Darlene Stieh v. Mark Stieh, Sr.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: July 30, 2025
• Docket: A-1711-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1711-23

DARLENE STIEH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MARK STIEH, SR.,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted May 7, 2025 – Decided July 30, 2025

Before Judges Currier and Torregrossa-O'Connor.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FM-09-0407-17.

Robert J. Pompliano, attorney for appellant.

Feintuch, Porwich & Feintuch, attorneys for respondent (Alan S. Porwich, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Mark Stieh, Sr., appeals from a November 9, 2023 Family Part

order terminating his alimony obligation to plaintiff Darlene Stieh, but requiring defendant to pay plaintiff $34,350 in alimony arrears up through that date

contemporaneously entering a final judgment of divorce (FJOD). He also

appeals the court's January 19, 2024 order denying his motion for

reconsideration. On review of the record in light of applicable legal principles,

we affirm.

I.

Plaintiff and defendant were married on September 8, 1990, and plaintiff

filed a complaint for divorce in 2016 citing irreconcilable differences. Plaintiff

sought joint legal custody and primary physical custody of their unemancipated

child, child support, alimony, and equitable distribution.

Before trial commenced on March 28, 2018, the court granted a limited

judgment of divorce from bed and board (LJD), and the parties entered a

handwritten marital settlement agreement (MSA). The MSA required defendant

to pay "open durational alimony of $150[] per week, effective April 13, [2018]."

The MSA described the amount as based on "an imputed annual income of

$75,000[] to defendant and $50,000[] to plaintiff." The MSA required defendant

to continue to pay $176 per week in child support to plaintiff, set by a prior order

predating the divorce complaint. It also compelled plaintiff to maintain through

her employment medical insurance for defendant and their child.

A-1711-23 2 The MSA expressly stipulated: "Alimony shall cease upon plaintiff

obtaining a final judgment of absolute divorce or further order of the court as a

result of a change in circumstances, including, but not limited to the parties'

respective health and defendant's ability to work overtime."

In March 2019, plaintiff filed a motion seeking in relevant part an order

requiring defendant to satisfy his alimony arrears. The parties resolved the

matter by entering a consent order on May 23, 2019. The consent order fixed

alimony arrears at $8,400—the amount defendant owed to plaintiff between

April 13, 2018 and May 10, 2019. The parties subsequently agreed to further

credits owed to defendant and entered a consent order stating $316.60 was owed

in alimony arrears as of May 10, 2019.

Because defendant was terminated from his employment in April 2019,

the parties agreed defendant would make direct payments to Probation rather

than through wage garnishment. The consent order also contained the following

provision:

Any future alimony and child support payments made by defendant shall be without prejudice to any future application by defendant to seek a modification of alimony and/or child support to be paid by defendant, based upon a change in the economic circumstances of the parties. Any such application shall only be retroactive to the filing date of such application.

A-1711-23 3 On January 14, 2020, defendant filed a motion to modify alimony, based

on an alleged "change of circumstances." Defendant contended his overtime

hours were reduced and he lost his job due to a work-related injury, and his

resulting workers' compensation payments of $700 weekly placed his income

"at approximately half of the agreed upon amount" in the MSA. He further

claimed that plaintiff now earned $70,000 per year, significantly above the

MSA-stipulated amount. He argued these events constituted changed

circumstances sufficient to warrant termination of his alimony obligations.

On February 5, 2020, before litigating or resolving the pending motion,

the court granted defendant's counsel's request to withdraw the motion.

Three years later, plaintiff moved to convert the LJD to an FJOD and to

enforce litigant's rights, requesting the court order defendant to pay the

outstanding alimony arrears.

In her supporting certification, plaintiff alleged defendant failed to pay

217 weeks of alimony between May 11, 2019 and July 7, 2023, amounting to

$32,550 with a $600 credit for the amount defendant paid during that period.

