IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Darmon Y. Farral, Jun 19 2025, 8:56 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
June 19, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-2359 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Jose D. Salinas, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D23-2406-CM-17359
Opinion by Judge Weissmann Judges May and Scheele concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 1 of 8 Weissmann, Judge.
[1] After being arrested and handcuffed on outstanding felony warrants, Darmon
Farral fled from officers before they could place him in a police car. Convicted
of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, he appeals, claiming the
State failed to prove officers ordered him to stop after he started to run. Farral
misunderstands the elements of the offense. We affirm.
Facts [2] In June 2024, police officers went to an apartment complex to execute multiple
outstanding felony warrants on Farral. Uniformed officers knocked on Farral’s
apartment door, identified themselves as police, and explained that they needed
him to come out because they had warrants for his arrest. When Farral
eventually emerged, an officer told him he was being arrested for the warrants
and handcuffed Farral’s hands behind his back. Farral told the officer that he
knew about the warrants and then sighed, stating: “F***, here we go with this
sh** again.” State’s Exh. 1, 10:11-13 (footage from officer’s body-worn
camera).
[3] Officers walked Farral outside to the parking lot where approximately four
other uniformed officers were waiting. Farral told his girlfriend, who was
standing nearby, that he loved her and asked the officers if he could kiss her
goodbye. Rather than directly answering, an officer stated a few seconds later,
to either Farral or another nearby officer: “Stay right here with him.” Id. at
10:39-40. Farral remained in place.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 2 of 8 [4] Then suddenly, Farral’s girlfriend shrieked and collapsed to the ground. The
next second, Farral took off in a sprint. Still handcuffed, he ran from officers for
about thirty seconds before he was apprehended. Upon recapture, Farral
candidly admitted he knew that he would be charged with resisting law
enforcement because of his flight. He stated: “That was the dumbest sh** ever.
That was stupid. Who the f*** runs from the police.” Id. at 12:10-17.
[5] Farral was charged with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement
pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (2023).1 Following a bench trial,
the court found Farral guilty, concluding that an order to stop could be implied
from the circumstances. At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of
180 days but offered a shorter, 30-day sentence if Farral waived his right to
appeal. Farral rejected this offer, concerned it punished the exercise of his
appellate rights. The trial court explicitly stated it would “not take into
account” the State’s proposed sentencing agreement. Tr. Vol. II, p. 93.
[6] Farral was ultimately sentenced to 80 days in county jail. The execution of his
sentence was stayed pending appeal, as the court found this matter was one of
“first impression” and acknowledged that “the Court of Appeals may have a
different opinion” on its ruling. Id. at 95, 84.
1 This statute was amended effective July 1, 2024, one month after the incident took place. But the section at issue here—section (a) —was not affected by the amendment. We also note that this statute has been amended again, to take effect July 1, 2025. But again, that amendment does not affect section (a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 3 of 8 Discussion and Decision [7] On appeal, Farral raises two issues: (1) whether sufficient evidence supports his
conviction; and (2) whether the State’s proposed sentencing agreement was
improper. Unpersuaded by his first argument and declining to address his
second, we affirm.
I. Sufficiency of Evidence [8] Farral argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
resisting law enforcement conviction. When reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom without reweighing evidence or
reassessing witness credibility. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007).
We will affirm the conviction “unless no reasonable [factfinder] could find the
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation
omitted). The evidence need not “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.” Id. at 147 (citation omitted).
[9] Farral was convicted of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement under
Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3). That statute requires proof that a person
“knowingly or intentionally . . . fle[d] from a law enforcement officer after the
officer ha[d], by visible or audible means, including operation of the law
enforcement officer’s siren or emergency lights, identified himself or herself and
ordered the person to stop.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3). Farral does not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 4 of 8 dispute that he fled from officers who had identified themselves, but he
contends the State failed to prove he was ordered to stop.2
[10] Farral claims that Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) requires that an officer
“orders the defendant to stop after he begins his flight and he continues to flee.”
Appellant’s Br., p. 7 (emphasis in original). He states: “A command to stop
after the person starts to leave is an essential part of the statute.” Id. Based on
this interpretation, Farral argues that the State failed to meet its burden because
the officers did not order him to stop after he began running away.
