Darrell J. Doguet v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: November 9, 2020
• Docket: 2020CA0048
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2020 CA 0048

DARRELL J. DOGUET

VERSUS

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS, OFFICE OF MOTOR VEHICLES

Judgment rendered: NOV 0 9 2020

On Appeal from the Twenty -First Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Livingston State of Louisiana No. 161089, Div. "F"

The Honorable Elizabeth P. Wolfe, Judge Presiding

Mary E. Heck Barrios Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Denham Springs, Louisiana Darrell J. Doguet

Stephen A. Quidd Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Baton Rouge, Louisiana Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles

BEFORE: McDONALD, HOLDRIDGE, AND PENZATO, JJ. HOLDRIDGE, I

Darrell J. Doguet seeks review of a district court judgment sustaining a

peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action filed by the State

of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of

Motor Vehicles Department, on the basis of peremption, and thereby affirming the

suspension and disqualification of Doguet' s commercial driver' s license. For the

following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the

matter for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Doguet was arrested on the morning of April 14, 2018 at North Oaks

Hospital in Hammond, Louisiana, for suspicion of operating a vehicle while

intoxicated. Several hours earlier, Doguet was transported by ambulance to the

hospital after a Livingston Parish Sheriff' s Deputy found him unresponsive and

visibly injured in a ditch near an overturned all -terrain vehicle. Because a

subsequent chemical test for intoxication' indicated a blood alcohol concentration

exceeding the legal limit, the Department sought to suspend Doguet' s driving

privileges.

Doguet timely sought an administrative hearing concerning the proposed

suspension. An administrative law judge ( ALJ) conducted a telephone hearing on

August 20, 2018. Doguet' s counsel was present on his behalf and waived his

appearance. The Department had previously submitted its records relating to the

suspension and did not participate in the hearing. The records were admitted into

evidence without objection. After taking the matter under advisement, the ALJ

affirmed the proposed suspension on August 30, 2018. Attached to the ALJ' s

1 Doguet could not refuse a chemical test for intoxication because he suffered serious bodily injury in the accident. La. R. S. 32: 666( A). As such, the blood alcohol test was performed pursuant to a search warrant obtained for that purpose. 2 seven -page decision and order was a page entitled " Review Rights," which stated

as follows:

Please be advised that you may be entitled to a rehearing or reconsideration of this decision within 10 days of the date of this transmission, if you can establish that one of the legal grounds listed in La. R.S. 49: 959 is applicable to your case. Requests for a rehearing or reconsideration must be received by the Division of Administrative Law within 10 days of the date of this transmission. You may fax your request ... or email it ....

Notice of the decision and order was sent to all parties on August 31, 2018.

Doguet filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration in accordance therewith

and pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 49: 959. The Division of Administrative

Law (DAL) denied the motion.2

On October 19, 2018, Doguet filed a petition in the Twenty -First Judicial

District Court pursuant to La. R.S. 32: 414( F)( 4), seeking a de novo review of the

order suspending his commercial driver' s license. On December 4, 2018, the

Department filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action,

arguing that the statute' s thirty -day peremptive period for seeking judicial review

expired prior to Doguet' s filing of the petition. According to the Department, the

thirty -day peremptive period began to run on August 31, 2018, the date of notice of

the ALJ' s decision. The Department claimed Doguet' s right to judicial review was

extinguished before he filed his petition, and the matter was perempted.

Doguet opposed the exception, arguing the thirty -day peremptive period did

not begin to run until a final decision was rendered by the DAL. The DAL denied

the motion for rehearing by order issued October 2, 2018. Doguet thus claimed his

petition filed on October 19, 2018 was filed well within the thirty -day peremptive

period.

2 Neither the rehearing request nor the DAL' s ruling on the same is included in the record before us. It is undisputed, however, that Doguet filed a timely motion for rehearing that was denied. 3 The district court held a hearing on June 12, 2019. The testimony and

documentary evidence introduced that day primarily concerned the validity of the

search warrant obtained to withdraw a sample of Doguet' s blood following his

arrest on suspicion of DWI. The Department' s peremptory exception raising the

objection of no right of action was not addressed at that time. At the conclusion of

the trial, the district court took the matter under advisement.

Thereafter, the parties returned to court on July 16, 2019. In response to

questions posed by the court, the parties presented arguments on the issue of the

timeliness of Doguet' s petition for judicial review. The Department informed the

court that it was not disputing the fact that Doguet filed a request for

reconsideration or the date the request was denied. Rather, the Department

asserted that since it did not receive notice, Doguet should not " get credit for a

request for rehearing," The Department admitted it did not know whether it would

have responded to the rehearing request, but pointed out that it did not have the

opportunity to do so. In response, Doguet claimed he complied with DAL' s online

instructions, which only required sending the rehearing request by email. Further,

he noted, " we didn' t even know there was anybody from the Department at that

point, because we were dealing with the Division of Administrative Law."