After twice obtaining adjournments for his responsive filing, defendant

filed opposition to plaintiff's motion and a cross-motion on October 25, 2023,

seeking an order terminating his alimony obligation "based upon a change in the

A-1711-23 4 parties' financial circumstances," and requesting the termination be made

retroactive to January 1, 2019. Specifically, defendant claimed (1) the MSA

provision setting alimony was contingent upon his earning at least $75,000 per

year—an amount including an anticipated twenty to thirty hours per week of

overtime—and his employer reduced overtime starting in January 2019; (2) he

was unemployed after sustaining work-related injuries in April 2019 and

September 2019, reducing his income to a $700 weekly workers' compensation

payment; (3) he was "granted an early retirement" and approved for Social

Security disability benefits of $1,763 per month; (4) "since the beginning of

2019[, he] never approached the agreed[-]upon annual sum of $75,000[] upon

which the alimony award was based," and "[p]laintiff was fully aware of [his]

catastrophic injury and that is w[h]y she never filed an application to enforce

the alimony award"; and (5) he did not owe alimony because the parties

"specifically agreed that the overtime issue was the predicate to claim alimony

based upon the difference in [their] annual incomes." Defendant attached

documents regarding his workers' compensation and Social Security awards.

On October 31, 2023, plaintiff filed opposition contending (1) retroactive

forgiveness of arrears defendant accrued over four years would now be

inequitable and contrary to the parties' prior agreements; (2) defendant's

A-1711-23 5 application for retroactive termination as of January 1, 2019 ignored the plain

language of the May 2019 consent order providing for retroactivity to the date

of filing; (3) defendant's obligation to pay weekly alimony in the amount of $150

was "not an onerous amount" in light of plaintiff's providing defendant with

"medical, dental, prescription drug and vision insurance"; and (4) defendant's

claim for retroactive termination should fail as the motion was filed after her

initial motion seeking an FJOD.

On November 9, 2023, the court issued an FJOD granting plaintiff's

request to convert the LJD to an FJOD, and incorporated into its terms the MSA.

In that order, the court also granted plaintiff's request to enter judgment against

defendant for alimony arrears in the amount of $34,350. In a companion order

of the same date, the court stated the award constituted the total arrears after 233

weeks of nonpayment between May 11, 2018 and November 9, 2023, and

ordered credit of $600. The court "reject[ed] defendant's argument that his open

durational alimony was contingent on him earning $75,000 annually," finding

the MSA imputed defendant's income to be $75,000.

The court also denied in its entirety defendant's cross-motion to modify

the spousal support amount and to make the adjustment retroactive to January

1, 2019. The court relied on the MSA's language as controlling, citing

A-1711-23 6 applicable caselaw, and finding no basis to disregard "the sanctity of [the]

private contract[]" between the parties as defendant failed to "demonstrate[] any

unconscionability, fraud or overreaching in the agreement" or that the MSA's

provisions were "unjust or inequitable." As defendant had never moved to adjust

alimony before plaintiff filed for the FJOD, the court denied any application for

retroactive consideration. The court further noted defendant provided no

information regarding the nature of his April 2019 injury and never filed a Case

Information Statement in response to plaintiff's application seeking alimony

arrears.

The order granted plaintiff's request that defendant's arrears be payable

out of defendant's share of plaintiff's pension, ordering a Qualified Domestic

Relation Order be prepared to reflect this requirement.

Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the MSA's

designation of imputed income was not intended to control alimony, and

reiterating that overtime was "[t]he sole basis upon which the alimony

determination was made." He also claimed that he was not unemployed or

under-employed voluntarily and the circumstances had changed, making his and

plaintiff's base incomes "almost the same." Defendant argued the MSA and May

2019 consent order specifically identified his loss of overtime as a basis for

A-1711-23 7 termination of alimony, "in addition to any other valid change in circumstance

to [his] income." Defendant argued that his financial circumstances resulted in

his losing his residence and requested that the court retroactively terminate his

alimony obligation as "[i]t was unequivocal that [the parties'] intentions were

that if [defendant's] overtime ended, [his] alimony responsibility would also

end."