[11] Farral misreads the statute. Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) criminalizes
fleeing from an officer “after the officer” identifies himself and orders the person
to stop. Id. (emphasis added). Because the statute specifies that flight occurs
“after” the order to stop, the order to stop necessarily must precede the flight or,
if the flight has already begun, must precede the continued flight. Farral’s
argument that the officer must give the command after the flight has begun has
no basis in the text of the statute, and he points to no caselaw to support his
proposition.
[12] The record provides ample support for the conclusion that Farral was properly
ordered to stop before he fled from officers. An order to stop can be verbal or
visual, and “evidence of a proper visual order to stop is based on the
2 Although Farral argued at trial that these facts more appropriately support the offense of escape from lawful detention, he abandons such argument on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 5 of 8 circumstances surrounding the incident and whether a reasonable person would
have known that he or she had been ordered to stop.” Fowler v. State, 878
N.E.2d 889, 894-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Here, an officer stated, “Stay right
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IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Darmon Y. Farral, Jun 19 2025, 8:56 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
June 19, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-2359 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Jose D. Salinas, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D23-2406-CM-17359
Opinion by Judge Weissmann Judges May and Scheele concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 1 of 8 Weissmann, Judge.
[1] After being arrested and handcuffed on outstanding felony warrants, Darmon
Farral fled from officers before they could place him in a police car. Convicted
of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, he appeals, claiming the
State failed to prove officers ordered him to stop after he started to run. Farral
misunderstands the elements of the offense. We affirm.
Facts [2] In June 2024, police officers went to an apartment complex to execute multiple
outstanding felony warrants on Farral. Uniformed officers knocked on Farral’s
apartment door, identified themselves as police, and explained that they needed
him to come out because they had warrants for his arrest. When Farral
eventually emerged, an officer told him he was being arrested for the warrants
and handcuffed Farral’s hands behind his back. Farral told the officer that he
knew about the warrants and then sighed, stating: “F***, here we go with this
sh** again.” State’s Exh. 1, 10:11-13 (footage from officer’s body-worn
camera).
[3] Officers walked Farral outside to the parking lot where approximately four
other uniformed officers were waiting. Farral told his girlfriend, who was
standing nearby, that he loved her and asked the officers if he could kiss her
goodbye. Rather than directly answering, an officer stated a few seconds later,
to either Farral or another nearby officer: “Stay right here with him.” Id. at
10:39-40. Farral remained in place.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 2 of 8 [4] Then suddenly, Farral’s girlfriend shrieked and collapsed to the ground. The
next second, Farral took off in a sprint. Still handcuffed, he ran from officers for
about thirty seconds before he was apprehended. Upon recapture, Farral
candidly admitted he knew that he would be charged with resisting law
enforcement because of his flight. He stated: “That was the dumbest sh** ever.
That was stupid. Who the f*** runs from the police.” Id. at 12:10-17.
[5] Farral was charged with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement
pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (2023).1 Following a bench trial,
the court found Farral guilty, concluding that an order to stop could be implied
from the circumstances. At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of
180 days but offered a shorter, 30-day sentence if Farral waived his right to
appeal. Farral rejected this offer, concerned it punished the exercise of his
appellate rights. The trial court explicitly stated it would “not take into
account” the State’s proposed sentencing agreement. Tr. Vol. II, p. 93.
[6] Farral was ultimately sentenced to 80 days in county jail. The execution of his
sentence was stayed pending appeal, as the court found this matter was one of
“first impression” and acknowledged that “the Court of Appeals may have a
different opinion” on its ruling. Id. at 95, 84.
1 This statute was amended effective July 1, 2024, one month after the incident took place. But the section at issue here—section (a) —was not affected by the amendment. We also note that this statute has been amended again, to take effect July 1, 2025. But again, that amendment does not affect section (a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 3 of 8 Discussion and Decision [7] On appeal, Farral raises two issues: (1) whether sufficient evidence supports his
conviction; and (2) whether the State’s proposed sentencing agreement was
improper. Unpersuaded by his first argument and declining to address his
second, we affirm.
I. Sufficiency of Evidence [8] Farral argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
resisting law enforcement conviction. When reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom without reweighing evidence or
reassessing witness credibility. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007).
We will affirm the conviction “unless no reasonable [factfinder] could find the
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation
omitted). The evidence need not “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.” Id. at 147 (citation omitted).