Following counsels' arguments, the district court noted that the Department

did not receive notice of Doguet' s motion for rehearing, so it had no opportunity to

oppose it. As such, the court found the motion to reconsider did not " interrupt the

peremptive] period nor would it start the peremptive period again." Thus, the

district court concluded that the thirty -day peremptive period ran from the DAL' s

initial ruling on August 31, 2018, and Doguet' s petition for judicial review was

perempted. Accordingly, the district court granted the Department' s peremptory

exception raising the objection of no right of action and dismissed Doguet' s

M petition for review. The court signed a judgment to that effect on August 12, 2019,

thereby affirming the suspension and disqualification of Doguet' s commercial

driver' s license. From this judgment, Doguet appeals.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The Tests for Suspected Drunken Drivers law, La. R. S. 32: 661- 668,

addresses the testing of persons suspected of operating motor vehicles while under

the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled dangerous substances and

provides sanctions for persons who refuse to submit to a chemical test for

intoxication or who submit to a chemical test, the results of which are presumptive

of intoxication. Flynn v. State, Department of Public Safety & Correction, 608

So. 2d 994, 995 ( La. 1992). The statutes also provide the administrative procedures

for sanctioning such persons and for review of such decisions. Id.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 32: 667 authorizes law enforcement officers to

seize the driver' s license and issue a temporary receipt when a person has been

arrested for DWI and either refuses a chemical test or takes a test that results in a

finding of a blood alcohol level presumptive of intoxication. A person may then

request an administrative hearing under La. R.S. 32: 668( A). If the person then

seeks review of the administrative decision, La. R.S. 32: 668( C)( 1) provides:

After a person has exhausted his remedies with the department, he shall have the right to file a petition in the appropriate court for a review of the final order ofsuspension or denial by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections in the same manner and under the same conditions as is provided in [ La.] R.S. 32: 414 in the cases of suspension, revocation, and cancellation of licenses. The court in its review of the final order ofsuspension or denial by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections may exercise any action it deems necessary under the law including ordering the department to grant the person restricted non-commercial driving privileges where appropriate as provided in Subsection B of this Section. ( Emphasis added.) The above statute' s reference to La. R.S. 32: 414 is comparable to the statute

for the procedure following withdrawal of driving privileges after a conviction for driving while intoxicated or some other driving offense. Louisiana Revised

Statutes 32: 414( F)( 4) provides, in pertinent part:

Any person denied a license or whose license has been suspended, cancelled, or revoked shall have the right to file an application within thirty days thereafter for a hearing before the district court of the parish in which the applicant resides. That court is vested with jurisdiction to set the matter for hearing in open court upon ten days' written notice to the department and thereupon to determine whether the person is entitled to a license or is subject to suspension, cancellation, or revocation of license under the provisions of this Chapter. Appeal from the decision of the district court may be taken to any court of competent appellate jurisdiction. ( Emphasis added.)

The thirty -day time period provided for in La. R.S. 32: 414( F)( 4) is

peremptive. Knight v. State, Department of Public Safety & Corrections,

2017- 462 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 12/ 13/ 17), 2017 WL 6372252, at * 2 ( unpublished), writ

denied, 2018- 0089 ( La. 3/ 9/ 18), 247 So. 3d 115; State in Interest of C. C. M.,

2012- 1265 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 4/ 3/ 13), 2013 WL 1324413, at * 2 ( unpublished); See

also, Lord v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2012- 53

La. App. 5 Cir. 5/ 31/ 12), 97 So. 3d 1077, 1080. This means that both the

underlying cause of action and the legal right to bring that cause of action to court

dissolve at the end of the specified periods of time and may not be renounced,

interrupted, or suspended in accordance with La. C. C. arts. 3458 and 3461. 3

Cooper v. Poss, 2019- 0366 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 20/ 19), 2019 WL 6167835, at * 4

unpublished).

An administrative hearing requested under the provisions of La. R.S. 32: 667

and 668 falls under the Administrative Procedure Act ( APA), La. R.S. 49: 950 et

seq. Brown v. State, Dept. of Public Safety, License Control and Driver Imp.

