Opinion issued October 6, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-15-00649-CR ——————————— DARIOUS FABRIESE LINDSEY, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 351st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1435106
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A grand jury indicted Darious Lindsey for possession of a controlled
substance, namely cocaine. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115
(West 2009). After denying Lindsey’s motion to suppress, the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to confinement for one year. On appeal, Lindsey
challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Background
In July 2014, Houston Police Department Officers Turrentine and Duron
were surveilling a known crack house, where they had previously found illegal
narcotics sale activity. In the past, the police had made arrests of persons leaving
the house with narcotics. Turrentine saw a vehicle arrive at the house, park in the
driveway, stay for a couple of minutes, and then depart. Duron estimated that the
vehicle stayed in the driveway of the house for ten to fifteen minutes.
Turrentine and Duron did not observe whether any of the vehicle’s
occupants entered the house. After the vehicle left the driveway, Turrentine and
Duron followed it. The driver then failed to stop at a stop sign and turned without
signaling, at which point the police officers conducted a traffic stop. The driver
did not have a driver’s license or any other form of identification. Turrentine
arrested the driver for driving without a license and placed her in the back of the
police cruiser.
Turrentine asked Lindsey, who was a passenger in the car, to step out of the
vehicle. Turrentine testified that, “Immediately he’s extremely nervous, he’s
shaking, he’s looking around. So I know something is wrong with him just by his
demeanor.” Turrentine asked Lindsey whether he had any illegal drugs or a
2 weapon on his person. Lindsey admitted that he had a bottle of alprazolam in his
front left pocket for which he did not have a prescription. Turrentine removed the
bottle of alprazolam from Lindsey’s front pocket, opened it, and found the drug
and two rocks of crack cocaine inside. Officer Duron tagged, field-tested, and
stored the crack rocks. After Turrentine and Duron testified about the crack rocks,
Lindsey moved to suppress their testimony and the evidence of the crack cocaine
on the basis that the officers had no probable cause to detain Lindsey. The trial
court denied the motion, found Lindsey guilty of possession of a controlled
substance, and sentenced him to confinement for one year.
DISCUSSION
Lindsey argues that Turrentine’s order to exit the vehicle violated the Fourth
Amendment because it occurred after the traffic stop had been completed and the
driver was handcuffed in the police vehicle. He further contends that the officers
lacked a reasonable suspicion for detaining Lindsey for questioning.
I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We evaluate a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the weight and credibility of the
evidence and testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s determination of historical facts if
3 the record supports them. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493. We review de novo the trial
court’s application of the law to those facts. Id. “[T]he prevailing party is entitled
to ‘the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence.’” State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 465
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). A trial court’s ruling will be sustained if it is “reasonably
supported by the record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.”
Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Willover v.
State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
“Law enforcement and citizens engage in three distinct types of interactions:
(1) consensual encounters; (2) investigatory detentions; and (3) arrests.” State v.
Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (first citing Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991); and then citing Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111–12, 95 S. Ct. 854, 862; and then citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30–31, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884–85 (1968)). Consensual police-citizen
encounters do not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at 411 (citing
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S. Ct. at 2386). In contrast, if there is a detention, the
detaining officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person “is, has been, or
soon will be, engaged in criminal activity.” Id. (citing Florida v. Rodriguez, 469
U.S. 1, 5–6, 105 S. Ct. 308, 310–11 (1984)). A police officer has reasonable
4 suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational
inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person
detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Matthews v.
State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
We examine the reasonableness of a temporary investigative detention in
light of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an officer had an
objectively justifiable basis for the detention. Id. (first citing Terry, 392 U.S. at
21–22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880; and then citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417–18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, (1981)); Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002) (citing Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997)). Reasonable suspicion may exist even if the conduct of the person detained
is “as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity.” York v. State,
342 S.W.3d 528, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d
376, 378–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
When there is a warrantless arrest, the arresting officer must have “probable
cause to believe the same.” Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 410–11 (citing Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557 (2001)). Probable
cause to arrest exists when facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the
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Opinion issued October 6, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-15-00649-CR ——————————— DARIOUS FABRIESE LINDSEY, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 351st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1435106
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A grand jury indicted Darious Lindsey for possession of a controlled
substance, namely cocaine. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115
(West 2009). After denying Lindsey’s motion to suppress, the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to confinement for one year. On appeal, Lindsey
challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Background
In July 2014, Houston Police Department Officers Turrentine and Duron
were surveilling a known crack house, where they had previously found illegal
narcotics sale activity. In the past, the police had made arrests of persons leaving
the house with narcotics. Turrentine saw a vehicle arrive at the house, park in the
driveway, stay for a couple of minutes, and then depart. Duron estimated that the
vehicle stayed in the driveway of the house for ten to fifteen minutes.
Turrentine and Duron did not observe whether any of the vehicle’s
occupants entered the house. After the vehicle left the driveway, Turrentine and
Duron followed it. The driver then failed to stop at a stop sign and turned without
signaling, at which point the police officers conducted a traffic stop. The driver
did not have a driver’s license or any other form of identification. Turrentine
arrested the driver for driving without a license and placed her in the back of the
police cruiser.
