MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Apr 19 2016, 6:16 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Peter D. Todd Gregory F. Zoeller Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Chandra K. Hein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Darius L. Crockett, April 19, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A03-1509-CR-1282 v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff. Evan S. Roberts, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D01-1406-FD-693
Kirsch, Judge.
[1] Following a jury trial, Darius L. Crockett (“Crockett”) was convicted of Class
D felony domestic battery in the presence of a child less than sixteen years of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1509-CR-1282 | April 19, 2016 Page 1 of 7 age1 and Class D felony theft.2 He appeals and raises the following restated
issue: whether the trial court properly instructed the jury.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In November 2013, Crockett was living with his then-girlfriend (“Girlfriend”)
and her two young children. He punched Girlfriend in the face in the presence
of her children, and he shoved her to the ground and pinned her there, with her
one-year-old child underneath her. Crockett thereafter threatened Girlfriend
with a steak knife, and before leaving the premises, he took Girlfriend’s keys
and cell phone from her. In June 2014, the State charged him with one count of
Class D felony domestic battery and one count of Class D felony theft.
[4] A jury trial was conducted. The record before us reflects that, on the morning
of the second day of trial, counsel for both parties met with the trial court in
chambers “to begin work on the final instructions.” Tr. at 300. Once back on
the record, the trial court summarized what had transpired and, as is relevant
here, stated:
The Court has granted the defendant’s request, without objection, as to providing the jury necessary lesser included
1 See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(2), (b)(2). We note that the statutes under which Crockett was charged were amended effective July 1, 2014. However, he committed his offenses in November 2013, and we apply the statutes in effect at that time. 2 See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1509-CR-1282 | April 19, 2016 Page 2 of 7 offenses of Domestic Battery, as a Class A Misdemeanor; Battery, as a Class A Misdemeanor; Battery, as a Class B Misdemeanor; and Criminal Conversion, as a Class A Misdemeanor. In addition, the Court has modified the final instructions to avoid confusing the jury with reference to the verdict form[.]
Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
[5] The referenced verdict form instruction provided the following explanation to
the jury about how to complete the verdict form:
I am submitting to you a Verdict Form you may return. The foreperson should sign and date the verdict to which you all agree. Do not sign any form for which there is not unanimous agreement. The foreperson must return the verdict form, signed or unsigned. You must address all counts and lesser included offenses as contained in the Verdict Form. By way of example only, if you find that the State of Indiana has met its burden of proof (that is, beyond a reasonable doubt) as to the Class D Felony of Domestic Battery, you should mark that Count Guilty; or, if you find that the State of Indiana has not met its burden of proof (that is, beyond a reasonable doubt) as to the Class D Felony of Domestic Battery, you should mark that Count, Not Guilty.
Appellant’s App. at 49; Tr. at 302 (emphasis added). Crockett’s counsel lodged
an objection to the instruction as written and asked that the instruction use the
language “may” return a verdict of guilty instead of “should,” arguing that “it’s
more in line with the jury’s role as judges of the facts and the law[.]” Tr. at 301-
02. The trial court overruled the objection and later read the instruction to the
jury. Id. at 408-09.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1509-CR-1282 | April 19, 2016 Page 3 of 7 [6] The jury found Crockett guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to
three years of incarceration for the Class D felony domestic battery conviction
and one year for the Class D felony theft conviction, to be served consecutively.
He now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [7] Crockett claims it was error to instruct the jury that, if it determined that the
State had met its burden of proof on a charged offense, then it “should” mark
that count as guilty. Initially, we observe that, aside from the standard of
review and reciting the instruction at issue, Crockett’s argument consists of two
sentences, and he cites to no case law in support of his argument. Appellant’s Br.
at 2. Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) provides in relevant part, “The argument
must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented supported
by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the
authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied
on.” A party waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent
argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.
Lyles v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1035, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly,
Crockett has waived this issue for appellate review.