Plaintiff filed opposition, citing the language from the parties' 2019

consent order regarding the retroactive application only to the date of the filing

of any request to modify or terminate alimony or child support awards. She

argued that any of defendant's efforts "to eliminate his alimony arrears before

he filed his cross-motion on or about October 25, 2023" were not litigated and

"should be rejected."

Defendant provided a supplemental certification, indicating his prior

attorney's illness and death "resulted in a great delay in securing any and all

records that [he] could get to address the [c]ourt's concern when [he] initially

opposed [plaintiff]'s claim for alimony." He indicated his homelessness and job

loss further impeded his ability to locate necessary financial data and medical

records. Defendant attached a medical examination report completed in

connection with his workers' compensation case.

A-1711-23 8 On January 19, 2024, the court denied reconsideration. It reasoned

defendant added "nothing new in the current application warranting

reconsideration," noting defendant's January 14, 2020 motion, filed while he was

represented by his former attorney, was "almost identical" to the relief sought

in his later motion. The court found comparison of the two filings "directly

rebut[ted]" defendant's argument that his prior attorney's death caused the delay

and found no basis to entertain defendant's belated challenges.

II.

Defendant now appeals the portions of the court's November 2023 orders

compelling payment of $34,350 in alimony arrears, arguing the court erred in

requiring alimony arrear payments through November 9, 2023. Specifically,

defendant argues the parties "determined two events which would end"

defendant's alimony obligation to plaintiff in their MSA: (1) conversion of the

LJD to an FJOD; and (2) defendant's "health deterioration or his loss of overtime

pay."

Defendant asserts that, after withdrawing his January 2020 application, "a

great number of obstacles . . . delayed" his moving for relief until October 2023.

He argues that the time of "the onset of the substantial change in

circumstance . . . controls modifications of alimony." He also contends that

A-1711-23 9 because he withdrew without prejudice his January 2020 motion, that prior filing

date allows for retroactive modification of his alimony obligation and

adjustment of arrears to that date. Specifically, he claims his October 2023

cross-motion "relate[d]" back to the original motion, drawing an analogy to

amendments to pleadings under Rule 4:9-3. Defendant asserts plaintiff

acquiesced to defendant's declining to pay alimony for approximately four years,

showing she had notice and awareness of defendant's changed circumstances,

which also demonstrated alimony "was unnecessary."

Defendant additionally appeals the court's order denying reconsideration,

arguing that he submitted a medical report confirming his work-related injuries

and his Social Security award supporting his claim and thus "form[ing] the basis

to reduce and/or terminate alimony."

Plaintiff reiterates her arguments made before the trial court, contending

the MSA and March 2019 consent order amply support the court's denial of

defendant's motion to retroactively modify or terminate alimony. Plaintiff

asserts that defendant never litigated a motion to modify alimony, and his 2020

filing was withdrawn and dismissed, undermining any claim that it triggered the

consent order's retroactivity provision.

A-1711-23 10 III.

This court's review of Family Part orders is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare,

154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). "We review the Family Part judge's findings in

accordance with a deferential standard of review, recognizing the court's 'special

jurisdiction and expertise in family matters.'" Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227

N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413). Therefore, "findings

by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial,

credible evidence." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc.

v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "[A]n appellate court should

not disturb the 'factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless

[it is] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with

the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the

interests of justice.'" Id. at 412 (second alteration in original) (quoting Rova

Farms, 65 N.J. at 484).

We review a trial court's decisions to modify or terminate alimony for an

abuse of discretion. See Rolnick v. Rolnick, 262 N.J. Super. 343, 360 (App.

Div. 1993); Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 584 (App. Div. 2013).

Conversely, we review de novo a family court's legal conclusions. See Thieme,

227 N.J. at 283.

A-1711-23 11 "New Jersey has long espoused a policy favoring the use of consensual

agreements to resolve marital controversies." Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158

N.J. 185, 193 (1999). "[F]air agreements arrived at by mutual consent 'should

not be unnecessarily or lightly disturbed.'" Edgerton v. Edgerton, 203 N.J.