Div., 2011- 1224 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 1/ 12), 2012 WL 1986505, at * 2 n.7

3 Louisiana Civil Code article 3458 states that "[ p] eremption is a period of time fixed by law for the existence of a right. Unless timely exercised, the right is extinguished upon the expiration of the peremptive period." Louisiana Civil Code article 3461 states that "[ p] eremption may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended." 6 unpublished). With respect to a rehearing, the APA provides that a decision or

order shall be subject to rehearing by the agency within ten days from the date of

its entry. La. R.S. 49: 959( A). If an application for rehearing is timely filed, " the

period within which judicial review, under the applicable statute, must be sought,

shall run from the final disposition of such application." [ Emphasis added.] La.

R.S. 49: 959( B). Louisiana Revised Statutes 49: 964, concerning judicial review of

a final decision in an adjudication proceeding, states that proceedings for review

may be instituted by filing a petition in the district court of the parish in which the

agency is located. If a rehearing is requested, the statute requires that the petition

be filed "within thirty days after the decision thereon." La. R.S. 49: 964( B).

In this case, the Department filed a peremptory exception raising the

objection of no right of action based on peremption in response to Doguet' s

petition for judicial review.4 At a hearing on a peremptory exception brought

pursuant to La. C. C. P. art. 927, evidence may be introduced to support or

controvert the exception. See La. C. C. P. art. 931. If evidence is introduced, the

trial court' s findings of fact are reviewed under the manifest error -clearly wrong

standard of review. Cooper, 2019 WL 6167835, at * 3. If no evidence is

introduced to support or controvert the objection, an exception of peremption must

be decided based upon the facts alleged in the petition with all of the allegations

therein accepted as true. In that case, the manifest error standard of review does

not apply, and the appellate court' s role is to determine whether the trial court's

ruling was legally correct. Id. Here, no evidence was introduced to support or

4 It is questionable as to whether the peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action was the proper procedural exception for this case. An objection of no right of action presumes that the petition states a valid cause of action. See L& G Drywall, Inc. v. Gray Insurance Co., 2019- 441 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 3/ 18/ 20), 293 So. 3d 775, 778. The proper exception that should have been filed in this case was either a peremptory exception raising the objection of peremption or a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action, since if perempted, the right no longer exists. See La. C. C. P. arts. 927( 2) & ( 5); La. C. C. art. 3458. 7 controvert the Department' s exception, which was granted by the district court.

Accordingly, we must determine whether that ruling was legally correct, accepting as true the facts alleged in Doguet' s petition.

Doguet alleged in his petition that he filed a motion for rehearing and

reconsideration on September 11, 2018, 5 pursuant to La. R.S. 49: 959, which the

DAL denied on October 2, 2018. The district court ruled that the thirty -day

peremptive period began to run from August 31, 2018, the date of notice of DAL' s

original ruling, despite the fact that a motion for rehearing was filed, because the

Department did not receive notice of the motion.

We note that, after submitting its records pertaining to the suspension of

Doguet' s driver' s license, the Department was not present and did not participate

in the initial August 20, 2018 administrative hearing. The Tests for Suspected

Drunken Drivers law, La. R.S. 32: 661- 668, does not require notice to the

Department until a person files a petition for judicial review of a final order of

suspension in the district court. La. R.S. 32: 668( C)( 2). Further, the APA does not

require that notice of a motion for rehearing be provided to the Department. La.

R.S. 49: 959( A). When proceedings for judicial review of a final agency decision

are instituted, the APA then requires that copies of the petition be served upon the

agency and all parties of record. La. R.S. 49: 964( B).

Louisiana Revised Statutes 32: 668( C) provides a person the right to petition

for judicial review of afinal order ofsuspension or denial by the Department. The

APA provides that proceedings for judicial review must be instituted within thirty

days from the final disposition of an application for rehearing. La. R.S. 49: 959( B)

and 964( B). In this case, the Department' s final order of suspension was rendered

5 Doguet stated in opposition to the Department' s exception and at the July 16, 2019 hearing that his motion for rehearing was filed on September 10, 2018; the date listed on the petition was a typographical error. The district court apparently accepted this explanation. Moreover, the Department does not dispute the fact that Doguet filed a timely motion for rehearing. 8 on October 2, 2018, when it denied Doguet' s motion for rehearing. Accordingly,

we conclude that the thirty -day peremptive period set forth in La. R.S.

32: 414( F)( 4) did not begin to run until October 2, 2018, the date on which

Douget' s motion for rehearing was denied. As such, Doguet' s petition for judicial

review filed on October 19, 2018 was timely filed and is not perempted. The

district court committed legal error in holding otherwise.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

sustaining the Department' s exception of no right of action on the basis of

peremption is reversed. This case is remanded for further proceedings, including a

determination of the validity of the suspension and disqualification of Doguet' s

commercial driver' s license.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.