Darius Dashawn Anderson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 18, 2017
• Docket: 71A04-1611-CR-2693
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), May 18 2017, 10:10 am

this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK Indiana Supreme Court regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals and Tax Court court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Sean P. Hilgendorf Curtis T. Hill, Jr. South Bend, Indiana Attorney General

Matthew B. MacKenzie Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Darius Anderson, May 18, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 71A04-1611-CR-2693 v. Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Jane Woodward Appellee-Plaintiff Miller, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 71D01-1603-F3-20

Crone, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1611-CR-2693 | May 18, 2017 Page 1 of 6 Case Summary [1] Darius Anderson appeals his convictions, following a bench trial, for two

counts of level 3 felony attempted robbery. Anderson asserts that the State

presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Finding the evidence

sufficient, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History The evidence most favorable to the convictions indicates that on March 24,

2016, Candice Kramer and her friend Tiffany Hisler drove to Mishawaka to

pick up Anderson and his friend Dwayne Johnson. Hisler and Johnson

previously met on a dating website and had been talking to each other for a

couple weeks. After picking up Anderson and Johnson, Kramer and Hisler

drove back to Hisler’s apartment in Michigan where all four of them hung out

to “get to know each other” better. Tr. at 8. Toward the end of the evening,

Kramer agreed to drive Anderson and Johnson back to Mishawaka, but Hisler

told Johnson to give Kramer ten dollars for gas money. Johnson angrily gave

Kramer ten dollars for gas but told Hisler he was going to “beat [Kramer’s]

ass.” Id. at 49. On the way back to Mishawaka, the women sat in the front seat

of the car, and the men sat in the back seat. As they were driving, Johnson

texted Hisler that their relationship was over. Kramer could hear that

Anderson and Johnson were having a mumbled conversation, but she could not

make out what they were saying to each other. Unbeknownst to the women,

Johnson and Anderson were discussing what was “about to happen.” Id. at 85.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1611-CR-2693 | May 18, 2017 Page 2 of 6 [2] Johnson directed Kramer to drive to the very back of the parking lot by a

dumpster located in the Hickory Village Apartments. When Kramer parked the

car, Johnson and Anderson both pulled out handguns, pointed their guns at

Kramer and Hisler, and aggressively demanded both women’s belongings.

Both men reached over the seat and tried to grab Kramer’s bag that was sitting

next to the middle console. Johnson also tried to grab the gas money from

Hisler. Kramer held onto her bag, and as she tussled with both men, Johnson

stated, “[G]ive me all your shit bitch. Give me all your shit.” Id. at 41.

Johnson then exited the car and tried to open the passenger-side door where

Hisler was seated, but the door was locked. Simultaneously, Anderson exited

the car and opened the driver’s-side door and tried to pull Kramer and her bag

from the vehicle. Anderson punched Kramer in the face during the scuffle, but

she was able to keep control of her bag and shut and lock her door. Johnson

and Anderson then fled the scene together while Kramer and Hisler drove to a

church and called the police. When police eventually located Johnson and

Anderson in a nearby apartment complex, they were still together.

[3] The State charged Anderson with two counts of level 3 felony attempted

robbery. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Anderson guilty as

charged. The court sentenced Anderson to four years executed on each count,

to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of eight years. This appeal

ensued.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1611-CR-2693 | May 18, 2017 Page 3 of 6 Discussion and Decision [4] Anderson contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his

attempted robbery convictions. When reviewing a claim of insufficient

evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Bell v.

State, 31 N.E.3d 495, 499 (Ind. 2015). We look to the evidence and reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom that support the conviction, and will affirm if there

is probative evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In short, if the testimony

believed by the trier of fact is enough to support the conviction, then the

reviewing court will not disturb it. Id. at 500.

[5] To convict Anderson of his offenses as charged, the State was required to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that, while armed with a deadly weapon, Anderson

knowingly or intentionally attempted to take property from Kramer and Hisler

by threatening the use of force. See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-5-1 (robbery), 35-41-5-1

(attempt). Additionally, a “person who knowingly or intentionally aids,

induces, or causes another to commit an offense, commits that offense ….”

Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. “It is well settled that there is no distinction between the

responsibility of a principal and an accomplice.” Stokes v. State, 919 N.E.2d

1240, 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Anderson asserts that while the

evidence is sufficient to prove that Johnson1 was armed with a handgun and

1 The record indicates that Johnson pled guilty to one count of level 3 felony attempted robbery. Tr. at 74. He testified at Anderson’s bench trial as a prosecution witness.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1611-CR-2693 | May 18, 2017 Page 4 of 6 attempted to take property from both women by threatening the use of force,

there was an “evidentiary discrepancy” regarding whether Anderson was armed

and his level of participation in these crimes, and therefore there was

insufficient evidence to convict him as either a principal or an accomplice.

Appellant’s Br. at 8. We disagree.

[6] Kramer testified that both Anderson and Johnson were armed with handguns,

both men pointed their guns at the two victims, and both men aggressively

demanded both women’s belongings. See Tr. at 15. This testimony was

sufficient to support Anderson’s convictions of attempted robbery as a principal

with respect to both victims.

[7] Moreover, even assuming that Johnson was the principal perpetrator of the

crimes, factors generally considered in determining whether a person has aided

another in the commission of a crime include: (1) presence at the scene of the

crime; (2) companionship with another engaged in a crime; (3) failure to oppose

the commission of the crime; and (4) the course of conduct before, during, and

after the occurrence of the crime. Stokes, 919 N.E.2d at 1245. All four factors

overwhelmingly support a conclusion that Anderson knowingly or intentionally

aided Johnson in the commission of two attempted robberies. Indeed,

Anderson was no mere spectator to these crimes as he appears to suggest. The

evidence shows that after Johnson directed Kramer to drive to the back of the

parking lot, he and Anderson talked quietly about what was “about to happen.”

Tr. at 85. Anderson not only aggressively demanded both women’s belongings

while armed with a deadly weapon, but when Johnson exited the car and tried

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1611-CR-2693 | May 18, 2017 Page 5 of 6 to get money from Hisler, Anderson also exited the car and tried to grab

Kramer’s bag, punching her in the face during the struggle. The two men fled

the scene together and were still together when located by police. In sum, the

evidence supports Anderson’s convictions as both a principal and an

accomplice. Accordingly, we affirm.

[8] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Barnes, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1611-CR-2693 | May 18, 2017 Page 6 of 6