[9] Farral was convicted of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement under
Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3). That statute requires proof that a person
“knowingly or intentionally . . . fle[d] from a law enforcement officer after the
officer ha[d], by visible or audible means, including operation of the law
enforcement officer’s siren or emergency lights, identified himself or herself and
ordered the person to stop.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3). Farral does not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 4 of 8 dispute that he fled from officers who had identified themselves, but he
contends the State failed to prove he was ordered to stop.2
[10] Farral claims that Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) requires that an officer
“orders the defendant to stop after he begins his flight and he continues to flee.”
Appellant’s Br., p. 7 (emphasis in original). He states: “A command to stop
after the person starts to leave is an essential part of the statute.” Id. Based on
this interpretation, Farral argues that the State failed to meet its burden because
the officers did not order him to stop after he began running away.
[11] Farral misreads the statute. Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) criminalizes
fleeing from an officer “after the officer” identifies himself and orders the person
to stop. Id. (emphasis added). Because the statute specifies that flight occurs
“after” the order to stop, the order to stop necessarily must precede the flight or,
if the flight has already begun, must precede the continued flight. Farral’s
argument that the officer must give the command after the flight has begun has
no basis in the text of the statute, and he points to no caselaw to support his
proposition.
[12] The record provides ample support for the conclusion that Farral was properly
ordered to stop before he fled from officers. An order to stop can be verbal or
visual, and “evidence of a proper visual order to stop is based on the
2 Although Farral argued at trial that these facts more appropriately support the offense of escape from lawful detention, he abandons such argument on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 5 of 8 circumstances surrounding the incident and whether a reasonable person would
have known that he or she had been ordered to stop.” Fowler v. State, 878
N.E.2d 889, 894-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Here, an officer stated, “Stay right
here with him,” to either Farral or another officer nearby. State’s Exh. 1, 10:39-
40. Regardless of whom the officer was addressing, this directive made clear
that Farral was to stay put.
[13] Additionally, the surrounding circumstances would lead any reasonable person
to understand they had been ordered to stop. Farral had just been arrested,
handcuffed, and escorted outside by multiple officers—clear demonstrations
that he was not free to leave. Farral told officers that he was aware of his
outstanding warrants, and he understood that he was being taken into custody,
as evidenced by his request to say goodbye to his girlfriend. Then, upon his
recapture, Farral said: “That was stupid. Who the f*** runs from the police.”
Id. at 12:10-17.
[14] These circumstances are more than enough to constitute an order to stop. See,
e.g., Conley v. State, 57 N.E.3d 836, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (finding hand
gesture from uniformed officer constituted order to stop). And though Farral
points to the absence of police sirens or lights—circumstances noted in the
statute—these are merely examples and do not constitute an exhaustive list of
ways a person may be ordered to stop. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3)
(explaining that the order to stop and the identification of officers can be by
visible or audible means, “including” the activation of sirens and lights).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 6 of 8 II. Sentencing Agreement [15] Farral also takes issue with the State’s offer to agree to a shorter sentence in
exchange for his agreement to waive his right to appeal. Farral acknowledges
that he rejected this offer and that the trial court specifically stated it would not
consider the proposal. Additionally, Farral makes no claim that the discussion
of a sentencing agreement harmed him, and he does not challenge the 80-day
sentence that the trial court ultimately imposed.
[16] Instead, Farral asks this Court for a general declaration that “any request made
to a convicted Defendant to waive his appellate rights in exchange for a shorter
sentence is impermissible under Indiana Law.” Appellant’s Br., p. 10. But
because Farral rejected the State’s proposal and alleges no harm to him from
the mere offer, Farral essentially seeks an advisory opinion about a future,
hypothetical situation unrelated to any request for relief in his case. We do not
render advisory opinions. Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 786 (Ind. 2011) (“[A]
cardinal principle of the judicial function is that courts should not issue
advisory opinions but instead should decide cases only on the specific facts of
the particular case and not on hypothetical situations.”). We therefore decline
Farral’s invitation to speak on an issue not properly before us.
Conclusion [17] We find sufficient evidence supports Farral’s conviction for resisting law
enforcement, as he was ordered to stop before fleeing. We do not address
Farral’s request for an advisory opinion as to the rejected sentencing agreement.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 7 of 8 [18] Affirmed.
May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Steven J. Halbert Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jesse R. Drum Assistant Section Chief, Criminal Appeals Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2359 | June 19, 2025 Page 8 of 8