Darrell D. Kincaid v. Daniel Eberle, Individually and in His Capacity as an Agent or Employee of the Lafayette, Indiana Police Department

Seventh Circuit

Darrell D. Kincaid v. Daniel Eberle, Individually and in His Capacity as an Agent or Employee of the Lafayette, Indiana Police Department

712 F.2d 1023, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 25120

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

DecidedAugust 8, 1983

Docket80-1003

StatusPublished

Cited by54 cases

This text of 712 F.2d 1023 (Darrell D. Kincaid v. Daniel Eberle, Individually and in His Capacity as an Agent or Employee of the Lafayette, Indiana Police Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Darrell D. Kincaid v. Daniel Eberle, Individually and in His Capacity as an Agent or Employee of the Lafayette, Indiana Police Department, 712 F.2d 1023, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 25120 (7th Cir. 1983).

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PER CURIAM.

This appeal presents a question of first impression but little difficulty: whether a witness before a grand jury has, as the district court held, absolute immunity from a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for giving false testimony to the damage of the plaintiff. Briscoe v. LaHue,-U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), holds that a witness at trial has such immunity, and although the Court reserved the question whether its holding applied to pretrial proceedings, id. at 1112 n. 5, we cannot see how a different result could be reached. The position at common law, on which the Court laid heavy emphasis, see id. at 1113-15, was the same: the witness before a grand jury had absolute immunity. See Lake v. King, 1 Wms.Saund. 131, 132, 85 Eng.Rep. 137, 139 (K.B.1679); The King v. Skinner, 1 Lofft 55, 56, 98 Eng.Rep. 529, 530 (K.B. 1772); Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3 Allen 393,396 (Mass.1862); Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. [1024]*1024325, 328,106 N.W. 1066,1067 (1906). Turning from history to policy, we think it apparent that the concern that the Supreme Court expressed with regard to the impact of liability on witnesses at trial, see 103 S.Ct. at 1115,1119-20, is every bit as forcefully presented by the prospect of imposing liability on witnesses before the grand jury. A police officer (the defendant here, as in Briscoe) who faces the prospect of a section 1983 suit every time he testifies in a grand jury proceeding will be distracted from and impeded in the performance of his official duties. If anything, the argument for absolute immunity is stronger in the grand jury setting than in the trial setting, because false testimony before the grand jury is less harmful than false testimony at trial; the grand jury can indict, but cannot convict.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

This appeal presents a question of first impression but little difficulty: whether a witness before a grand jury has, as the district court held, absolute immunity from a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for giving false testimony to the damage of the plaintiff. Briscoe v. LaHue,-U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), holds that a witness at trial has such immunity, and although the Court reserved the question whether its holding applied to pretrial proceedings, id. at 1112 n. 5, we cannot see how a different result could be reached. The position at common law, on which the Court laid heavy emphasis, see id. at 1113-15, was the same: the witness before a grand jury had absolute immunity. See Lake v. King, 1 Wms.Saund. 131, 132, 85 Eng.Rep. 137, 139 (K.B.1679); The King v. Skinner, 1 Lofft 55, 56, 98 Eng.Rep. 529, 530 (K.B. 1772); Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3 Allen 393,396 (Mass.1862); Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. [1024]*1024325, 328,106 N.W. 1066,1067 (1906). Turning from history to policy, we think it apparent that the concern that the Supreme Court expressed with regard to the impact of liability on witnesses at trial, see 103 S.Ct. at 1115,1119-20, is every bit as forcefully presented by the prospect of imposing liability on witnesses before the grand jury. A police officer (the defendant here, as in Briscoe) who faces the prospect of a section 1983 suit every time he testifies in a grand jury proceeding will be distracted from and impeded in the performance of his official duties. If anything, the argument for absolute immunity is stronger in the grand jury setting than in the trial setting, because false testimony before the grand jury is less harmful than false testimony at trial; the grand jury can indict, but cannot convict.

Affirmed.

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712 F.2d 1023, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 25120, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/darrell-d-kincaid-v-daniel-eberle-individually-and-in-his-capacity-as-an-ca7-1983.

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