Jackson d/b/a Turner Brothers Mortuary contacted
Croley to inform them that Jackson was to take charge of Lonzell’s body and his arrangements.
In their lawsuit, the Radfords alleged that Croley “failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation to identify or locate [Lonzell’s] heirs” before permitting his transfer and cremation 4 “based solely on paperwork signed by Ardie Govan, who lacked any legal authority to authorize
the disposition of [Lonzell’s] body.”4 Croley and Tyler Crematory argued that their actions were
authorized by the Texas Health and Safety Code.
Section 711.002(i) expressly states,
A cemetery organization, a business operating a crematory or columbarium or both, a funeral director or an embalmer, or a funeral establishment shall not be liable for carrying out the written directions of a decedent or the directions of any person who represents that the person is entitled to control the disposition of the decedent’s remains.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(i). This section protects crematories, funeral
homes, and their directors “from liability when they carry out the instructions of” a person like
Govan, who represented that she had the authority to control the disposition of Lonzell’s
remains. See Carruth v. SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc., 221 S.W.3d 134, 137 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(i)).
Also, “[a] crematory establishment, funeral establishment, funeral director, cemetery, or other
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In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-25-00058-CV
DARRELL RADFORD, LARRY KEITH RADFORD, CEDRIC LEON RADFORD, AND WILBURN SHENARD RADFORD AND THE ESTATE OF LONZELL RADFORD, Appellants
V.
TODD STANSBURY, ARDIE GOVAN, CROLEY FUNERAL HOME, INC. D/B/A CROLEY FUNERAL HOME-GILMER, GARY JACKSON, GARY JACKSON D/B/A TURNER BROTHERS MORTUARY, AND MURRAY FUNERAL HOMES LLC., BOREN-CONNER FUNERAL HOME, INC. D/B/A TYLER CREMATORY, Appellees
On Appeal from the 115th District Court Upshur County, Texas Trial Court No. 574-23
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lonzell Radford passed away at his residence on June 21, 2023, where he lived with
Ardie Govan. Govan reported Lonzell’s death to the Wood County Sheriff’s Office (WCSO),
which called Croley Funeral Home, Inc., to arrange for the removal of Lonzell’s body. Croley
Funeral Home transferred Lonzell’s body to Turner Brothers Mortuary, which released the body
to Tyler Crematory for cremation. When Lonzell’s adult sons, Darrell Radford, Larry Keith
Radford, Cedric Leon Radford, and Wilburn Shenard Radford,1 discovered on September 15,
2023, that their father had passed away and that his body had been cremated without their
knowledge, they, along with Lonzell’s estate (collectively the Radfords), sued Croley Funeral
Home, Inc. d/b/a Croley Funeral Home-Gilmer; Croley’s director, Todd Stansbury; Murray
Funeral Homes LLC.; and Boren-Conner Funeral Home, Inc. d/b/a Tyler Crematory (collectively
Appellees) for wrongful cremation, among other things.2
The Appellees filed traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment arguing,
in part, that they were statutorily immune from suit. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 711.002 (Supp.), § 716.203. The trial court granted the Appellees’ summary judgment motions
and dismissed the Radfords’ claims against them. The Radfords appeal. Because we find the
1 Wilburn passed away during the pendency of the proceedings, and Laqundria Radford was substituted as a party in his place. 2 The Radfords also sued Ardie Govan, Gary Jackson, and Gary Jackson d/b/a Turner Brothers Mortuary, but later nonsuited their claims against them. 2 trial court’s statutory immunity ruling proper and dispositive of this appeal, 3 we affirm the trial
court’s take-nothing summary judgment against the Radfords.
I. Standard of Review
“A party that moves for traditional summary judgment must demonstrate that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Energen
Res. Corp. v. Wallace, 642 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. 2022) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)). Our
review of a summary judgment “is de novo, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmovants by indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in their
favor.” City of Houston v. Rodriguez, 704 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex. 2024).
“Once the movant produces evidence entitling it to summary judgment, the burden shifts
to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.” Coniglio v.
Woods, 693 S.W.3d 44, 50 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, pet. denied) (quoting Polecat Hill,
LLC v. City of Longview, 648 S.W.3d 315, 330 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (citing
Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996))). “The evidence raises a genuine issue of
fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all the
summary judgment evidence.” Id. (quoting Delta Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. PPF Gin &
Warehouse, LLC, 632 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, pet. denied)).
II. Appellees Are Statutorily Immune from Suit as a Matter of Law
The summary judgment evidence established that, after the WCSO asked Croley Funeral
Home, Inc., and Stansbury (collectively Croley) to remove Lonzell’s body from his home,
3 As a result of our finding on statutory immunity, we need not address the Radfords’ point of error arguing that the trial court should have denied the no-evidence motions for summary judgment. 3 Croley accepted the body for refrigerated storage. The WCSO represented that Govan was
Lonzell’s “fiancé[e] and contact person.” According to Croley, Govan “presented herself as the
fiancé[e]” and told Croley that Lonzell had four adult sons for whom she had no contact
information. On discovering that, Croley explained that it would not do anything without
Lonzell’s children’s permission and that they were responsible for Croley’s arrangements.