Turrentine asked Lindsey, who was a passenger in the car, to step out of the
vehicle. Turrentine testified that, “Immediately he’s extremely nervous, he’s
shaking, he’s looking around. So I know something is wrong with him just by his
demeanor.” Turrentine asked Lindsey whether he had any illegal drugs or a
2 weapon on his person. Lindsey admitted that he had a bottle of alprazolam in his
front left pocket for which he did not have a prescription. Turrentine removed the
bottle of alprazolam from Lindsey’s front pocket, opened it, and found the drug
and two rocks of crack cocaine inside. Officer Duron tagged, field-tested, and
stored the crack rocks. After Turrentine and Duron testified about the crack rocks,
Lindsey moved to suppress their testimony and the evidence of the crack cocaine
on the basis that the officers had no probable cause to detain Lindsey. The trial
court denied the motion, found Lindsey guilty of possession of a controlled
substance, and sentenced him to confinement for one year.
DISCUSSION
Lindsey argues that Turrentine’s order to exit the vehicle violated the Fourth
Amendment because it occurred after the traffic stop had been completed and the
driver was handcuffed in the police vehicle. He further contends that the officers
lacked a reasonable suspicion for detaining Lindsey for questioning.
I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We evaluate a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the weight and credibility of the
evidence and testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s determination of historical facts if
3 the record supports them. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493. We review de novo the trial
court’s application of the law to those facts. Id. “[T]he prevailing party is entitled
to ‘the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence.’” State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 465
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). A trial court’s ruling will be sustained if it is “reasonably
supported by the record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.”
Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Willover v.
State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
“Law enforcement and citizens engage in three distinct types of interactions:
(1) consensual encounters; (2) investigatory detentions; and (3) arrests.” State v.
Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (first citing Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991); and then citing Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111–12, 95 S. Ct. 854, 862; and then citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30–31, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884–85 (1968)). Consensual police-citizen
encounters do not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at 411 (citing
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S. Ct. at 2386). In contrast, if there is a detention, the
detaining officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person “is, has been, or
soon will be, engaged in criminal activity.” Id. (citing Florida v. Rodriguez, 469
U.S. 1, 5–6, 105 S. Ct. 308, 310–11 (1984)). A police officer has reasonable
4 suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational
inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person
detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Matthews v.
State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
We examine the reasonableness of a temporary investigative detention in
light of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an officer had an
objectively justifiable basis for the detention. Id. (first citing Terry, 392 U.S. at
21–22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880; and then citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417–18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, (1981)); Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002) (citing Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997)). Reasonable suspicion may exist even if the conduct of the person detained
is “as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity.” York v. State,
342 S.W.3d 528, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d
376, 378–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
When there is a warrantless arrest, the arresting officer must have “probable
cause to believe the same.” Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 410–11 (citing Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557 (2001)). Probable
cause to arrest exists when facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the
arresting officer, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, would
warrant a reasonably prudent person in believing that a particular person has
5 committed or is committing a crime. State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999).
II. Analysis
Police may not extend a traffic stop once the tasks tied to the traffic
infraction have been completed. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614
(2015). Since traffic stops can be dangerous, however, it is permissible for police
to require a passenger to exit the vehicle to ensure officer safety during a traffic
stop without additional reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1616, 135; Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997).
Lindsey acknowledges that, according to Maryland v. Wilson, an officer may
order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop. See id. at.
415, 117 S. Ct. at 886. However, the traffic stop usually ends when the police have
no further need to control the scene, and inform the passengers they are free to
leave. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 325, 129 S. Ct. 781, 783 (2009).
Turrentine asked Lindsey to exit the vehicle after he determined that the driver had
no driver’s license or identification, placed the driver under arrest, and detained her
in the back seat of the police cruiser. The officers had yet to secure the vehicle,
determine whether Lindsey was authorized to drive the vehicle, or inventory its
contents. The traffic stop thus was not completed before Turrentine asked Lindsey
6 to exit the vehicle. As a result, the order did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
See id.
Lindsey relies on St. George v. State to contend that the officer’s questioning
was not based on any reasonable suspicion. 237 S.W.3d 720, 726 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). In St. George, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a request for
identification from a passenger after the completion of a traffic stop for an
inoperative license-plate light was impermissible absent reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. Id. But the facts in St. George are different from the facts
presented here. In St. George, the driver produced a driver’s license and had valid
inspection and registration stickers. Id. at 722. The officer continued questioning
the passenger for several minutes after the warning had issued and the traffic stop
was completed, and the officer told the passenger that his identification problem
had to be resolved before he could leave. Id. at 726.
In this case, Lindsey was a passenger in a vehicle that the officers followed
after it had parked for several minutes at a crack house. The driver of the car did
not have a driver’s license or any other identification, and she was placed in the
police cruiser. When Turrentine asked Lindsey to exit the car, Turrentine noticed
that Lindsey appeared extremely nervous and was shaking and looking around.
The facts in this case are more like those in Green v. State. 256 S.W.3d 456
(Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.). In Green, the court of appeals concluded that
7 stopping in front of a known drug house with someone, walking into the house,
nervousness, and initial noncompliance were sufficient to give rise to probable
cause to search Green’s truck. Id. at 465. Lindsey responds that nothing suggests
that the officers were in danger or connected Lindsey to a possible crime. His
presence in front of a crack house, his apparent nervousness, and the fact that
driver did not have a driver’s license issued to her or any other identification,
however, were sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion.
Once Lindsey stepped out of the vehicle, the trial court, based on the
combination of factors, reasonably could have concluded that the officers had
reasonable suspicion to detain him for further questioning. Once Lindsey
voluntarily admitted that he was carrying a controlled substance without a
prescription, the officers had probable cause to search Lindsey. See Sandoval v.
State, 860 S.W.2d 255, 259–60 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d);
Conclusion
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion
to suppress. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jane Bland Justice Panel consists of Justices Bland, Massengale, and Lloyd.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).