[8] Waiver notwithstanding, we find no error. In reviewing challenges to jury
instructions, we afford great deference to the trial court. R.T. v. State, 848
N.E.2d 326, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. The manner of instructing
the jury lies within the trial court’s sound discretion. Id. Jury instructions will
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1509-CR-1282 | April 19, 2016 Page 4 of 7 be considered as a whole and not individually, and a court does not necessarily
abuse its discretion by giving an erroneous instruction. Womack v. State, 738
N.E.2d 320, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. To find that the court
abused its discretion by giving an erroneous instruction, we must find that the
instructions taken as a whole misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury. Id.
A defendant is only entitled to a reversal if he affirmatively demonstrates that
the instructional error prejudiced his substantial rights. Snell v. State, 866
N.E.2d 392, 396 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[9] Crockett argues that the use of the word “should” in the instruction – i.e., “if
you find … then you should” – was erroneous. He suggests that the phrase
“may return a verdict” of guilty or not guilty “more properly states the role of
the jury.” Appellant’s Br. at 2. We believe that Crockett’s argument is that the
instruction impermissibly impinged upon the jury’s role under Article I, section
19 of the Indiana Constitution, which states: “In all criminal cases whatever,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Apr 19 2016, 6:16 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Peter D. Todd Gregory F. Zoeller Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Chandra K. Hein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Darius L. Crockett, April 19, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A03-1509-CR-1282 v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff. Evan S. Roberts, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D01-1406-FD-693
Kirsch, Judge.
[1] Following a jury trial, Darius L. Crockett (“Crockett”) was convicted of Class
D felony domestic battery in the presence of a child less than sixteen years of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1509-CR-1282 | April 19, 2016 Page 1 of 7 age1 and Class D felony theft.2 He appeals and raises the following restated
issue: whether the trial court properly instructed the jury.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In November 2013, Crockett was living with his then-girlfriend (“Girlfriend”)
and her two young children. He punched Girlfriend in the face in the presence
of her children, and he shoved her to the ground and pinned her there, with her
one-year-old child underneath her. Crockett thereafter threatened Girlfriend
with a steak knife, and before leaving the premises, he took Girlfriend’s keys
and cell phone from her. In June 2014, the State charged him with one count of
Class D felony domestic battery and one count of Class D felony theft.
[4] A jury trial was conducted. The record before us reflects that, on the morning
of the second day of trial, counsel for both parties met with the trial court in
chambers “to begin work on the final instructions.” Tr. at 300. Once back on
the record, the trial court summarized what had transpired and, as is relevant
here, stated:
The Court has granted the defendant’s request, without objection, as to providing the jury necessary lesser included
1 See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(2), (b)(2). We note that the statutes under which Crockett was charged were amended effective July 1, 2014. However, he committed his offenses in November 2013, and we apply the statutes in effect at that time. 2 See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1509-CR-1282 | April 19, 2016 Page 2 of 7 offenses of Domestic Battery, as a Class A Misdemeanor; Battery, as a Class A Misdemeanor; Battery, as a Class B Misdemeanor; and Criminal Conversion, as a Class A Misdemeanor. In addition, the Court has modified the final instructions to avoid confusing the jury with reference to the verdict form[.]
Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
[5] The referenced verdict form instruction provided the following explanation to
the jury about how to complete the verdict form:
I am submitting to you a Verdict Form you may return. The foreperson should sign and date the verdict to which you all agree. Do not sign any form for which there is not unanimous agreement. The foreperson must return the verdict form, signed or unsigned. You must address all counts and lesser included offenses as contained in the Verdict Form. By way of example only, if you find that the State of Indiana has met its burden of proof (that is, beyond a reasonable doubt) as to the Class D Felony of Domestic Battery, you should mark that Count Guilty; or, if you find that the State of Indiana has not met its burden of proof (that is, beyond a reasonable doubt) as to the Class D Felony of Domestic Battery, you should mark that Count, Not Guilty.
Appellant’s App. at 49; Tr. at 302 (emphasis added). Crockett’s counsel lodged
an objection to the instruction as written and asked that the instruction use the
language “may” return a verdict of guilty instead of “should,” arguing that “it’s
more in line with the jury’s role as judges of the facts and the law[.]” Tr. at 301-
02. The trial court overruled the objection and later read the instruction to the
jury. Id. at 408-09.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1509-CR-1282 | April 19, 2016 Page 3 of 7 [6] The jury found Crockett guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to
three years of incarceration for the Class D felony domestic battery conviction
and one year for the Class D felony theft conviction, to be served consecutively.