The law is clear that a cremation cannot occur without a “cremation authorization form
signed by an authorizing agent.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 716.051(1). Even so, it
is undisputed that, on July 12, 2023, Govan signed an authorization for cremation and disposition
by Turner Brothers Mortuary and described her relationship to Lonzell as
“FRIEND/EXECUTOR.” See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 716.052. By signing the
form, Govan “certif[ied], warrant[ed], and represent[ed]” that she had “the full legal right to
authorize the cremation, processing[,] and disposition” of Lonzell’s body and remains. Govan
also agreed to the following provision:
If another person has an equal priority right to authorize cremation, the authorizing agent has made all reasonable efforts but failed to contact that person and believes the person would not object to the cremation and agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the funeral establishment and the crematory establishment for any liability arising from performing the cremation without the person’s authorization.
As a result, the State of Texas issued a Burial-Transit Permit authorizing the transfer of Lonzell’s
body to Tyler Crematory. On July 14, Gary Jackson d/b/a Turner Brothers Mortuary contacted
Croley to inform them that Jackson was to take charge of Lonzell’s body and his arrangements.
In their lawsuit, the Radfords alleged that Croley “failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation to identify or locate [Lonzell’s] heirs” before permitting his transfer and cremation 4 “based solely on paperwork signed by Ardie Govan, who lacked any legal authority to authorize
the disposition of [Lonzell’s] body.”4 Croley and Tyler Crematory argued that their actions were
authorized by the Texas Health and Safety Code.
Section 711.002(i) expressly states,
A cemetery organization, a business operating a crematory or columbarium or both, a funeral director or an embalmer, or a funeral establishment shall not be liable for carrying out the written directions of a decedent or the directions of any person who represents that the person is entitled to control the disposition of the decedent’s remains.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(i). This section protects crematories, funeral
homes, and their directors “from liability when they carry out the instructions of” a person like
Govan, who represented that she had the authority to control the disposition of Lonzell’s
remains. See Carruth v. SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc., 221 S.W.3d 134, 137 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(i)).
Also, “[a] crematory establishment, funeral establishment, funeral director, cemetery, or other
person that contracts to provide for a cremation, accepts human remains, cremates human
remains, or releases or disposes of the cremated remains as provided on a cremation
authorization form is not criminally or civilly liable for performing the actions authorized.” TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 716.203(a). Further, “[a] crematory establishment, funeral
establishment, funeral director, cemetery, or other person is not liable in a civil action for
representations made by the authorizing agent or the agent’s representative in the cremation
4 Against Croley and Tyler Crematory, the Radfords asserted causes of action for Deceptive Trade Practices, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, gross negligence, fraud, fraud by nondisclosure, fraudulent concealment, conspiracy, conversion, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and asserted a violation of Chapters 711 and 716 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. 5 authorization form.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 716.203(d).
Even when faced with this statutory language, the Radfords argue that “funeral homes
and directors have a duty to ensure that the person directing the disposition of a decedent’s
remains has legal authority to do so.” Texas courts have found otherwise. “Under the plain
language of section 711.002, subsection (i) does not require a funeral establishment to
affirmatively investigate the person’s representations to confirm that the person making the
representation actually has priority under subsection 711.002(a) or otherwise has the authority
the person represents he has.” Tran v. Affordable Burial and Cremation Servs., LLC, No. 03-22-
00406-CV, 2023 WL 8655277, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 15, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(citing Salazar v. Phillips & Luckey Co., No. 03-11-00441-CV, 2013 WL 4516021, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Austin Aug. 21, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[S]ection 711.002, subsection (i) does not
require a funeral establishment to affirmatively investigate the person’s representations to it,
such as to make sure the person with priority under subsection (a) has consented to the
arrangement or to confirm that the person directing the establishment actually has priority under
subsection (a) . . . .”)). “Nor does the statute require that a funeral establishment’s protection
from liability depend on its having followed directions from a person with priority pursuant to
section 711.002(a).” Id. “Rather, the statute provides that the funeral establishment shall not be
liable for carrying out the ‘directions of any person who represents that the person is entitled to
control the disposition of the decedent’s remains.’” Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 711.002(i)) (citing Carruth, 221 S.W.3d at 138).
By signing a cremation authorization form, Govan represented that she had the authority
6 to make arrangements for Lonzell’s body. Further, it is undisputed that Croley and Tyler
Crematory acted pursuant to the cremation authorization form signed by Govan. Therefore,
“[u]nder the plain language of section 711.002(i) [Croley and Tyler Crematory] proved as a
matter of law that [they were] entitled to statutory immunity when [they] subsequently carried
out the cremation based on that representation,” and the Radfords introduced no evidence
suggesting otherwise. Bonnen v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, No. 14-24-00389-CV, 2025 WL 2215914, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 5, 2025, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (citing Tran, 2023 WL
8655277, at *4 (“concluding funeral establishment established as a matter of law that it was
protected from liability by [Section 711.002(i)] because the evidence conclusively proved [it
was] acting at the direction of a person who represented [s]he was [a common law spouse]
entitled to control the disposition of the decedent’s remains”)); see Salazar, 2013 WL 4516021,
at *3. Consequently, we overrule the Radfords’ first point of error, which we find dispositive of
this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Charles van Cleef Justice
Date Submitted: November 17, 2025 Date Decided: November 25, 2025