Darley Ex Rel. Darley v. Daisy Manufacturing Co.

566 F. Supp. 2d 544
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedSeptember 19, 2008
Docket1:04-cv-00241
StatusPublished

This text of 566 F. Supp. 2d 544 (Darley Ex Rel. Darley v. Daisy Manufacturing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Darley Ex Rel. Darley v. Daisy Manufacturing Co., 566 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Tex. 2008).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENCE

SCHELL, District Judge.

Now before the Court are:

(1) Defendant Denton Sports Sales, Inc. d/b/a T & Sons’ Amended Motion to *545 Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment with Supporting Brief, filed May 3, 2005 [Dkt. # 30];
(2) Joint Motion of Defendants Daisy and Denton Sports to Exclude Plaintiffs Evidence, Including Expert Testimony, or, Alternatively, Motion in Limine, with Supporting Brief, filed August 5, 2005 [Dkt. ## 33 & 34]; and
(3) Defendant Daisy Manufacturing Co.’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Supporting Brief, filed August 8, 2005 [Dkt. # 35],

After a thorough review of the evidence, parties’ pleadings, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendant Denton Sports Sales Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, GRANTS Defendant Daisy Manufacturing Co.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs Evidence.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Lon Jackson Darley III, as Guardian and Next Friend for Lon Jackson Darley IV, initiated this suit in Texas state court, asserting state products liability claims for strict liability, negligence and gross negligence. Pl.’s Original Pet. at ¶¶ 14 & 20. Defendants Daisy Manufacturing Co. (“Daisy”) and Denton Sports Sales, Inc. (“Denton Sports”) subsequently removed the suit to this court. Notice of Removal at 1.

The facts underlying Plaintiffs suit are few and straightforward. On July 20, 1999, Plaintiff Lon Jackson Darley IV suffered a serious and permanently debilitating brain injury after he was accidentally shot by a friend in the head with a Daisy Model 880 Air Gun .177 Cal. (4.5 mm). Pl.’s Original Pet. at ¶¶ 9-11. Plaintiff alleges that the accident and resulting injuries were proximately caused by a defect in the design and manufacturing process of the gun which permitted a BB to lodge surreptitiously in the gun’s virtual magazine. Id. at ¶ 20. Based on this belief, Plaintiff filed the present suit against Defendant Daisy, the designer and manufacturer of the gun, and Defendant Denton Sports, the retailer from which Plaintiffs stepfather purchased the gun. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Defendants now move this court for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 obligates a court to grant summary judgment if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (stating that a dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”).

While the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of satisfying Rule 56(c)’s two-pronged standard, the manner in which this burden is discharged depends on the allocation of the burdens of proof at trial. Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on a claim or defense at trial, that party must come forward with evidence that shows “beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of [that] claim or defense” in order to prevail on its motion for summary judgment. Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir.1986). Alternatively, where, as in the present case, the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on *546 the claims at trial, its burden may be discharged by simply showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the claims asserted. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the moving party discharges its burden under Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory unless the non-moving party sets forth “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In this regard, it is important to note that a court may not grant summary judgment simply because the non-moving party fails to oppose it — even if the failure violates a local rule. See Hibernia Nat’l Bank v. Administracion Central Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir.1985). Alternatively, when faced with an unopposed motion for summary judgment, courts are obliged to treat it as such by accepting the moving party’s description of the undisputed facts as pri-ma facie evidence of its entitlement to judgment. Local Rule CV-7(d); Eversley v. MBank of Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 173-74 (5th Cir.1988).

III. DISCUSSION

In the instant case, Defendants Denton Sports and Daisy move, in separate motions, for summary judgment on Plaintiffs product liability claims. Because Plaintiff did not respond to either of Defendants’ Motions, the court accepts Defendants’ description of the pertinent facts as prima facie evidence of their entitlement to summary judgment. Local Rule CV-7(d); Eversley, 843 F.2d at 173-74. For the following reasons, the court accordingly grants Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment.

a. Defendant Denton Sports’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Denton Sports, as the alleged retailer of the Daisy Model 880 Air Gun, relies on Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 82.003 to support its Motion for Summary Judgment. Section 82.003 provides that a non-manufacturing seller of a product is not liable for harm caused by the product unless the claimant proves one of seven statutory exceptions contained therein. Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 82.003. As Denton Sports has adduced undisputed evidence that negates each of the pertinent exceptions contained in section 82.003, see F. Hensley Aff. at 2 and L. Hensley Aff. at 2, the court finds that Denton Sports has met its burden under Rule 56(c) of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this case and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Marian Fontenot, Etc. v. The Upjohn Company
780 F.2d 1190 (Fifth Circuit, 1986)
McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc.
416 S.W.2d 787 (Texas Supreme Court, 1967)
V. Mueller & Co. v. Corley
570 S.W.2d 140 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1978)

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566 F. Supp. 2d 544, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/darley-ex-rel-darley-v-daisy-manufacturing-co-txed-2008.