Darmos v. Pasqua

Connecticut Superior Court

Darmos v. Pasqua

374 A.2d 814, 34 Conn. Super. Ct. 529, 34 Conn. Supp. 529, 1976 Conn. Super. LEXIS 336

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedNovember 26, 1976

DocketFILE No. 303

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 374 A.2d 814 (Darmos v. Pasqua) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Darmos v. Pasqua, 374 A.2d 814, 34 Conn. Super. Ct. 529, 34 Conn. Supp. 529, 1976 Conn. Super. LEXIS 336 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).

Pincite

Opinion

*530 Per Curiam.

In this ease the plaintiff’s damage claims were for the rental value of the premises occupied by the defendants as tenants and for waste occurring during the tenancy. It is undisputed that no formal hearing in damages was held. In oral argument the plaintiff conceded that no court reporter was present, that no testimony was taken and that the judge took his action in chambers. Although the judge did file a finding, a finding was not proper because he heard no evidence. Gary Excavating Co. v. North Haven, 160 Conn. 411, 413; Sorensen v. Cox, 132 Conn. 583, 587.

The record recites that on March 23, 1976, a “default for failure to appear & defend at time of trial” was entered against the defendants. It does not appear that the default was entered in open court. Even were we to assume that the judge was authorized to order a default in chambers; but see Norwalk Street Ry. Co.’s Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 602; the entry of the default would have entitled the plaintiff to a judgment for only nominal damages. Went v. Schmidt, 117 Conn. 257, 258. If the plaintiff wished to recover anything more than nominal damages a hearing in damages was required. 1 Cardona v. Valentin, 160 Conn. 18, 26; Went v. Schmidt, supra, 258-59.

A hearing in damages implies a hearing. “A ‘hearing’ is generally understood to be a proceeding where evidence is taken to the end of determining an issue of fact and a decision made on the basis *531 of that evidence.” People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508, 521. The proceeding must he such that the affected party has the means of knowing what evidence is offered or considered so that he may test, explain or refute it. Davis v. Davis, 103 N.J. Super. 284, 288. Where the judge acts in chambers and no transcript is taken of the proceedings, the defendants have no way of knowing what, if anything, the judge considered in rendering judgment and, therefore, they are deprived of a factual basis for testing the judge’s action either on a motion to open or on appeal. Because a hearing in damages was not conducted in this action, the judgment was rendered erroneously.

There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to grant the defendants’ motion to open and to proceed thereafter according to law.

Parskey, D. Shea and Sponzo, Js., participated in this decision.

1

The plaintiff’s reliance on Practice Book § 288 is misplaced. That section, which permits the filing of an affidavit in proof of damages, applies only to actions of contract. The plaintiff’s claim for waste is based on wilful and malicious damage to the demised premises, while his claim for rent is based, not on the tenants’ express agreement, but rather on the implication from the defendants’ holding over after receiving notice from the plaintiff of a rental increase. No contract can be implied from a mere holding over under such circumstances. DiCostanzo v. Tripodi, 137 Conn. 513, 515.

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*530 Per Curiam.

In this ease the plaintiff’s damage claims were for the rental value of the premises occupied by the defendants as tenants and for waste occurring during the tenancy. It is undisputed that no formal hearing in damages was held. In oral argument the plaintiff conceded that no court reporter was present, that no testimony was taken and that the judge took his action in chambers. Although the judge did file a finding, a finding was not proper because he heard no evidence. Gary Excavating Co. v. North Haven, 160 Conn. 411, 413; Sorensen v. Cox, 132 Conn. 583, 587.

The record recites that on March 23, 1976, a “default for failure to appear & defend at time of trial” was entered against the defendants. It does not appear that the default was entered in open court. Even were we to assume that the judge was authorized to order a default in chambers; but see Norwalk Street Ry. Co.’s Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 602; the entry of the default would have entitled the plaintiff to a judgment for only nominal damages. Went v. Schmidt, 117 Conn. 257, 258. If the plaintiff wished to recover anything more than nominal damages a hearing in damages was required. 1 Cardona v. Valentin, 160 Conn. 18, 26; Went v. Schmidt, supra, 258-59.

A hearing in damages implies a hearing. “A ‘hearing’ is generally understood to be a proceeding where evidence is taken to the end of determining an issue of fact and a decision made on the basis *531 of that evidence.” People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508, 521. The proceeding must he such that the affected party has the means of knowing what evidence is offered or considered so that he may test, explain or refute it. Davis v. Davis, 103 N.J. Super. 284, 288. Where the judge acts in chambers and no transcript is taken of the proceedings, the defendants have no way of knowing what, if anything, the judge considered in rendering judgment and, therefore, they are deprived of a factual basis for testing the judge’s action either on a motion to open or on appeal. Because a hearing in damages was not conducted in this action, the judgment was rendered erroneously.

There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to grant the defendants’ motion to open and to proceed thereafter according to law.

Parskey, D. Shea and Sponzo, Js., participated in this decision.

1

The plaintiff’s reliance on Practice Book § 288 is misplaced. That section, which permits the filing of an affidavit in proof of damages, applies only to actions of contract. The plaintiff’s claim for waste is based on wilful and malicious damage to the demised premises, while his claim for rent is based, not on the tenants’ express agreement, but rather on the implication from the defendants’ holding over after receiving notice from the plaintiff of a rental increase. No contract can be implied from a mere holding over under such circumstances. DiCostanzo v. Tripodi, 137 Conn. 513, 515.

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Bluebook (online)

374 A.2d 814, 34 Conn. Super. Ct. 529, 34 Conn. Supp. 529, 1976 Conn. Super. LEXIS 336, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/darmos-v-pasqua-connsuperct-1976.

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