He now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [7] Crockett claims it was error to instruct the jury that, if it determined that the
State had met its burden of proof on a charged offense, then it “should” mark
that count as guilty. Initially, we observe that, aside from the standard of
review and reciting the instruction at issue, Crockett’s argument consists of two
sentences, and he cites to no case law in support of his argument. Appellant’s Br.
at 2. Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) provides in relevant part, “The argument
must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented supported
by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the
authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied
on.” A party waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent
argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.
Lyles v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1035, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly,
Crockett has waived this issue for appellate review.
[8] Waiver notwithstanding, we find no error. In reviewing challenges to jury
instructions, we afford great deference to the trial court. R.T. v. State, 848
N.E.2d 326, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. The manner of instructing
the jury lies within the trial court’s sound discretion. Id. Jury instructions will
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1509-CR-1282 | April 19, 2016 Page 4 of 7 be considered as a whole and not individually, and a court does not necessarily
abuse its discretion by giving an erroneous instruction. Womack v. State, 738
N.E.2d 320, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. To find that the court
abused its discretion by giving an erroneous instruction, we must find that the
instructions taken as a whole misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury. Id.
A defendant is only entitled to a reversal if he affirmatively demonstrates that
the instructional error prejudiced his substantial rights. Snell v. State, 866
N.E.2d 392, 396 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[9] Crockett argues that the use of the word “should” in the instruction – i.e., “if
you find … then you should” – was erroneous. He suggests that the phrase
“may return a verdict” of guilty or not guilty “more properly states the role of
the jury.” Appellant’s Br. at 2. We believe that Crockett’s argument is that the
instruction impermissibly impinged upon the jury’s role under Article I, section
19 of the Indiana Constitution, which states: “In all criminal cases whatever,
the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.” In Wright v.
State, 730 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ind. 2000), our Supreme Court considered and
rejected a defendant’s challenge to similar instructions, which read:
Instruction 15
The State has the burden of proving that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. . . . If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you should find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1509-CR-1282 | April 19, 2016 Page 5 of 7 that he is not guilty, you should give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.
Instruction 21
I submit this case to you with the confidence that you will faithfully discharge the grave duty resting upon you, bearing in mind that the liberty of the accused is not to be trifled away nor taken by careless or inconsiderate judgment; but if after a careful consideration of the law and the evidence in the case you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, you should return your verdict accordingly. Duty demands it and the law requires it.
Id. at 716 (record citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[10] The Wright Court held that Instructions 15 and 21, which “inform[ed] the jurors
that if they conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty,
they should return a verdict of guilty,” did not violate Article I, Section 19. Id.
The Court further opined, “The instructions are hardly offensive to any of our
fundamental precepts of criminal justice[.]” Id.; see also Morgan v. State, 755
N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (Ind. 2001) (recognizing that trial court’s use of word
“should” in instruction does not violate Article I, Section 19). So long as the
jury is instructed on the elements of the crime, that it is judge of the law and the
facts, and that it is to consider all the instructions as they relate to each other,
“[I]t is proper to tell the jury it ‘should’ convict.” Wright, 730 N.E.2d at 716.
[11] Here, the trial court instructed the jurors that they had the right to determine
both the law and the facts. Tr. at 394; Appellant’s App. at 32, 56. It also
instructed the jury as to the elements of the offenses, that all instructions must Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1509-CR-1282 | April 19, 2016 Page 6 of 7 be considered together, that Crockett was entitled to the presumption of
innocence, and that the State had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Tr. at 394, 399-401; Appellant’s App. at 32, 34, 39, 58, 62. Taking the
instructions as a whole, the language of the challenged instruction did not
invade the province of the jury or require it to follow a certain course of action.
Crockett has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in
the manner in which it instructed the jury. See Burgett v. State, 758 N.E.2d 571,
577 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting defendant’s argument that phrase “you
should find him guilty” is mandatory and invades province of jury, as jury still
had right “to determine law and facts” as required by Article I, Section 19 of
Indiana Constitution), trans. denied.
[12] Affirmed.
[13] Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1509-CR-1282 | April 19, 2016 Page 7 of 7