Super. 160, 171 (App. Div. 1985) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 358

(1977)). "Agreements between separated spouses executed voluntarily and

understandingly for the purpose of settling the issue of [alimony and child

support] are specifically enforceable, but only to the extent that they are just and

equitable." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 48 (2016) (alteration in original)

(quoting Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 55 N.J. 564, 569 (1970)).

A trial court possesses the equitable authority to modify an agreement

upon a showing of changed circumstances, including "an increase in the cost of

living, an increase or decrease in the income of the supporting or supported

spouse, cohabitation of the dependent spouse, illness or disability arising after

the entry of the judgment, and changes in federal tax law." J.B. v. W.B., 215

N.J. 305, 327 (2013). Parties may agree on the circumstances constituting

changed circumstances, and generally "the court should defer to the

arrangements undertaken by the parties." Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 197.

A-1711-23 12 We conclude the court did not err in granting plaintiff's application for

alimony arrears and denying defendant's motion for retroactive termination or

reduction of that amount. The court properly enforced the plain language of the

MSA. The MSA provided for alimony based on agreed-upon imputed income

for both parties. We discern no misuse of discretion in the family court's

rejection of defendant's claim that the imputed income amounts were never

intended to provide the basis for alimony calculations. On the contrary, the

parties agreed to these amounts, which the MSA unambiguously provided would

only be terminated or altered by "plaintiff obtaining a final judgment of absolute

divorce or further order of the court as a result of a change in circumstances,

including, but not limited to, the parties' respective health and defendant's ability

to work overtime." There is no fair interpretation of this provision to suggest

that a decline in defendant's health or overtime created a self-fulfilling right to

reduction in alimony obviating the need for a court-ordered reduction.

The court appropriately enforced the language of the parties' MSA,

finding defendant failed to demonstrate that "the negotiated and fully executed

provisions of the MSA [we]re unjust or inequitable." The court appropriately

applied the MSA terms to find alimony terminated at the entry of the FJOD on

November 9, 2023. See Quinn, 225 N.J. at 52 (recognizing the trial court found

A-1711-23 13 the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly entered into an agreement designating

circumstances triggering termination of alimony).

Importantly, the court terminated alimony based on plaintiff's motion for

entry of the FJOD. It did not grant defendant's cross-motion, filed on October

25, 2023, months after plaintiff's initial filing. Thus, applying the terms of the

MSA, the court did not err in calculating the amount of alimony arrears.

Further, the May 2019 consent order unambiguously provided that any

alteration to the alimony set by the MSA upon a showing of changed

circumstances would "only be retroactive to the filing date of such application."

That defendant previously filed an application to terminate alimony years

prior—and voluntarily withdrew that application before litigating it—would not

warrant retroactive termination or adjustment of the alimony arrears.

We likewise conclude the court did not err in denying defendant's motion

for reconsideration. We review the trial court's denial of a motion for

reconsideration under an abuse of discretion standard. See Branch v. Cream-O-

Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). "Motions for reconsideration are

governed by Rule 4:49-2, which provides that the decision to grant or deny a

motion for reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the trial court."

Hoover v. Wetzler, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Pitney

A-1711-23 14 Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App.

Div. 2015)). Reconsideration should be granted only if the court made its

decision on a "palpably incorrect or irrational basis" or if the court failed to

consider or "appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence."

Triffin v. SHS Grp., LLC, 466 N.J. Super. 460, 466 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting

Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996)).

We discern no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of defendant's

motion for reconsideration. It found defendant raised nothing new in the motion

and reasoned defendant had all the resources and information necessary to make

his application for modification of alimony since the time of his initial filing in

2020. We are satisfied the court analyzed defendant's arguments under the

appropriate standard and did not misapply its discretion in denying

reconsideration.

Affirmed.

A-1711-23 15