Darrell H. Strouse v. City of Houston and Harold L. Hurtt, in His Official Capacity as Chief of Police of the Houston Police Department

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 29, 2008
• Docket: 14-06-00618-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Reversed and Remanded and Memorandum Opinion filed May 29, 2008

Reversed and Remanded and Memorandum Opinion filed May 29, 2008.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-06-00618-CV

DARRELL H. STROUSE, Appellant

V.

CITY OF HOUSTON AND HAROLD L. HURTT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, Appellees

On Appeal from the 164th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 04-71559

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

This appeal arises out of a dispute between a police officer and the city that employed him.  The police chief indefinitely suspended the officer.  The officer appealed his suspension to a hearing examiner, and both the officer and the city appealed the hearing examiner=s ruling to the district court.  The officer moved for summary judgment asking the district court for various items of relief.  The city did not seek a summary judgment; rather, the city asserted that fact issues precluded summary judgment and urged the district court to deny the officer=s motion.  The district court granted summary judgment but did not grant any of the relief requested by the officer.  We reverse and remand.

                               Suspension and Hearing Examiner

The Chief of Police of the City of Houston indefinitely suspended appellant Darrell H. Strouse, who, at the time of his suspension was a sergeant with the Houston Police Department.  Strouse appealed his suspension to a hearing examiner.  The hearing examiner ruled, inter alia, that (1) just cause did not exist for the indefinite suspension, (2) Strouse should be reinstated, but at the lower position of officer rather than sergeant, (3) upon his reinstatement, Strouse=s Acontractual and any other benefits are to be restored,@ and (4) Strouse was entitled to backpay at the position of officer effective January 1, 2002.

                                   Appeal to the District Court

After the hearing examiner issued his ruling, Strouse appealed the hearing examiner=s ruling to the district court, as did appellees City of Houston and Harold L. Hurtt, in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the Houston Police Department (hereinafter collectively referred to as Athe City@).  After the appeals were consolidated in the district court below, Strouse filed a motion for summary judgment, in which he asked the district court to do the following by way of summary judgment:

!       strike the portion of the hearing examiner=s award that changed Strouse=s position from sergeant to officer,

!       modify the hearing examiner=s award to give backpay at the pay scale for a sergeant rather than for an officer,

!       render a declaratory judgment as to the meaning of Acontractual and any other benefits@ that the hearing examiner awarded to Strouse,

!       affirm the remainder of the award, and

!       order immediate reinstatement upon issuance of the final summary-judgment order. 

The City did not seek summary judgment.  Instead, in its response to Strouse=s motion, the City asserted, among other things, the following:

!       The summary-judgment evidence, the pleadings, and the law show a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment.

!       The City is not entitled to summary judgment. 

!       The City requests that the district court deny Strouse=s motion.

After a hearing, the district court signed an order in which it stated the following:

!       The district court grants in part Strouse=s motion for summary judgment.

!       The court orders the hearing examiner=s award vacated.

!       The court finds the hearing examiner was not within his jurisdiction to order the demotion of Strouse Aand certain other aspects of the award.@

Strouse filed a motion asking the district court to clarify and modify this order, asserting that the order was unclear.  At the hearing on this motion, the district court stated that it did not believe it could modify the hearing examiner=s award; rather, the court asserted it could only affirm the award or vacate it.  The court stated that, in its prior order, it had vacated the entire award so that the parties could have another hearing before a hearing examiner.  Strouse=s counsel argued that the district court lacked authority to vacate the award and remand for another hearing before a hearing examiner.  The district court disagreed and refused to change its prior order. The court then signed a final summary judgment incorporating the same language from its prior summary-judgment order. 

Appeal to this Court

On appeal to this court, Strouse asserts that the district court erred in granting the summary-judgment relief contained in the district court=s order.  We agree. 

The City did not seek summary judgment.  Strouse sought certain relief by summary judgment; however, the district court did not grant any of this requested relief.  Instead, the district court granted relief that Strouse did not seek and that he asserted was improper. The district court erred in granting summary-judgment relief not requested in a summary-judgment motion.  See LaGoye v. Victoria Wood Condominium Ass=n, 112 S.W.3d 777, 786 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (holding trial court cannot grant relief on summary judgment that was not requested by a movant for summary judgment).  Accordingly, we reverse the district court=s summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

/s/      Kem Thompson Frost

Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed May 29, 2008.

Panel consists of Justices Fowler, Frost, and Seymore.